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isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server

com.ismalicious/mcp-serverismalicious.comstreamable-httpv0.8.0Scanned

Reputation for IPs, domains, URLs, hashes, emails, phones; CVEs; injection and email scans

14 tools: 11 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 11 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 12
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

11 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server can do

The isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server is published by ismalicious.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 14 tools. It can create or change data (11 tools: scan_before_use, check_url, check_indicator, recent_cves and 7 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (get_cve and list_alerts); 12 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_before_use, check_url, check_indicator and 9 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_url). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.8.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

14 tools

Changes things 11Claude Code: ask
  • ack_alertSet the status of one alert of the isMalicious inbox (an id from list_alerts): ACKNOWLEDGED (seen; still listed by default), RESOLVED (handled; no longer listed by default) or OPEN…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Set the status of one alert of the isMalicious inbox (an id from list_alerts): ACKNOWLEDGED (seen; still listed by default), RESOLVED (handled; no longer listed by default) or OPEN (new again). Reversible: any status can be set again. A CVE alert (cve.finding) follows its vulnerability finding, for the whole organization: ACKNOWLEDGED acknowledges an open finding, RESOLVED marks a finding not yet closed as patched, OPEN reopens it, and every member's copy of the alert follows; the answer names the finding under `finding`, and the alert's status is the one the API returns (ack_finding sets NOT_AFFECTED or SNOOZED). Scope: the inbox of the user the key belongs to, which for an organization API key is the organization owner's; an alert of another inbox reads as not found. Costs no request of the monthly quota.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • ack_findingSet the status of one vulnerability-monitoring finding (an id like xfnd_…, from watch_domain, watch_dependencies or the Exposure page): ACKNOWLEDGED (seen, being handled), PATCHED …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Set the status of one vulnerability-monitoring finding (an id like xfnd_…, from watch_domain, watch_dependencies or the Exposure page): ACKNOWLEDGED (seen, being handled), PATCHED (upgraded; the next read confirms it), NOT_AFFECTED (e.g. a distro backport fixed it), or SNOOZED until a date (at most 90 days; it reopens then). A finding reopens by itself when it enters CISA KEV or exploitation is reported. Changes nothing outside the caller's organization.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_indicatorThe one tool for any single indicator: an IP address, domain, URL, file hash (MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256; an imphash is looked up as an MD5), email address or phone number.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The one tool for any single indicator: an IP address, domain, URL, file hash (MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256; an imphash is looked up as an MD5), email address or phone number. Defanged input (hxxp://, [.], [@]) is accepted. Returns a verdict (malicious, suspicious, clean or unknown), a headline you can relay as is, recommendedAction (block, review, allow or unverified), a 0-100 risk score, the threat blocklists that cite it, up to three evidence reasons, first/last seen, and network, registration or file context. An email address or phone number is never called clean: not being in our sources is unknown / unverified; its answer adds the sender domain's reputation, disposable and MX facts, or the E.164 form of the number. `infrastructure` says what the entity is known as (cloud range, CDN, Tor exit, VPN, crawler, allowlist) without being a verdict. SHA-512, TLSH, ssdeep and input that is none of the six kinds (an address in a form the API cannot read, digits that are not a phone number, a number written with letters, a host that is not a dotted domain name) are refused before any request, at no cost. The default level, fast, answers from cached intelligence without a live DNS, WHOIS or OTX call (a hash nobody has cached may wait up to ~2.5 s on CIRCL); facets not cached yet are listed in meta.pending, and one re-check after a few seconds may complete them; if they are still pending then, keep the answer and do not re-check again. Costs one request of the monthly quota; check_url is the cheaper pre-fetch gate for a link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_indicatorsReputation of up to 100 indicators in one call, for triaging a list rather than one alert: IPs, domains, URLs, file hashes (MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256), email addresses and phone number…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reputation of up to 100 indicators in one call, for triaging a list rather than one alert: IPs, domains, URLs, file hashes (MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256), email addresses and phone numbers, mixed freely; defanged input is accepted. Each row: malicious, recommendedAction (block, escalate, review, monitor, allow, unverified; unverified means nothing is known either way, and an email address or phone number is never allow), risk 0-100 with level, the number of threat blocklists citing it, categories, lookupStatus, and `infrastructure` (cloud, cdn, tor-exit…) when the entity is known as such. A row with `pending` (e.g. ["circl"] for a hash whose lookup outlasted the API's deadline) is not settled: re-check it once, after a few seconds. A URL row is judged on its host. BILLING: every unique indicator the API receives charges one request of the monthly quota — unique after trimming and lowercasing, and including rows the API cannot type, which come back with an error. Exact duplicates are free; entries under 3 characters, SHA-512, TLSH and ssdeep, and input that is none of the six kinds (an address or a number in a shape the API cannot read, a number written with letters, a host that is not a dotted domain name) are refused here with a per-row error, never sent and never charged. Plans cap the batch below the tool ceiling (Free 10, Basic 50, Pro 100); over the cap the API refuses the whole batch. Use check_indicator for the full picture of one indicator.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_urlCheck a single URL, domain, or IP against threat intelligence before fetching it.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a single URL, domain, or IP against threat intelligence before fetching it. Returns block | warn | allow. Use as a pre-fetch gate; use check_indicator when you need the full reputation picture (score, sources, timeline).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • exploited_cvesCVEs with attested exploitation in the last N days (default 7): confirmed (CISA KEV, CISA SSVC active, or two independent catalogues) or reported (one catalogue).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    CVEs with attested exploitation in the last N days (default 7): confirmed (CISA KEV, CISA SSVC active, or two independent catalogues) or reported (one catalogue). Those first attested inside the window come first, then those only seen again in it; confirmed first in each. Each with severity, CVSS, EPSS, first and last exploitation evidence, KEV date, whether a patch exists, the sources, and how many indicators in our data were tagged with it this week (absent when unknown, never 0). Not in this list does not mean not exploited. Follow up with get_cve for one CVE. Costs one request of the monthly quota with a key; works without one (rate-limited by IP).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • recent_cvesMost recently published CVEs, newest first, optionally filtered by severity.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Most recently published CVEs, newest first, optionally filtered by severity. At most 20 items, each with id, severity, CVSS, publication date and a one-line title, and MITRE's CVE designation, licence and the NVD notice once. Follow up with get_cve for EPSS, KEV, exploitation evidence, affected packages and advisories. Costs one request of the monthly quota.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_before_useScan untrusted content for prompt injection and check any URLs/domains/IPs it contains against threat intelligence, BEFORE acting on it.