buyers MCP server
com.halowerk/buyershalowerk.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Five paid tools: website stacks, domain profiles, IP risk, speech transcription and email checks.
5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the buyers MCP server can do
The buyers MCP server is published by halowerk.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: technology_stack, ip_reputation, speech_to_text and email_batch), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (domain_profile); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (technology_stack, domain_profile, ip_reputation and 2 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (technology_stack). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
email_batchCheck email syntax, domain routing and disposable-address signals in one batch.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check email syntax, domain routing and disposable-address signals in one batch. 0.0006 USDC per address, minimum 0.001 USDC per request; up to 100 addresses.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
ip_reputationScreen one IP for reputation risks for 0.001 USDC, or check a batch of up to 100 IPs for 0.050 USDC.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen one IP for reputation risks for 0.001 USDC, or check a batch of up to 100 IPs for 0.050 USDC.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
speech_to_textTurn audio into timestamped text with optional speaker separation.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn audio into timestamped text with optional speaker separation. Transcription: 0.020 USDC; speaker separation: 0.025 USDC per started minute (1–30).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
technology_stackDetect a website’s CMS, frameworks and hosting technology for integration planning.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Detect a website’s CMS, frameworks and hosting technology for integration planning. 0.005 USDC per request.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
domain_profileGet technology, DNS, mail security, TLS and hosting findings in one domain profile.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "mail": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "mail": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Get technology, DNS, mail security, TLS and hosting findings in one domain profile. 0.035 USDC per request.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
5 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__buyers__technology_stack"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://halowerk.com/buyers/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including technology_stack (write), ip_reputation (write), speech_to_text (write), email_batch (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http buyers https://halowerk.com/buyers/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http buyers https://halowerk.com/buyers/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__buyers__domain_profile"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__buyers__technology_stack",
"mcp__buyers__ip_reputation",
"mcp__buyers__speech_to_text",
"mcp__buyers__email_batch"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as buyers. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__buyers__technology_stack untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__buyers__domain_profile private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__buyers__ip_reputation untrusted-input
- mcp__buyers__speech_to_text untrusted-input
- mcp__buyers__email_batch untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.halowerk/buyers/verify?hash=b2202fe138d0fc30bb7123b9c6f50be3d1393d77e21d620e13cca3cd6717e0d5" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b2202fe138d0, from Nov 16, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.halowerk/buyers/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.halowerk/buyers)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
buyers MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the buyers MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the buyers MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the buyers MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the buyers MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. technology_stack, ip_reputation, speech_to_text, email_batch and domain_profile.
Does the buyers MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the buyers MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): technology_stack.
Has the buyers MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.