KushBitx AgentProof MCP server
com.kushbitx/agentproofkushbitx.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Safety checks for AI agents paying on Base: free SpendGuard, paid x402 token risk and preflight.
6 tools: 4 do something that can't be undone and 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 3
- 5 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server can do
The KushBitx AgentProof MCP server is published by kushbitx.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (spendguard_evaluate, preflight, verify_payment and kushbitx_preflight) and create or change data (2 tools: quick_check and token_risk), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
6 tools bring in text other people can write (spendguard_evaluate, quick_check, token_risk and 3 more); 3 tools can send data out of your system (spendguard_evaluate, preflight and kushbitx_preflight).
The fixed checks matched 5 findings (annotation-conflict and base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Can't be undone 4Claude Code: ask
kushbitx_preflightOne check before money moves on Base.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.expectedTokenOut.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.expectedTokenOut.description: "...swap must deliver; 0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE for native ETH. For..."
- Warn
The server marks "kushbitx_preflight" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it One check before money moves on Base. Simulates the unsigned transaction, decodes approvals and transfers, screens the token and the recipient or spender, and applies a protected SpendGuard policy when given. Returns ALLOW, REVIEW or BLOCK with sourced findings. Fail-closed: no ALLOW unless every check ran. Does not detect prompt injection; Protected SpendGuard can cap what an agent pays, but does not detect it either. Paid tool: 0.005 USDC per call on Base via x402 (exact scheme). An unpaid call returns the payment requirement and charges nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: KushBitx Preflight
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
preflightSimulate one unsigned Base transaction before an agent signs it.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "preflight" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulate one unsigned Base transaction before an agent signs it. Runs eth_call and gas estimation on current chain state, decodes the intent (ERC-20 transfer, approve, NFT setApprovalForAll), flags unlimited approvals, calldata sent to a non-contract, zero-address targets, reverts and destination risk labels such as phishing or sanctions. Returns ALLOW, WARN, BLOCK or INCOMPLETE with findings. No key or signed transaction is requested. Paid tool: 0.001 USDC per call on Base via x402 (exact scheme). An unpaid call returns the payment requirement and charges nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Simulation Check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
spendguard_evaluateFree.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "spendguard_evaluate" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "spendguard_evaluate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "spendguard_evaluate" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Check a proposed Base USDC payment against a spending policy you supply (per-transaction limit, daily budget, human-approval threshold, allowed recipients) before money moves. Returns APPROVE, HUMAN_APPROVAL or BLOCK with findings. Advisory only: it never signs, holds keys or moves funds.
Annotations the server declares
- title: SpendGuard policy check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
verify_paymentVerify one Base USDC payment onchain before an agent releases goods or credit.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "verify_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify one Base USDC payment onchain before an agent releases goods or credit. Reads the transaction receipt and checks the official USDC Transfer logs against the expected recipient, amount and optional sender. Returns VERIFIED, MISMATCH, FAILED or PENDING_OR_NOT_FOUND with block number, confirmations, the matching transfer and a Basescan link. Read-only: never moves funds. Paid tool: 0.00288 USDC per call on Base via x402 (exact scheme). An unpaid call returns the payment requirement and charges nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Payment Proof
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
quick_checkFast pre-payment sanity check for agents on Base: confirms the RPC reports Base mainnet (chain ID 8453) and that the official USDC contract has deployed code.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Fast pre-payment sanity check for agents on Base: confirms the RPC reports Base mainnet (chain ID 8453) and that the official USDC contract has deployed code. No request body. Returns PASS or FAIL with both checks and a timestamp. It is not a token-risk report, transaction simulation or payment proof. Paid tool: 0.001 USDC per call on Base via x402 (exact scheme). An unpaid call returns the payment requirement and charges nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Quick Check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
token_riskToken-risk report for one Base ERC-20 contract.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Token-risk report for one Base ERC-20 contract. Checks whether the token can be sold (honeypot simulation), buy/sell/transfer tax, owner privileges (mint, pause, blacklist, balance changes, proxy upgrades), holder concentration and DEX liquidity. Returns ALLOW, WARN, BLOCK or INCOMPLETE with scored findings and per-check coverage. INCOMPLETE means required evidence was unavailable, never zero risk. Read-only: never signs or trades. Paid tool: 0.001 USDC per call on Base via x402 (exact scheme). An unpaid call returns the payment requirement and charges nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Token Risk
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (4 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://kushbitx.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including spendguard_evaluate (irreversible), preflight (irreversible), verify_payment (irreversible), kushbitx_preflight (irreversible), quick_check (write) and 2 more
Posture changes
- Nov 14, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
- Oct 30, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 6
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "spendguard_evaluate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "spendguard_evaluate" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- Warnpreflight
The server marks "preflight" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- Warnverify_payment
The server marks "verify_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
The input schema at properties.expectedTokenOut.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.expectedTokenOut.description: "...swap must deliver; 0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE for native ETH. For..."
The server marks "kushbitx_preflight" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 7.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
Tools1 added, 4 changed.+1 added~4 changedView diff
- Added:kushbitx_preflightCan't be undone
- Changed:preflightCan't be undonetitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:quick_checkChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:token_riskChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:verify_paymentCan't be undonedescription
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 -> 6.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 6
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentproof https://kushbitx.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentproof https://kushbitx.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentproof__spendguard_evaluate",
"mcp__agentproof__quick_check",
"mcp__agentproof__token_risk",
"mcp__agentproof__preflight",
"mcp__agentproof__verify_payment",
"mcp__agentproof__kushbitx_preflight"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentproof. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__agentproof__spendguard_evaluate untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agentproof__quick_check untrusted-input
- mcp__agentproof__token_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__agentproof__preflight untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agentproof__verify_payment untrusted-input
- mcp__agentproof__kushbitx_preflight untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.kushbitx/agentproof/verify?hash=602d700a2423908723839bcc3e6756cc64e3b2bc6d7edd860ca9242531fdf6b6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 602d700a2423, from Nov 8, 2026, 15:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.kushbitx/agentproof/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.kushbitx/agentproof)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 22, 2026, 14:17 UTC.
KushBitx AgentProof MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 4 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: spendguard_evaluate, preflight, verify_payment and kushbitx_preflight.
What tools does the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 4 irreversible, 2 write. spendguard_evaluate, preflight, verify_payment, kushbitx_preflight, quick_check and token_risk.
Does the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server send data to outside services?
- 3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): spendguard_evaluate, preflight and kushbitx_preflight.
Has the KushBitx AgentProof MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.