Regex Explainer MCP server
com.gumballtools/regex-explainergumballtools.comstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Explain a regex in plain English and detect catastrophic backtracking risk.
1 tool: 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Regex Explainer MCP server can do
The Regex Explainer MCP server is published by gumballtools.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
explain_regexExplain a regular expression in plain English and detect the failure modes that make patterns dangerous rather than merely wrong.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "explain_regex" says "explain": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Explain a regular expression in plain English and detect the failure modes that make patterns dangerous rather than merely wrong. Use this whenever a regex needs to be read, reviewed, or verified — and ALWAYS before putting a pattern somewhere it will run against untrusted input. The critical check is catastrophic backtracking: a pattern like (a+)+$ is three characters longer than a safe equivalent, looks harmless, and takes minutes of CPU on a 30-character input that almost matches. That makes it a denial-of-service vector. Whether a pattern is vulnerable depends on whether nested quantifiers can match the same characters in more than one way, which is a structural property that is unreliable to judge by reading. It also flags: missing anchors (an unanchored validator accepts any string that merely CONTAINS a valid value), unescaped dots, character ranges like [A-z] that span punctuation, alternation precedence mistakes where an anchor applies to only one branch, and constructs JavaScript does not support. Input: `pattern` accepts either a bare pattern or a full /pattern/flags literal. JavaScript syntax; PCRE-only constructs are reported as unsupported rather than guessed at. Returns: `summary` (one sentence), `steps` (an ordered walkthrough), `warnings` (each with a code, severity, detail, and fix), `flagNotes`, capture group counts and names, and `hasBlockingIssue` — check that flag first. If the pattern cannot be parsed it returns an error naming the position, rather than a plausible-looking explanation of something else.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http regex-explainer https://regex-explainer.gumballtools.com/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http regex-explainer https://regex-explainer.gumballtools.com/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__regex-explainer__explain_regex"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as regex-explainer. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.gumballtools/regex-explainer/verify?hash=2e28ce7b4d1768c8a9342f1bee17be9f3474eae4e021218ed73a67370cc314a1" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2e28ce7b4d17, from Nov 17, 2026, 14:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.gumballtools/regex-explainer/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.gumballtools/regex-explainer)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:56 UTC.
Regex Explainer MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Regex Explainer MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Regex Explainer MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Regex Explainer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Regex Explainer MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 read. explain_regex.
Does the Regex Explainer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Regex Explainer MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Regex Explainer MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.