GateCore Marketplace MCP server
com.gatecoreai/marketplacegatecoreai.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Procure governed AI capabilities: machine-readable price, scope, trust, gateway-delegation terms.
8 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the GateCore Marketplace MCP server can do
The GateCore Marketplace MCP server is published by gatecoreai.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can delete or cancel things (3 tools: procure, authorize_access and complete_access) and create or change data (3 tools: discover_listings, request_listing_access and submit_lead). 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (list_procurements).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
authorize_accessAuthorize signed access to a governed listing.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Authorize signed access to a governed listing. Purpose is forwarded unchanged when present; policy at the gateway decides whether the declared purpose is allowed.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
complete_accessHash seller output locally, attest completion with the buyer agent key, and return the terminal signed receipt.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Hash seller output locally, attest completion with the buyer agent key, and return the terminal signed receipt. Seller output itself is never forwarded or returned.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
procureRequest governed procurement for a listing.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "request": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Request governed procurement for a listing. In public full mode, identity comes from the MCP access key, trust comes from GateCore's baseline, and the result is a PROCURE, REVIEW, or DENY decision with gateway delegation when eligible.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
discover_listingsDiscover governed GateCore marketplace capabilities with machine-readable pricing, required scopes, and minimum trust terms.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Discover governed GateCore marketplace capabilities with machine-readable pricing, required scopes, and minimum trust terms. Results preserve the marketplace's organic order.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
request_listing_accessSubmit an idempotent listing-access request for the credential's tenant and agent.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_listing_access" says "request": a word for a change.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...empotent listing-access request for the credential's tenant and agent."
Description, as the server wrote it Submit an idempotent listing-access request for the credential's tenant and agent.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
submit_leadSubmit a consented consumer lead to a supported published listing.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_lead" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a consented consumer lead to a supported published listing.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_listingFetch one governed marketplace listing and its machine-enforceable contract terms: price, required scopes, minimum trust, target, and data classification.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_listing" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch one governed marketplace listing and its machine-enforceable contract terms: price, required scopes, minimum trust, target, and data classification.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
list_procurementsList procurement decisions for the credential tenant in public modes.Reads private data1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_procurements" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "credential": it reads secrets.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "List procurement decisions for the credential tenant in public modes."
Description, as the server wrote it List procurement decisions for the credential tenant in public modes.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:39 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (3 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.gatecoreai.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including procure (destructive), authorize_access (destructive), complete_access (destructive), discover_listings (write), request_listing_access (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "List procurement decisions for the credential tenant in public modes."
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...empotent listing-access request for the credential's tenant and agent."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http marketplace https://mcp.gatecoreai.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http marketplace https://mcp.gatecoreai.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__marketplace__get_listing",
"mcp__marketplace__list_procurements"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__marketplace__discover_listings",
"mcp__marketplace__request_listing_access",
"mcp__marketplace__submit_lead"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__marketplace__procure",
"mcp__marketplace__authorize_access",
"mcp__marketplace__complete_access"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as marketplace. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__marketplace__list_procurements private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.gatecoreai/marketplace/verify?hash=19dbe84c5da9df14df39647036b3eb474f21acb06927e70796ffff053fbb2137" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 19dbe84c5da9, from Nov 10, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.gatecoreai/marketplace/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.gatecoreai/marketplace)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:55 UTC.
GateCore Marketplace MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the GateCore Marketplace MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the GateCore Marketplace MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 3 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: procure, authorize_access and complete_access.
Can the GateCore Marketplace MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the GateCore Marketplace MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 3 destructive, 3 write, 2 read. procure, authorize_access, complete_access, discover_listings, request_listing_access, submit_lead, get_listing and list_procurements.
Does the GateCore Marketplace MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the GateCore Marketplace MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the GateCore Marketplace MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.