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Index Agentica MCP server

com.indexagentica/mcpindexagentica.comstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Search a curated directory of agent tools, MCP servers, APIs, protocols and skills. No auth.

5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Index Agentica MCP server can do

The Index Agentica MCP server is published by indexagentica.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: request_listing), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (search); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (list_categories); 1 tool can send data out of your system (request_listing). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • request_listingAsk Index Agentica to add something that is missing (a skill, agent harness, MCP server, tool, protocol, API, ...).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_listing" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask Index Agentica to add something that is missing (a skill, agent harness, MCP server, tool, protocol, API, ...). Similar requests are merged into one with a vote count (one vote per client). Nothing is listed automatically: the Curator verifies each request first. The public queue is at https://mcp.indexagentica.com/v1/requests and https://indexagentica.com/requested/. Limits: 5 requests per hour and 20 per day per client. Search first to check it is not already listed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Request a listing
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_contentFetch one Index Agentica long-form item by type and id (as returned by search).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_content" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch one Index Agentica long-form item by type and id (as returned by search). Returns its metadata (title, summary, author, tags, dates, referenced entries with links, related items, sources, links) and its markdown (scheme links resolved to absolute URLs). Comparisons include the structured table (criteria, one row per entry, verdict); stacks include the use case and components; skills include the full SKILL.md (skill_md) plus download links (links.zip, links.skill_md). Unknown ids return an error with suggestions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get guide, comparison, stack or skill
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_entryFetch one Index Agentica entry by its id (kebab-case slug, e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_entry" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch one Index Agentica entry by its id (kebab-case slug, e.g. "model-context-protocol"). Returns every field: name, category, summary, description, url, repo, docs, tags, license, pricing, status, agent_access (llms_txt, openapi, mcp_endpoint, auth), related ids, sources, dates and links. If the id is unknown the result is an error with suggested ids.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get directory entry
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_categoriesList all Index Agentica categories with their slug, name, description, entry count and links (HTML page and JSON).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "html": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all Index Agentica categories with their slug, name, description, entry count and links (HTML page and JSON). Use a slug as the category filter for search.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List categories
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__indexagentica__request_listing"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:40 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.indexagentica.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including request_listing (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http indexagentica https://mcp.indexagentica.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http indexagentica https://mcp.indexagentica.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__indexagentica__search",
      "mcp__indexagentica__get_entry",
      "mcp__indexagentica__get_content",
      "mcp__indexagentica__list_categories"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__indexagentica__request_listing"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as indexagentica. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__indexagentica__search private-data
  • mcp__indexagentica__list_categories untrusted-input
  • mcp__indexagentica__request_listing outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.indexagentica/mcp/verify?hash=bd33732024db0c815e9f966eaef3e807f28a21a0c62358476118cd7d7f445a5c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bd33732024db, from Nov 10, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.indexagentica/mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.indexagentica/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.indexagentica/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.indexagentica/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:56 UTC.

Index Agentica MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Index Agentica MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Index Agentica MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Index Agentica MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Index Agentica MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. request_listing, search, get_entry, get_content and list_categories.

Does the Index Agentica MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Index Agentica MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): request_listing.

Has the Index Agentica MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.