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IMBA Agent Docs MCP server

com.imbawallet/agent-docsimbawallet.comstreamable-httpv0.1.4Scanned

Read-only IMBA Agent API docs MCP. No register, deposit, buy, or withdraw.

6 tools: 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server can do

The IMBA Agent Docs MCP server is published by imbawallet.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

3 tools read private data (get_catalog_placement, get_public_url and list_docs_urls); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_public_url and list_docs_urls); 1 tool can send data out of your system (get_public_url). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.1.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • get_agent_factsCanonical prepaid-agent policy and catalog: Visa prepaid, eSIM, gift cards, KYT address screen, USDT TRC-20, forbidden rails, tiers.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_facts" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Canonical prepaid-agent policy and catalog: Visa prepaid, eSIM, gift cards, KYT address screen, USDT TRC-20, forbidden rails, tiers. Cite as-is. Does not move money.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • get_agent_use_casesPlaybook: Visa prepaid (flights, datacenter bills), travel eSIM, ~20k gift cards, paid KYT address screen.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_use_cases" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Playbook: Visa prepaid (flights, datacenter bills), travel eSIM, ~20k gift cards, paid KYT address screen. MCP tools per job. Cite as-is. Does not move money.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • get_catalog_placementWhich directories take the docs MCP vs the spend MCP.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_catalog_placement" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "directory": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Which directories take the docs MCP vs the spend MCP. OpenAI is docs-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • get_public_urlHTTP GET of an allowlisted public docs URL (HowTo, use cases, discovery JSON, llms-agent).Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_public_url" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "doc": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_public_url" says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    HTTP GET of an allowlisted public docs URL (HowTo, use cases, discovery JSON, llms-agent). Never calls register/deposit/buy.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • get_tier_policyTier 0 vs 1+.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_tier_policy" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Tier 0 vs 1+. Convert closed at 0 (AML). Convert at 1 is a separate request. Withdraw stays closed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • list_docs_urlsHowTo, use cases, tiers, discovery, OpenAPI, MCP endpoints.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_docs_urls" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "list_docs_urls" says "list" and "doc": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "list_docs_urls" says "list" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    HowTo, use cases, tiers, discovery, OpenAPI, MCP endpoints.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-docs__get_public_url"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:40 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-docs https://imbawallet.com/mcp/docs
claude mcp add --transport http agent-docs https://imbawallet.com/mcp/docs

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-docs__get_agent_facts",
      "mcp__agent-docs__get_agent_use_cases",
      "mcp__agent-docs__get_tier_policy",
      "mcp__agent-docs__get_catalog_placement",
      "mcp__agent-docs__list_docs_urls"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-docs__get_public_url"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-docs. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__agent-docs__get_catalog_placement private-data
  • mcp__agent-docs__get_public_url private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agent-docs__list_docs_urls private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.imbawallet/agent-docs/verify?hash=a3399bbf4d795fef37d9e38a4ca6c164825c3682d6289991d8f3b2306d88dbca" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a3399bbf4d79, from Nov 10, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.imbawallet/agent-docs/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.imbawallet/agent-docs
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.imbawallet/agent-docs.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.imbawallet/agent-docs)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:56 UTC.

IMBA Agent Docs MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server have?

6 tools: 6 read. get_agent_facts, get_agent_use_cases, get_tier_policy, get_catalog_placement, get_public_url and list_docs_urls.

Does the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_public_url.

Has the IMBA Agent Docs MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.