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Android Management API MCP server

com.googleapis.androidmanagement/mcpandroidmanagement.googleapis.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Remote enterprise management of Android devices and apps

9 tools: 9 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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What the Android Management API MCP server can do

The Android Management API MCP server is published by androidmanagement.googleapis.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_web_app and list_web_apps).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • get_applicationGets application details for a given enterprise and application ID.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_application" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Gets application details for a given enterprise and application ID. Requires the resource name in the format: enterprises/{enterpriseId}/applications/{applicationId}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_deviceGets device details for a given enterprise and device ID.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_device" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Gets device details for a given enterprise and device ID. Requires the resource name in the format: enterprises/{enterpriseId}/devices/{deviceId}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_enterpriseGets an enterprise for a given enterprise ID.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_enterprise" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Gets an enterprise for a given enterprise ID. Requires the enterprise ID in the name field (e.g., enterprises/{enterpriseId}).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_policyGets a policy for a given enterprise and policy ID.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_policy" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Gets a policy for a given enterprise and policy ID. Requires the resource name in the format: enterprises/{enterpriseId}/policies/{policyId}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_web_appGets a web app.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_web_app" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_web_app" says "get" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Gets a web app. Requires the resource name in the format: enterprises/{enterpriseId}/webApps/{webAppId}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_devicesLists devices for a given enterprise.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_devices" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists devices for a given enterprise. Requires the enterprise ID in the parent field (e.g., enterprises/{enterpriseId}).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_enterprisesLists enterprises accessible to the caller.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_enterprises" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists enterprises accessible to the caller.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_policiesLists policies for a given enterprise.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_policies" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists policies for a given enterprise. Requires the enterprise resource name in the parent field (e.g., enterprises/{enterpriseId}).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_web_appsLists web apps for a given enterprise.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_web_apps" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "list_web_apps" says "list" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists web apps for a given enterprise. Requires the enterprise resource name in the parent field (e.g., enterprises/{enterpriseId}).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:39 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://androidmanagement.googleapis.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://accounts.google.com/
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
no

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http androidmanagement https://androidmanagement.googleapis.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http androidmanagement https://androidmanagement.googleapis.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__androidmanagement__get_enterprise",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__list_enterprises",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__get_application",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__get_device",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__list_devices",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__get_policy",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__list_policies",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__get_web_app",
      "mcp__androidmanagement__list_web_apps"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as androidmanagement. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__androidmanagement__get_web_app untrusted-input
  • mcp__androidmanagement__list_web_apps untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.googleapis.androidmanagement/mcp/verify?hash=46807686172c519a3983445f23c0cc94919ecf150460ff340b6fc648af20224f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 46807686172c, from Nov 9, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.googleapis.androidmanagement/mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.googleapis.androidmanagement/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.googleapis.androidmanagement/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.googleapis.androidmanagement/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:55 UTC.

Android Management API MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Android Management API MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Android Management API MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Android Management API MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Android Management API MCP server have?

9 tools: 9 read. get_enterprise, list_enterprises, get_application, get_device, list_devices, get_policy, list_policies, get_web_app and 1 more.

Does the Android Management API MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Android Management API MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Android Management API MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.