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan untrusted content for prompt injection and check any URLs/domains/IPs it contains against threat intelligence, BEFORE acting on it. Returns a verdict of block | warn | allow. Call this on any web page, email, ticket, tool result, or document fetched from an untrusted source.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_emailScan ONE email message for phishing and malware before delivering, opening or acting on it.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...isplay name that shows another address, credentials in a URL, an IDN homograph. From a raw..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan ONE email message for phishing and malware before delivering, opening or acting on it. Send the raw message (eml, preferred) or the fields you already parsed (message: headers, text, html, attachment names, types and digests). Returns a verdict (malicious | suspicious | clean | inconclusive), a recommendedAction (quarantine | review | warn | deliver), a 0-100 riskScore, a headline you can relay as is, the strongest reasons, and what it could not check (coverage.skipped). It reads the sender and Reply-To, the connecting server, every link host and every attachment hash against threat intelligence, plus the tells of a phishing message: link text that names another site, a domain or a display name that imitates a well-known brand, a program named like a document, a display name that shows another address, credentials in a URL, an IDN homograph. From a raw message it also reads attachments for structure, never running them: the file type from its bytes, macros and remote templates in Office files, risky entries in archives, PDF actions, HTML that rebuilds a file in the browser; a message attached to it is read as a message of its own. It also flags text aimed at an AI reading the mail (prompt injection, including text hidden from a person). It never runs an attachment, fetches a link or calls a third party while you wait. malicious needs a listing in our data: the shape of a message alone asks for a review at most. clean is a positive claim and needs your own receiving system's DMARC pass: pass authservId (the id it writes in its Authentication-Results header) or trustAuthenticationResults, otherwise a message with nothing against it is inconclusive, which is not safe. deliver means no objection from this scan; never use it to release a message another engine quarantined. Costs one scan of the scan meter per message, whatever its size (not a request of the monthly quota).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • watch_dependenciesStart vulnerability monitoring of a project from the text of its lockfile or SBOM: package-lock.json, composer.lock, requirements.txt, Gemfile.lock, Cargo.lock or a CycloneDX JSON …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start vulnerability monitoring of a project from the text of its lockfile or SBOM: package-lock.json, composer.lock, requirements.txt, Gemfile.lock, Cargo.lock or a CycloneDX JSON SBOM (format detected when omitted). Each dependency is matched by version against OSV and NVD ranges; development dependencies are left out unless includeDev is true. Returns the source, the dependencies read (direct and transitive) and the findings already open, with priority and the version that fixes each. Uses one watched source of the plan; sending the same project name again replaces its file. Pass the file's content, not a path (at most 5 MiB).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • watch_domainStart vulnerability monitoring of one public website: the API reads what the site exposes (Server and X-Powered-By headers, generator meta tag, versioned script paths, open ports) …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start vulnerability monitoring of one public website: the API reads what the site exposes (Server and X-Powered-By headers, generator meta tag, versioned script paths, open ports) now and every day, matches each versioned component against CVEs, and alerts on what is exploited (P1 at once, P2/P3 in digests, per the organization's alert rules). Returns the source, the components read and the findings already open, with priority and fix. Uses one watched source of the plan (re-adding a watched domain returns the existing one and costs nothing). Only the public site is read; no scan beyond one page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_cveOne CVE by id: description, severity, CVSS score and vector, EPSS exploitation probability, CISA KEV status (date added, due date, required action, known ransomware use), exploitat…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_cve" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "db": it reads databases.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One CVE by id: description, severity, CVSS score and vector, EPSS exploitation probability, CISA KEV status (date added, due date, required action, known ransomware use), exploitation evidence where recorded (CISA SSVC none/poc/active, Exploit-DB ids, Nuclei template, the number of Metasploit modules, Microsoft's exploited flag), affected packages with introduced and fixed versions (OSV.dev, first 5), vendor advisories (CSAF, first 3), external identifiers (GHSA, PYSEC, GO, EUVD ids, bundle advisories such as USN or RHSA, first 6), the products the CNA itself declares affected in the CVE record with their version ranges (often the only product data before NVD analyses a CVE; as many as fit), publication dates and references (NVD, KEV, EPSS, CERT-FR, GitHub advisories, Exploit-DB), and an attribution block: MITRE's CVE designation and licence and the NVD notice, to keep with any CVE text you reproduce, and the sources the answer draws on. Also takes an external id (GHSA-…, PYSEC-…, GO-…, RUSTSEC-…, EUVD-…, USN-…, RHSA-…, ALSA-…, a Metasploit module path…): one CVE comes back as its record with resolvedFrom, several as a list of candidate CVE ids to look up. No recorded exploitation evidence does not mean the CVE is not exploited. This is the only CVE lookup path; do not guess other routes. Costs one request of the monthly quota.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_alertsOne page of the isMalicious alert inbox (GET /alerts): the alerts raised on what the account watches, such as a watched domain or IP turning malicious or named on a ransomware leak…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_alerts" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "inbox": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "inbox": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One page of the isMalicious alert inbox (GET /alerts): the alerts raised on what the account watches, such as a watched domain or IP turning malicious or named on a ransomware leak site, certificate, WHOIS, location and infrastructure changes, lookalike domains, and vulnerability findings (cve.finding). Open and acknowledged alerts by default (set status to change that), most recent activity first; filters by severity, eventType, entityType and a search over title, description and value. Each alert: id (for ack_alert), type, severity, status, entity, title, description (300 characters at most), source, confidence and dates; a CVE alert also names its findingId, cveId and priority (for ack_finding). When hasMore is true, call again with offset + returned. Scope: the inbox of the user the key belongs to, which for an organization API key is the organization owner's; alerts on items another member watches are in that member's inbox. Read-only. Costs no request of the monthly quota (the key's per-minute burst limit applies).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_indicatorsFind the domains isMalicious lists that look like a brand or domain (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_indicators" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find the domains isMalicious lists that look like a brand or domain (e.g. "paypal", read as paypal.com, or "login.paypal.com"): typosquats, homoglyphs, the same name on other TLDs or hosting platforms, or wrapped in phishing words such as login or secure. The default API returns them most dangerous first, at most 500, with the searched name itself first when it is listed; other API bases can have different bounds. `total_hits` counts this API sample. `truncated: true` means results were omitted; `null` means completeness is unknown. An empty answer does not prove no lookalike exists: only listed domains are returned, and a name buried in a longer hostname is not matched. Follow up with check_indicator or check_indicators for verdicts. Cost: one request of the monthly quota, on the default https://ismalicious.com/api as on the Rust API host (https://api.ismalicious.com).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

