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AI Use Policy Draft MCP server

com.igdigi/ai-use-policyigdigi.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Drafts a short AI use policy for a small business from eight questions. Free, answers not stored.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server can do

The AI Use Policy Draft MCP server is published by igdigi.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: draft_ai_use_policy), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_policy_questions).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • draft_ai_use_policyBuilds a short AI use policy draft in Markdown (ten sections, about two pages) from the answers to get_policy_questions: purpose, scope, approved tools, data rules (what never goes…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.data_handled.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.data_handled.description: "...idential information, personal data and credentials; add anything else."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Builds a short AI use policy draft in Markdown (ten sections, about two pages) from the answers to get_policy_questions: purpose, scope, approved tools, data rules (what never goes into free or unapproved AI tools), allowed and prohibited uses, human review of AI output, approval of new tools, incident reporting and a review date. It is a fixed template filled with the answers: no AI model is called, there is no network access, and this server does not store or log the answers. Only company_name is required. Every other answer left out becomes a bracketed placeholder in the draft, and the result lists them. Ask the person for the answers, do not invent them. Optional effective_date (YYYY-MM-DD) defaults to today (UTC). The output is a draft for internal use, not legal advice.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Draft a short AI use policy
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_policy_questionsReturns the short questionnaire behind draft_ai_use_policy: eight questions for a small business (company name, industry, AI tools in use, kinds of data the team handles, allowed u…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_policy_questions" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the short questionnaire behind draft_ai_use_policy: eight questions for a small business (company name, industry, AI tools in use, kinds of data the team handles, allowed uses, prohibited uses, who approves new tools, review cadence). Each question has an id, plain wording, type, limits and an example. Call this first, ask the person the questions, then pass their answers to draft_ai_use_policy. Takes no arguments, makes no network calls, stores nothing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Get the AI use policy questionnaire

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 8, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://igdigi.com/mcp/ai-policy: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including draft_ai_use_policy (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The input schema at properties.data_handled.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.data_handled.description: "...idential information, personal data and credentials; add anything else."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ai-use-policy https://igdigi.com/mcp/ai-policy
claude mcp add --transport http ai-use-policy https://igdigi.com/mcp/ai-policy

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__ai-use-policy__get_policy_questions"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ai-use-policy__draft_ai_use_policy"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ai-use-policy. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__ai-use-policy__get_policy_questions untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.igdigi/ai-use-policy/verify?hash=3888f75982e1b4bf22d7800a767c937b9f6762ed75dea6120083458508d0fe9d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3888f75982e1, from Nov 8, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.igdigi/ai-use-policy/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.igdigi/ai-use-policy
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.igdigi/ai-use-policy.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.igdigi/ai-use-policy)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

AI Use Policy Draft MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. draft_ai_use_policy and get_policy_questions.

Does the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AI Use Policy Draft MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.