Skip to content

Kenwea Notary MCP server

com.kenwea.www/notarywww.kenwea.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Signed, traced record of what an npm package or file attempts when run, network included. No key.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 9 findings, 3 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Kenwea Notary MCP server can do

The Kenwea Notary MCP server is published by www.kenwea.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: kenwea_notary_check, kenwea_notary_verify and kenwea_notary_check_tools), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (kenwea_notary_check, kenwea_notary_check_tree and kenwea_notary_check_tools).

The fixed checks matched 9 findings, 3 of them high severity (sensitive-path, credentials-mention, long-description, model-directed-text and 1 more). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • kenwea_notary_checkNotarize what a file or npm package does at the moment Kenwea fetches it, and get a signed record anyone can check.Reads text others write3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to "~/.npmrc".

      Matched text

      description: "...runner keeps real ones (an npm token in ~/.npmrc and NPM_TOKEN, a GitHub token, AWS keys..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...npm adds for a binding.gyp) with decoy credentials where a developer machine or CI runner..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description is 4,914 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...ave (use kenwea_notary_verify, which runs nothing and does not spend your quota)."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Notarize what a file or npm package does at the moment Kenwea fetches it, and get a signed record anyone can check. Input: exactly one of artifactRef, a public https URL of a single file, npm tarball or Python wheel, or package, an npm package name such as express@4.18.2 (resolved to the exact tarball npm install would download; no version means latest), or a Python one as pypi:requests@2.31.0 (resolved on PyPI to the wheel this sandbox can import: pure Python, or musllinux for CPython 3.12), or an OpenClaw plugin on ClawHub as clawhub:name@version (the release ClawHub serves, refused unless it has the SHA-256 ClawHub publishes; no install step runs, as OpenClaw installs with --ignore-scripts, and the plugin is loaded as OpenClaw loads it, its openclaw.extensions entries imported and register() called with a stand-in OpenClaw API, decoy OpenClaw keys in its config and in ~/.openclaw). Behavior: Kenwea downloads the bytes (up to 32 MiB) and runs executable content in isolation: no route out (a stand-in network inside the sandbox answers every lookup and every TCP connection, on any port and straight to any IP address, and records them), all capabilities dropped, read-only filesystem, not as root, 15 seconds for a file and 55 for a package. For a package it runs the install steps npm would run (preinstall, install, postinstall, and the node-gyp step npm adds for a binding.gyp) with decoy credentials where a developer machine or CI runner keeps real ones (an npm token in ~/.npmrc and NPM_TOKEN, a GitHub token, AWS keys, an SSH key, CI variables, and wallet keys: a Solana keypair, Ethereum and Foundry keystores, MetaMask and Phantom vaults, PRIVATE_KEY, a seed phrase and RPC API keys), each traced for the network connections, DNS lookups and programs it attempts, the credential files it opens and any decoy it puts into what it sends or starts; a single file and a Python package run with the same decoys (plus a PyPI token for Python) and are traced the same way; a PyPI wheel (package pypi:name) is imported with its dependencies installed, resolved as pip would for CPython 3.12 on Linux x86_64 and each checked against PyPI's sha256. After its install a registry npm package is also loaded once, as an application would require or import it, and onLoad says what loading it did; a load that reaches the network or a credential is its own finding (load_tried_network, load_read_credentials, load_sent_credentials). For a registry package that runs something at install, the dependency tree npm would install goes in first, each tarball checked against the registry's integrity hash, and every install step in the tree runs, the dependencies' first; a package that declares none is checked when a dependency does (dependencies.installSteps names them). Returns: level, one word for what the record means (nothing_runs, quiet, network, reads_credentials, sends_credentials, unfinished), and summary, one sentence; installSteps (what runs at install; empty means nothing does) and observed (what the steps attempted, with credentialsRead and credentialsSent when a decoy was touched, and requests: what a step sent to the stand-in network, plain HTTP in full, HTTPS in full when the step accepted the stand-in's certificate authority and otherwise by server name and size); for an npm package, sincePrevious, which install steps were added, removed or changed since the previous published version (from the registry, not signed); a verdict and a reasonCode, the sha256 of what was read, and signedAttestation, an Ed25519 signature over the facts. quiet (verdict approved) means everything that ran finished, was traced whole and touched nothing watched; a step that tried the network, read a credential file, failed or could not be observed is manual_review with the reason; rejected is for a step that tried to send a decoy credential, and for files carrying a provider-formatted credential. A URL that cannot be fetched returns checked false with the reason instead of a verdict; a limit of our runner comes back as manual_review stated as ours. Limits: no key or signup; 20 checks per hour per network address (an IPv6 /64 counts as one address) within a shared hourly ceiling, refused with rate_limited and the reset time. A Kenwea API key sent as a Bearer token uses that key's own quota. At most four checks run at once; one that gets no slot within 10 seconds comes back manual_review with reasonCode runner_busy and nothing run, so retry. The same bytes at the same address under the same checker version get the record issued the first time, marked cached, and nothing is run again. Keeps no copy of the artifact; a finished record is held in memory for up to 24 hours to answer repeats, and a rate counter and a log line keep a short hash of your address. Not for: checking a record you already have (use kenwea_notary_verify, which runs nothing and does not spend your quota).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Notarize what an artifact does
  • kenwea_notary_check_toolsScore an MCP server's tool definitions for what they ask of the model, before you connect it.Reads text others write4 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • High