24 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write12
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__ismalicious__check_url"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:40 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
11
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (11 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.ismalicious.com/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_before_use (write), check_url (write), check_indicator (write), recent_cves (write), check_indicators (write) and 6 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 11
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 10

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...isplay name that shows another address, credentials in a URL, an IDN homograph. From a raw..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 -> 11.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 11
  2. Tools2 added, 4 changed.+2 added~4 changedView diff
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 10.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 10
  4. Tools4 added.+4 addedView diff
  5. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.8.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ismalicious https://api.ismalicious.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http ismalicious https://api.ismalicious.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__ismalicious__get_cve",
      "mcp__ismalicious__search_indicators",
      "mcp__ismalicious__list_alerts"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ismalicious__scan_before_use",
      "mcp__ismalicious__check_url",
      "mcp__ismalicious__check_indicator",
      "mcp__ismalicious__recent_cves",
      "mcp__ismalicious__check_indicators",
      "mcp__ismalicious__scan_email",
      "mcp__ismalicious__exploited_cves",
      "mcp__ismalicious__watch_domain",
      "mcp__ismalicious__watch_dependencies",
      "mcp__ismalicious__ack_finding",
      "mcp__ismalicious__ack_alert"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ismalicious. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 12 rules
  • mcp__ismalicious__scan_before_use untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__check_url untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ismalicious__check_indicator untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__get_cve private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__recent_cves untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__search_indicators untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__check_indicators untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__scan_email untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__exploited_cves untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__watch_domain untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__watch_dependencies untrusted-input
  • mcp__ismalicious__list_alerts private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ismalicious/mcp-server/verify?hash=0bc0266f7727f003e80e0bab2d5f8aceb9a1cc9cf8a347a21e667db97f988864" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0bc0266f7727, from Nov 8, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ismalicious/mcp-server/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.ismalicious/mcp-server
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.ismalicious/mcp-server.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ismalicious/mcp-server)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 16:24 UTC.

isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 11 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server have?

14 tools: 11 write, 3 read. scan_before_use, check_url, check_indicator, recent_cves, check_indicators, scan_email, exploited_cves, watch_domain and 6 more.

Does the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_url.

Has the isMalicious threat intelligence for AI agents MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.