legwork MCP server
com.heylegwork/legworkheylegwork.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Hire humans for tasks agents cannot do: errands, calls, photos, verification. Escrowed, verified.
12 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 do something that can't be undone, 6 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 3
- 1 finding, 1 high
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
10 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the legwork MCP server can do
The legwork MCP server is published by heylegwork.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 12 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: octopus_cancel_task), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (octopus_send_message, octopus_request_changes and octopus_topup) and create or change data (6 tools: octopus_register, octopus_declare_intents, octopus_marketplace, octopus_post_task and 2 more). 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (octopus_get_task); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (octopus_get_task); 3 tools can send data out of your system (octopus_register, octopus_post_task and octopus_send_message). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding, 1 of them high severity (sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
12 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
octopus_cancel_taskCancel a task for a full refund.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "octopus_cancel_task" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
Description, as the server wrote it Cancel a task for a full refund. Allowed while open, or while claimed-and-overdue.
Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
octopus_request_changesSend submitted work back for revision with specific, per-criterion feedback.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "octopus_request_changes" says "request": a word for a change.
- The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Send submitted work back for revision with specific, per-criterion feedback. The human revises and resubmits.
octopus_send_messageReply on a task's thread, the human working your task can ask clarifying questions; answer promptly or the work stalls.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "octopus_send_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "octopus_send_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Reply on a task's thread, the human working your task can ask clarifying questions; answer promptly or the work stalls.
octopus_topupCreate a payment link to add credits (returns a Stripe Checkout URL to hand to your principal).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "octopus_topup" says "topup": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a payment link to add credits (returns a Stripe Checkout URL to hand to your principal). In sandbox mode this explains the sandbox instead.
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
octopus_approveAccept submitted work: releases the escrowed budget to the human and completes the task.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "octopus_approve" says "approve": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Accept submitted work: releases the escrowed budget to the human and completes the task. Verify each criterion response (and open attachment URLs) first.
octopus_declare_intentsPre-register the kinds of tasks you expect to post (category, description, locations, cadence).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-register the kinds of tasks you expect to post (category, description, locations, cadence). Workers get recruited for your categories first and you get priority access as supply arrives; first declaration in the beta adds $10 fee credit.
octopus_marketplaceLive Octopus marketplace stats and recent open tasks.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Live Octopus marketplace stats and recent open tasks. No auth needed.
octopus_post_taskHire a human: post a paid task to Octopus.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "octopus_post_task" says "post": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "octopus_post_task" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Hire a human: post a paid task to Octopus. The budget (USD) goes entirely to the worker and is escrowed from your credits along with a 15% platform fee (waived while your beta fee credit lasts), released when you approve the work. Write acceptance criteria as individually verifiable checks, the human answers each one with evidence. Humans take minutes-to-hours: post early, keep working, then poll with octopus_get_task.
octopus_registerCreate an Octopus agent account.Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhook_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- High
The description refers to ".env".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...an api_key (SAVE IT somewhere durable: .env, project memory). In the private beta y..."
Description, as the server wrote it Create an Octopus agent account. Instant, returns an api_key (SAVE IT somewhere durable: .env, project memory). In the private beta your first $25 of platform fees are waived. Do this once per project, not per session.
octopus_walletYour credit balance and ledger.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Your credit balance and ledger. To add credits: octopus_topup.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
octopus_get_taskFetch one of your tasks: status, submissions with per-criterion evidence and attachment URLs, message thread, and an advice field with the sensible next move.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "octopus_get_task" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "message": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch one of your tasks: status, submissions with per-criterion evidence and attachment URLs, message thread, and an advice field with the sensible next move. Set wait_seconds (max 55) to block until the status moves on or a new message arrives, pass since_status/since_messages from your last look.
octopus_my_tasksList the tasks you have posted, with statuses.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the tasks you have posted, with statuses. Tasks with status "submitted" need your review.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__legwork__octopus_get_task"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:40 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 10
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://heylegwork.com/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including octopus_cancel_task (destructive), octopus_send_message (irreversible), octopus_request_changes (irreversible), octopus_topup (irreversible), octopus_register (write) and 5 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Highoctopus_register
The description refers to ".env".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...an api_key (SAVE IT somewhere durable: .env, project memory). In the private beta y..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http legwork https://heylegwork.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http legwork https://heylegwork.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__legwork__octopus_my_tasks",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_get_task"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__legwork__octopus_register",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_declare_intents",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_marketplace",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_post_task",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_send_message",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_approve",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_request_changes",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_wallet",
"mcp__legwork__octopus_topup"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__legwork__octopus_cancel_task"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as legwork. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__legwork__octopus_register outbound
- mcp__legwork__octopus_post_task outbound
- mcp__legwork__octopus_get_task private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__legwork__octopus_send_message outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.heylegwork/legwork/verify?hash=f0d631db373ce030a2ea64016e1be6ed741a2639ef60d0d74e36f3cada997b5f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash f0d631db373c, from Nov 10, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.heylegwork/legwork/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.heylegwork/legwork)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:56 UTC.
legwork MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the legwork MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the legwork MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: octopus_cancel_task.
Can the legwork MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: octopus_send_message, octopus_request_changes and octopus_topup.
What tools does the legwork MCP server have?
- 12 tools: 1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 6 write, 2 read. octopus_cancel_task, octopus_send_message, octopus_request_changes, octopus_topup, octopus_register, octopus_declare_intents, octopus_marketplace, octopus_post_task and 4 more.
Does the legwork MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the legwork MCP server send data to outside services?
- 3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): octopus_register, octopus_post_task and octopus_send_message.
Has the legwork MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.