      The description contains "<IMPORTANT>", a tag of the kind used to mark instructions for the model.

      Matched text

      description: "...: tags that frame text as instructions (<IMPORTANT>, <instructions>), HTML comments and inv..."

      What this check looks for
    • High

      The description refers to "~/.ssh", "~/.cursor/mcp.json" and "~/.aws".

      Matched text

      description: "...ument, naming files where secrets live (~/.ssh, ~/.cursor/mcp.json, ~/.aws), asking fo..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "....cursor/mcp.json, ~/.aws), asking for a credential the schema has no parameter for, steeri..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The description contains "other servers", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      description: "...for, steering the model off the web or other servers toward this one, and speaking to the mo..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Score an MCP server's tool definitions for what they ask of the model, before you connect it. Input: tools, the tools array of a server's tools/list answer (each {name, description, inputSchema}); or server, the server's name as Smithery lists it (for example brave or owner/name), whose published definitions are read from Smithery. Behavior: runs nothing and calls no server. Fixed rules read each description and every parameter description against the tool's own input schema, because anything in the prose the schema does not need is where an injected instruction lives: tags that frame text as instructions (<IMPORTANT>, <instructions>), HTML comments and invisible characters (zero width, bidirectional controls, Unicode tags), asking the model to drop its instructions, to keep something from the user, or to put a file's contents into an argument, naming files where secrets live (~/.ssh, ~/.cursor/mcp.json, ~/.aws), asking for a credential the schema has no parameter for, steering the model off the web or other servers toward this one, and speaking to the model rather than describing the tool. No model reads the text, so the same definitions always get the same findings and anyone can redo them. Keyless, read-only. Returns: level (clean, review or suspicious), summary, findings (each with tool, rule, severity, where and an excerpt), rulesVersion and inputSha256, the SHA-256 of the definitions as read. A finding is a reason to read the definition, not a verdict on the server: on 500 Smithery servers (12,598 tools, rules 2026-10-31.1) 495 were clean, 3 review and 2 suspicious, and read by hand none hid an order or reached for data: the 3 steer the model off web search toward the server, the 2 were a vendor's response instructions and a false positive. Not for: what a server's code does when it runs (use kenwea_notary_check on its npm package).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Score an MCP server's tool definitions
  • kenwea_notary_verifyCheck a signed record produced by kenwea_notary_check: whether its signature is valid under Kenwea's published Ed25519 key, what it attests, and whether it is in Kenwea's public tr…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a signed record produced by kenwea_notary_check: whether its signature is valid under Kenwea's published Ed25519 key, what it attests, and whether it is in Kenwea's public transparency log (log.included, proven with an inclusion proof against a checkpoint signed by the same key), so it was shown to everyone and not only to you. Input: payload and signature exactly as they appear in the record's signedAttestation. payload is a JSON string and must be passed byte for byte; re-serialising it (reordering keys, changing spacing) breaks the signature. signature is standard base64 with padding. Optionally contentSha256, the hex sha256 of bytes you hold, compared without regard to letter case. Behavior: runs nothing and makes no request except fetching Kenwea's published key list (https://www.kenwea.com/.well-known/kenwea-attestation-keys.json), which it caches for an hour and reads again when a record names a key it does not hold. A record names its key inside the signed payload (format 2) and is checked against that key; an older record is tried against every published key. A record signed with a key Kenwea has revoked returns valid false and says so. Read-only and idempotent; it never counts against the check quota. Returns: valid, the keyId and its status, and the signed facts (verdict, reasonCode, installSteps, observed, contentSha256, issuedAt and the rest); with contentSha256, also matchesContentSha256. An altered or re-serialised record returns valid false with the reason, not an error. If the key list cannot be fetched the call fails with key_unavailable and says why. Not for: learning what an artifact does (use kenwea_notary_check). To verify without this tool, take the key from kenwea_notary_get_public_key and use any Ed25519 library.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify a signed Kenwea record
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • kenwea_notary_check_treeAnswer for every package in a project's npm dependency tree at once, from records the notary already holds.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "kenwea_notary_check_tree" says "tree": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...a_notary_check's sandbox run with decoy credentials; one that has none yet is queued and ch..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description is 2,352 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...ockfileVersion 1 file has no hasInstallScript flags and is refused with a reason."