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Front Sentinel MCP server

com.frontsentinel/domain-securityfrontsentinel.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Read-only security checks for dApp domains: registry lock, DNSSEC, CAA, SRI, SEAL DNS controls

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Front Sentinel MCP server can do

The Front Sentinel MCP server is published by frontsentinel.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: scan_domain, check_registry_lock, check_sri and check_seal_dns_registrar), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_domain, check_registry_lock, check_sri and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_sri).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • check_registry_lockReads the domain's EPP status codes from RDAP and tells whether registry lock (serverUpdateProhibited + serverTransferProhibited) is on, partly on or off, and which registrar-level…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_registry_lock" says "lock": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_registry_lock" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_registry_lock" says "lock": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reads the domain's EPP status codes from RDAP and tells whether registry lock (serverUpdateProhibited + serverTransferProhibited) is on, partly on or off, and which registrar-level locks are set.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_seal_dns_registrarGoes through the 16 controls of the SEAL Security Frameworks certification for DNS & Registrar and marks what public data shows for each: ok, partial, gap, not visible from outside…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Goes through the 16 controls of the SEAL Security Frameworks certification for DNS & Registrar and marks what public data shows for each: ok, partial, gap, not visible from outside, or a process control the team has to document itself. Includes DNSSEC, CAA, SPF/DMARC/MTA-STS, locks, expiry and security.txt.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_sriLoads a public page and lists every script, stylesheet and preload it pulls in.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Loads a public page and lists every script, stylesheet and preload it pulls in. For third-party files, checks whether an integrity= hash is present and matches, and returns a ready sha384 hash for files that have none.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_domainScores how well a dApp or website domain is protected against hijacking: registrar transfer/update locks, registry lock, DNSSEC, CAA, expiry, nameserver consistency across resolver…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scores how well a dApp or website domain is protected against hijacking: registrar transfer/update locks, registry lock, DNSSEC, CAA, expiry, nameserver consistency across resolvers, SRI on third-party scripts and the Content-Security-Policy header. Returns a 0-100 score, each check with pass/fail/unknown and advice. Results are cached for an hour.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 23, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://frontsentinel.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_domain (write), check_registry_lock (write), check_sri (write), check_seal_dns_registrar (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "check_registry_lock" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_registry_lock" says "lock": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http domain-security https://frontsentinel.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http domain-security https://frontsentinel.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__domain-security__scan_domain",
      "mcp__domain-security__check_registry_lock",
      "mcp__domain-security__check_sri",
      "mcp__domain-security__check_seal_dns_registrar"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as domain-security. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__domain-security__scan_domain untrusted-input
  • mcp__domain-security__check_registry_lock untrusted-input
  • mcp__domain-security__check_sri untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__domain-security__check_seal_dns_registrar untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.frontsentinel/domain-security/verify?hash=7a9242ec30d5c7253b7dea21ccf7ae6e180f174d5d548d77c19577226d99da86" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7a9242ec30d5, from Nov 8, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.frontsentinel/domain-security/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.frontsentinel/domain-security
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.frontsentinel/domain-security.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.frontsentinel/domain-security)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 11:17 UTC.

Front Sentinel MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Front Sentinel MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Front Sentinel MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Front Sentinel MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Front Sentinel MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. scan_domain, check_registry_lock, check_sri and check_seal_dns_registrar.

Does the Front Sentinel MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Front Sentinel MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_sri.

Has the Front Sentinel MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.