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iFreeWork — public content MCP server

com.ifreework/contentifreework.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

iFreeWork services, portfolio, blog, search, contacts and consent-gated messages.

10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 9 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 0 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 7
  • Can send data out · 4
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the iFreeWork — public content MCP server can do

The iFreeWork — public content MCP server is published by ifreework.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_message), but cannot delete data. 9 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_contact); 7 tools bring in text other people can write (get_service, get_portfolio_item, list_blog_posts and 4 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (get_service, get_portfolio_item, get_blog_post and 1 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • send_messageDelivers a message to Andrey Zubar through the same mechanism as the contact form on the home page.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delivers a message to Andrey Zubar through the same mechanism as the contact form on the home page. Requires the human user's approval of the exact text and reply-to e-mail (confirmed_by_user=true). Rate limited; duplicates are not sent twice. / Отправить сообщение владельцу как через форму на главной; только с согласия пользователя.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • get_aboutAbout page: who Andrey Zubar is, experience, stack and how he works.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_about" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    About page: who Andrey Zubar is, experience, stack and how he works. / Страница «О себе».

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_blog_postFull text of one blog article as Markdown.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_blog_post" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_blog_post" says "get" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full text of one blog article as Markdown. Pass id, slug or url. / Полный текст статьи.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_contactTelegram and e-mail of the developer and how to send a message.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_contact" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_contact" says "get" and "contact": it reads contacts.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "mail": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "mail": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Telegram and e-mail of the developer and how to send a message. / Контакты: Telegram и почта.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_portfolio_itemFull case description of one project as Markdown.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_portfolio_item" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full case description of one project as Markdown. Pass id, slug or url. / Полное описание работы.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_serviceFull text of one service page as Markdown.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_service" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full text of one service page as Markdown. Pass id, slug or url. / Полный текст услуги.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_blog_postsBlog articles, newest first; filter by category; paginated.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_blog_posts" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "list_blog_posts" says "list" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Blog articles, newest first; filter by category; paginated. / Статьи блога.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_portfolioCompleted portfolio projects with category, tags and summary; filter by category slug/title or tag; paginated.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_portfolio" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Completed portfolio projects with category, tags and summary; filter by category slug/title or tag; paginated. / Работы из портфолио.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_servicesServices offered (AI agents and RAG, Telegram bots, CRM, Laravel backend, integrations, security, crypto).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Services offered (AI agents and RAG, Telegram bots, CRM, Laravel backend, integrations, security, crypto). / Список услуг.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_contentKeyword search across About, Services, Portfolio and Blog; returns ranked pages with snippets and urls.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_content" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Keyword search across About, Services, Portfolio and Blog; returns ranked pages with snippets and urls. / Поиск по сайту.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

28 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write7
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__content__get_contact"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:40 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://ifreework.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including send_message (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http content https://ifreework.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http content https://ifreework.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__content__get_about",
      "mcp__content__list_services",
      "mcp__content__list_portfolio",
      "mcp__content__list_blog_posts",
      "mcp__content__get_contact",
      "mcp__content__search_content"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__content__get_service",
      "mcp__content__get_portfolio_item",
      "mcp__content__get_blog_post",
      "mcp__content__send_message"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as content. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__content__get_service untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__content__get_portfolio_item untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__content__list_blog_posts untrusted-input
  • mcp__content__get_blog_post untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__content__get_contact private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__content__send_message untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__content__search_content untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ifreework/content/verify?hash=7b163a1f0317e9eaa2944c395e4883d4fae22913ec0ba2e6e44ec58d69cd3909" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7b163a1f0317, from Nov 13, 2026, 12:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ifreework/content/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.ifreework/content
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.ifreework/content.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ifreework/content)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:56 UTC.

iFreeWork — public content MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the iFreeWork — public content MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the iFreeWork — public content MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the iFreeWork — public content MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_message.

What tools does the iFreeWork — public content MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 irreversible, 9 read. send_message, get_about, list_services, get_service, list_portfolio, get_portfolio_item, list_blog_posts, get_blog_post and 2 more.

Does the iFreeWork — public content MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the iFreeWork — public content MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_service, get_portfolio_item, get_blog_post and send_message.

Has the iFreeWork — public content MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.