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gimmeclip MCP server

com.gimmeclip/gimmeclipgimmeclip.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Video info, transcripts, trimmed share links and AI edits (captions, vertical) for public videos.

6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 5
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the gimmeclip MCP server can do

The gimmeclip MCP server is published by gimmeclip.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: get_transcript, download_video, share_video and edit_video), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (get_transcript, get_video_info, download_video and 2 more); 5 tools can send data out of your system (get_transcript, get_video_info, download_video and 2 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • download_videoPrepare a video as MP4 (H.264 + AAC, plays everywhere), MP3, or a looping GIF of up to 10 s, and return a download link.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a video as MP4 (H.264 + AAC, plays everywhere), MP3, or a looping GIF of up to 10 s, and return a download link. The link works for 15 minutes after the last request. Long videos may still be preparing when this returns: then call check_download with the job_id. Counts against the caller's daily limit (40 per IP).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • edit_videoMake an edited copy of part of a public video (up to 60 s between start and end): vertical 9:16 or square crop, burned-in captions of the speech and of other sounds such as "[music…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "edit_video" says "edit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Make an edited copy of part of a public video (up to 60 s between start and end): vertical 9:16 or square crop, burned-in captions of the speech and of other sounds such as "[music]" (in the language spoken, or translated to English, Portuguese, Spanish), even loudness; with a prompt also AI-written text over the picture (thought bubbles, meme captions, a title), a dramatic zoom, and slow motion or speed-up. Describe the edit in prompt, or set frame and captions_language (these override the prompt). Returns a gimmeclip.com/w/… watch link kept for 30 days; if it returns an edit_id, call edit_video again with only that edit_id to keep waiting. Each new edit counts against the caller's 5 edits a day, and preparing the source against the daily download limit; repeating the same edit is free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_transcriptTranscribe speech from a public video, optionally between start and end.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_transcript" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_transcript" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_transcript" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Transcribe speech from a public video, optionally between start and end. Returns a transcript_id while processing in the background: call this tool again with transcript_id to check. When done, fetch text_url for timestamped plain text with source attribution; Markdown and JSON links are also provided. Parts without speech are listed as machine-labelled sounds with times, closed-caption style (e.g. "[cat meowing]", "[music]"). Visual content is not described. New transcription uses the normal daily quota; results last 30 days.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • share_videoPrepare the video (or just the part between start and end) and return a short gimmeclip.com/w/… link anyone can open and play, kept for 30 days.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare the video (or just the part between start and end) and return a short gimmeclip.com/w/… link anyone can open and play, kept for 30 days. Counts against the caller's daily limit (40 per IP) unless the same clip was shared before. If it returns a job_id, call share_video again with that job_id to keep waiting.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_downloadWait for a download started by download_video and return its link when ready.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "wait": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Wait for a download started by download_video and return its link when ready.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_video_infoTitle, uploader, duration, thumbnail and available qualities of a public video link (YouTube, Instagram, X / Twitter, TikTok, Bluesky, Facebook, VK, LinkedIn, Weibo).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_video_info" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Title, uploader, duration, thumbnail and available qualities of a public video link (YouTube, Instagram, X / Twitter, TikTok, Bluesky, Facebook, VK, LinkedIn, Weibo). Posts with several videos list each one as an item.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out5
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://gimmeclip.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including get_transcript (write), download_video (write), share_video (write), edit_video (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "get_transcript" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_transcript" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http gimmeclip https://gimmeclip.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http gimmeclip https://gimmeclip.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__gimmeclip__check_download"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__gimmeclip__get_transcript",
      "mcp__gimmeclip__get_video_info",
      "mcp__gimmeclip__download_video",
      "mcp__gimmeclip__share_video",
      "mcp__gimmeclip__edit_video"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gimmeclip. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__gimmeclip__get_transcript untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__gimmeclip__get_video_info untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__gimmeclip__download_video untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__gimmeclip__share_video untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__gimmeclip__edit_video untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.gimmeclip/gimmeclip/verify?hash=05ef15d3f59eef2d26e5aabb0bbc39e726d99b868ce9403f17e081548025e81a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 05ef15d3f59e, from Nov 13, 2026, 16:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.gimmeclip/gimmeclip/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.gimmeclip/gimmeclip
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.gimmeclip/gimmeclip.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.gimmeclip/gimmeclip)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 16:17 UTC.

gimmeclip MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the gimmeclip MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the gimmeclip MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the gimmeclip MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the gimmeclip MCP server have?

6 tools: 4 write, 2 read. get_transcript, download_video, share_video, edit_video, get_video_info and check_download.

Does the gimmeclip MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the gimmeclip MCP server send data to outside services?

5 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_transcript, get_video_info, download_video, share_video and edit_video.

Has the gimmeclip MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.