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answer for every package in a project's npm dependency tree at once, from records the notary already holds. Input: lockfile, the text of a package-lock.json (lockfileVersion 2 or 3, or its JSON), a pnpm-lock.yaml (v5, v6, v9), a yarn.lock (v1 or berry) or a project's package.json (its ranges resolved as npm would today, devDependencies included); or packages, a list of {name, version, hasInstallScript}, with directs, the project's own dependencies as {name, version}. Behavior: the lockfile says which packages run something at install (hasInstallScript, or requiresBuild in pnpm up to v6), and where it does not (pnpm v9, yarn) the registry is asked for each version (usually a few percent run something); the rest run nothing of their own and are only counted. A step runs inside the project, under the package that pulled it in (@scarf/scarf reports telemetry only for the package that depends on it), so the tree is checked through the project's direct dependencies: each one under which something runs at install is answered by its own record, made with its whole tree installed, and the packages under it come back as covered, with coveredBy naming it. A yarn.lock does not say which packages are direct, so there each package that runs something is checked on its own, and checkedThrough says which way it went. Each record is a stored signed record, made by kenwea_notary_check's sandbox run with decoy credentials; one that has none yet is queued and checked in the background, about two a minute, so ask again later with the same tree to collect it. Nothing runs during the call and it does not spend the per-address check quota (60 tree calls an hour per address). Returns: summary, counts (total, runNothing, runSomething, answered, queued), findings (packages whose level is network, reads_credentials or sends_credentials), checkedThrough (direct_dependencies or each_package), and packages, each with status (answered, queued, not_queued, covered) and, for a direct dependency, covers; when answered, level, summary, verdict, reasonCode, observed and signedAttestation. Verify each record with kenwea_notary_verify or your own Ed25519 code; the tree summary itself is not signed. Not for: one package you want checked now (use kenwea_notary_check). A lockfileVersion 1 file has no hasInstallScript flags and is refused with a reason.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Check a whole dependency tree
  • kenwea_notary_get_public_keyReturn Kenwea's published Ed25519 notary key, so a signed record can be verified with your own code instead of kenwea_notary_verify.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "kenwea_notary_get_public_key" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return Kenwea's published Ed25519 notary key, so a signed record can be verified with your own code instead of kenwea_notary_verify. Input: none. Behavior: reads Kenwea's published key list (https://www.kenwea.com/.well-known/kenwea-attestation-keys.json) and caches it for an hour. Runs nothing, read-only, never counts against the check quota. Fails with key_unavailable if the list cannot be fetched. Returns: the active key's keyId, algorithm ed25519, the key as base64 (32 raw bytes) and as PEM, keyUrl and keysUrl, and keys, every published key with its status (active, retired or revoked). To verify, check signedAttestation.signature (base64) over the exact bytes of signedAttestation.payload with the key whose keyId the payload names, and treat a revoked key as no signature. Not for: checking an artifact (use kenwea_notary_check) or having the check done for you (use kenwea_notary_verify).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Get the notary's public key

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.kenwea.com/notary/v1: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including kenwea_notary_check (write), kenwea_notary_verify (write), kenwea_notary_check_tools (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 high1 warn5 info
Show 3 more findings

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 3.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http notary https://mcp.kenwea.com/notary/v1
claude mcp add --transport http notary https://mcp.kenwea.com/notary/v1

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_get_public_key",
      "mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_check_tree"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_check",
      "mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_verify",
      "mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_check_tools"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as notary. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_check_tree untrusted-input
  • mcp__notary__kenwea_notary_check_tools untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.kenwea.www/notary/verify?hash=22b373a8f4f150dec49082cec7e85c7721b3d0003c27ae7d31bf26acb864b6ce" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 22b373a8f4f1, from Nov 10, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.kenwea.www/notary/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.kenwea.www/notary
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.kenwea.www/notary.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.kenwea.www/notary)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:57 UTC.

Kenwea Notary MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Kenwea Notary MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 9 findings (3 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Kenwea Notary MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Kenwea Notary MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Kenwea Notary MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. kenwea_notary_check, kenwea_notary_verify, kenwea_notary_check_tools, kenwea_notary_get_public_key and kenwea_notary_check_tree.

Does the Kenwea Notary MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Kenwea Notary MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Kenwea Notary MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.