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Requirements Desk MCP server

com.forevenza.services/requirements-deskservices.forevenza.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Company, sanctions, SEC and federal award lookups, document conversion, and requirement capture.

8 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 2 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 4
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

6 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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What the Requirements Desk MCP server can do

The Requirements Desk MCP server is published by services.forevenza.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (submit_request and federal_contract_awards) and create or change data (4 tools: screen_sanctions, company_financial_facts, extract_web_page and convert_document), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (describe_proposition, screen_sanctions, company_financial_facts and 3 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (submit_request, federal_contract_awards, extract_web_page and 1 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • federal_contract_awardsPlumbline: US federal contract actions (awards and modifications) by vendor name, NAICS code, place-of-performance state and fiscal year, ten at a time, from FPDS, the government's…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "federal_contract_awards" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Plumbline: US federal contract actions (awards and modifications) by vendor name, NAICS code, place-of-performance state and fiscal year, ten at a time, from FPDS, the government's contract reporting system.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • submit_requestSend a requirement to any service, or describe one none of them lists (slug "anything-else").Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_request" says "submit": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The input carries an amount (input.budget.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
    • The input addresses people (input.geography.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.geography.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a requirement to any service, or describe one none of them lists (slug "anything-else"). It is recorded and answered with a receipt: keep its id and token to read the request's status (request_status), to add details later (continuation), and to act on an offer made in reply. A requirement is not an order and costs nothing; nothing is bought until an offer's exact terms are accepted.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • company_financial_factsPlumbline: Reported values of one XBRL concept for one SEC filer, by CIK or ticker, from its SEC filings (EDGAR): each value with its period, fiscal year, form, filing date and acc…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Plumbline: Reported values of one XBRL concept for one SEC filer, by CIK or ticker, from its SEC filings (EDGAR): each value with its period, fiscal year, form, filing date and accession number, the latest 40.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • convert_documentDecant: Convert an uploaded file (file_base64) or public URL: CSV and XLSX become JSON rows per sheet; text PDFs become text per page.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "convert_document" says "convert": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "convert_document" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "convert_document" says "convert": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decant: Convert an uploaded file (file_base64) or public URL: CSV and XLSX become JSON rows per sheet; text PDFs become text per page. Up to 5 MB decoded, 20,000 rows per sheet; no OCR, PDF table grids or schema extraction. No account or API key; free within the shared daily limit. Files are sent to Decant, processed in memory and not stored. URL fetching honours robots.txt. Send exactly one input; local files need not be published. For a large file, pass limit (and offset) to page the rows, since many hosts show only part of a long tool result. Raw-upload HTTP is also available.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • extract_web_pageDecant: Read one public web page into title, headings, text, links and JSON-LD.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decant: Read one public web page into title, headings, text, links and JSON-LD. robots.txt is honoured.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • screen_sanctionsPlumbline: Screen a person or company name against the US Treasury OFAC SDN list and its aliases (US OFAC SDN only: not the EU, UK or UN lists).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Plumbline: Screen a person or company name against the US Treasury OFAC SDN list and its aliases (US OFAC SDN only: not the EU, UK or UN lists). Returns each match with its score, SDN entry number, type and programs, and the date the list was published. A match is a lead for review, not a determination. The list is in Latin script: a name in Cyrillic, Greek, Georgian, Armenian, Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, Chinese, Korean or Japanese kana is screened by transliteration (screened: "TRANSLITERATED", with the forms and systems tried, what could not be read, and how each match was found), which is weaker than the party's official Latin spelling, so pass that spelling too when you have it; a no-match answer of that kind is not a clean result. Weaker tiers come apart in leads, each labelled and never counted as a match: PARTIAL_NAME (part of a name shared with a listed one, too little to be that party; each lead says why) and SKELETON (a consonant-skeleton fit, the only comparison possible for Arabic, Persian and Hebrew, which therefore return leads and no matches); read summary and lead_counts as well as matches. Thai, Devanagari, other scripts and Japanese kanji are not transliterated and are answered as not screened.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • describe_propositionEverything about one service, by the slug list_propositions gives: what happens to a request, what you receive, its price basis (never an offer), when a reply is due, who the buyer…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_proposition" says "describe": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "reply": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Everything about one service, by the slug list_propositions gives: what happens to a request, what you receive, its price basis (never an offer), when a reply is due, who the buyer contracts with and who invoices, scope and limits, the request fields with examples, and the lookups it runs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_propositionsList every service, with the business it belongs to and a one-line summary: lookups that run instantly, and requirements you can send.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_propositions" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every service, with the business it belongs to and a one-line summary: lookups that run instantly, and requirements you can send.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://services.forevenza.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_request (irreversible), federal_contract_awards (irreversible), screen_sanctions (write), company_financial_facts (write), extract_web_page (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 11, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 6

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "federal_contract_awards" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "convert_document" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "convert_document" says "convert": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 1 removed, 7 changed.+1 added−1 removed~7 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 6.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 6

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http requirements-desk https://services.forevenza.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http requirements-desk https://services.forevenza.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__requirements-desk__list_propositions",
      "mcp__requirements-desk__describe_proposition"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__requirements-desk__submit_request",
      "mcp__requirements-desk__screen_sanctions",
      "mcp__requirements-desk__company_financial_facts",
      "mcp__requirements-desk__federal_contract_awards",
      "mcp__requirements-desk__extract_web_page",
      "mcp__requirements-desk__convert_document"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as requirements-desk. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__requirements-desk__describe_proposition untrusted-input
  • mcp__requirements-desk__submit_request outbound
  • mcp__requirements-desk__screen_sanctions untrusted-input
  • mcp__requirements-desk__company_financial_facts untrusted-input
  • mcp__requirements-desk__federal_contract_awards untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__requirements-desk__extract_web_page untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__requirements-desk__convert_document untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.forevenza.services/requirements-desk/verify?hash=b9e201591fe92772d7a924ddb56981b2182c198e2483e723d7545921e97f9d6a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b9e201591fe9, from Nov 17, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.forevenza.services/requirements-desk/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.forevenza.services/requirements-desk
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.forevenza.services/requirements-desk.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.forevenza.services/requirements-desk)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 4, 2026, 04:17 UTC.

Requirements Desk MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Requirements Desk MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Requirements Desk MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Requirements Desk MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: submit_request and federal_contract_awards.

What tools does the Requirements Desk MCP server have?

8 tools: 2 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read. submit_request, federal_contract_awards, screen_sanctions, company_financial_facts, extract_web_page, convert_document, list_propositions and describe_proposition.

Does the Requirements Desk MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Requirements Desk MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): submit_request, federal_contract_awards, extract_web_page and convert_document.

Has the Requirements Desk MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.