Jemeen Agent Services MCP server
com.jemeen/agent-servicesjemeen.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Agent verification tools: CSV quality, citation checks, AI-readiness audits, requirement extraction
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server can do
The Jemeen Agent Services MCP server is published by jemeen.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: csv_quality, agent_readiness and extract_requirements), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_citations and agent_readiness).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 2, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
agent_readinessAudits how discoverable and usable a domain is for AI assistants and autonomous agents: AI crawler access in robots.txt (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, PerplexityBot, Google-Extended and other…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits how discoverable and usable a domain is for AI assistants and autonomous agents: AI crawler access in robots.txt (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, PerplexityBot, Google-Extended and others), llms.txt, sitemap, homepage metadata and schema.org JSON-LD, A2A Agent Card, MCP and OpenAPI discovery, and x402 payment readiness. Returns a 0-100 score, every check with evidence, and prioritised fixes. Free tier: One public domain per call; fetches at most 10 URLs.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
csv_qualityDeterministic quality report for a CSV file: structure errors, ragged rows, inferred column types and conformance, blanks, whitespace, mixed date formats, invalid emails/URLs/phone…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Deterministic quality report for a CSV file: structure errors, ragged rows, inferred column types and conformance, blanks, whitespace, mixed date formats, invalid emails/URLs/phones, duplicate rows and candidate keys, with row-level examples and recommended fixes. No model calls, no data retained. Free tier: Up to 5 MB of CSV text (paid) or 200 KB (free tier).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
extract_requirementsExtracts obligations (must/shall/required), prohibitions, recommendations, deadlines, submission instructions and evaluation criteria from tender, RFP, contract or policy text.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Extracts obligations (must/shall/required), prohibitions, recommendations, deadlines, submission instructions and evaluation criteria from tender, RFP, contract or policy text. Every item carries exact character offsets and its section heading so another agent can cite it, plus extracted dates, money amounts and percentages. Deterministic; no model calls. Free tier: Up to 500,000 characters (paid) or 30,000 (free tier). Plain text input; convert PDFs first.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
validate_jsonValidates a JSON document against a JSON Schema (core 2020-12 keywords incl.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_json" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Validates a JSON document against a JSON Schema (core 2020-12 keywords incl. $ref/$defs, anyOf/oneOf/allOf, formats) and returns every error with instance path, schema path and a plain-language message. Use it as an independent gate on structured LLM output before acting on it. Free tier: Document and schema up to 1 MB combined (paid) or 100 KB (free tier).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_citationsFetches each cited URL and checks whether the quoted text actually appears there.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetches each cited URL and checks whether the quoted text actually appears there. Returns supported / partial / not_found / unreachable per claim, with the matching source passage, character offset, HTTP status, content hash and fetch time. Catches hallucinated or drifted citations before an agent relies on them. Free tier: Up to 20 claims per call (paid) or 3 (free tier); public http(s) URLs only; 2 MB per page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 3, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 503
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 503.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-services https://jemeen-agent-services.onrender.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-services https://jemeen-agent-services.onrender.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-services__verify_citations",
"mcp__agent-services__validate_json"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-services__csv_quality",
"mcp__agent-services__agent_readiness",
"mcp__agent-services__extract_requirements"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-services. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__agent-services__verify_citations untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-services__agent_readiness untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.jemeen/agent-services/verify?hash=692139c299a338decf8d2758f8f230d69f292013cd6bb81d07a4f4f07566830d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 692139c299a3, from Nov 2, 2026, 03:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.jemeen/agent-services/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.jemeen/agent-services)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 2, 2026, 03:17 UTC.
Jemeen Agent Services MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. csv_quality, agent_readiness, extract_requirements, verify_citations and validate_json.
Does the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Jemeen Agent Services MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 2, 2026.