hypsh fashion stylist MCP server
com.hypsh/fashionhypsh.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Natural-language fashion search and complete outfits from real shop pieces. Anonymous, read-only.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server can do
The hypsh fashion stylist MCP server is published by hypsh.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: generate_outfit), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (semantic_search and generate_outfit).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
generate_outfitUse this when the user wants a complete outfit.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_outfit" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "generate_outfit" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_outfit" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user wants a complete outfit. Primary chat path is prompt-based generation; widget actions may call this with product_id for item-based outfit generation. Pass `gender` when you know who the outfit is for. Do not use this for single-item product search. The result's `content` is a plain-text summary of the outfit (each piece with brand and price); `structuredContent.outfit` holds the same pieces with product ids and shop links.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Put together an outfit
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
semantic_searchUse this when the user wants to find specific fashion products (clothing, footwear, accessories) by text, optionally guided by images.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "semantic_search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user wants to find specific fashion products (clothing, footwear, accessories) by text, optionally guided by images. Pass `gender` when you know who the clothes are for. Do not use this for full outfit generation or visualization-only requests. The result's `content` is a plain-text list of the products (brand, price); `structuredContent.products` holds the same products with ids and shop links.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search fashion products
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 26, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.hypsh.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including generate_outfit (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warngenerate_outfit
The server marks "generate_outfit" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_outfit" says "generate": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:generate_outfitChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
- Changed:semantic_searchOnly readstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http fashion https://mcp.hypsh.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http fashion https://mcp.hypsh.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__fashion__semantic_search"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__fashion__generate_outfit"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as fashion. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__fashion__semantic_search untrusted-input
- mcp__fashion__generate_outfit untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.hypsh/fashion/verify?hash=88a40edcfa79aa40db0ec111e7d75208f9f5d5bb071c3f2d83262a652c58eb7b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 88a40edcfa79, from Nov 9, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.hypsh/fashion/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.hypsh/fashion)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
hypsh fashion stylist MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. generate_outfit and semantic_search.
Does the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the hypsh fashion stylist MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.