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LayerCall MCP server

com.layercall/trust-apilayercall.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Score an IP, email, phone, domain or device for fraud in one call, with the signals behind it.

7 tools: 6 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the LayerCall MCP server can do

The LayerCall MCP server is published by layercall.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: score_ip, verify_email, score_domain, score_device and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools can send data out of your system (verify_agent and score_user).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • score_deviceJudge a browser fingerprint from /fp.js: headless detection, automation frameworks (Selenium, Puppeteer, Playwright), timezone-versus-IP mismatch and repeat-device history.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Judge a browser fingerprint from /fp.js: headless detection, automation frameworks (Selenium, Puppeteer, Playwright), timezone-versus-IP mismatch and repeat-device history. Note the ceiling honestly — the declared signals it relies on are the first thing stealth tooling patches, so a clean result is weaker evidence than a dirty one.
  • score_domainProfile a domain: registration date from RDAP, registrar, MX/SPF/DMARC configuration, disposable-mail and risky-TLD detection.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Profile a domain: registration date from RDAP, registrar, MX/SPF/DMARC configuration, disposable-mail and risky-TLD detection. newly_registered is null when the age genuinely could not be determined — treat that as unknown, not as 'established'.
  • score_ipRisk-score an IPv4 or IPv6 address.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Risk-score an IPv4 or IPv6 address. Detects commercial VPNs (naming the provider where its own published list confirms it), proxies, Tor exit nodes and datacenter hosting, and returns geolocation, ASN and a 0-100 risk score with an allow/review/block verdict.
  • score_userScore an entire signup in one call — any combination of IP, email, phone and domain — returning a single weighted risk score, a verdict, and the top contributing signals.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Score an entire signup in one call — any combination of IP, email, phone and domain — returning a single weighted risk score, a verdict, and the top contributing signals. A hard block on any component is never averaged away. This is the tool to use when judging a person rather than a value. Costs one lookup PER COMPONENT supplied, not one per call, so four identifiers cost four; the response reports the exact figure as billable_lookups, and cached components are refunded.
  • verify_agentCryptographically verify a Web Bot Auth signature (RFC 9421) — proof of WHICH agent is calling, not a guess from the user-agent.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cryptographically verify a Web Bot Auth signature (RFC 9421) — proof of WHICH agent is calling, not a guess from the user-agent. Returns verified true/false plus the agent's identity and declared purpose. This is the only check here that proves rather than infers, so it carries no score and no verdict: a verified assistant acting for a real user is usually welcome, a verified scraper usually is not, and that policy is the caller's. Pass the request the agent made to YOU — the signature covers its method, authority and path.
  • verify_emailCheck an email for syntax, MX records, disposable/throwaway providers, role accounts (info@, admin@), homograph lookalikes and domain age.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an email for syntax, MX records, disposable/throwaway providers, role accounts (info@, admin@), homograph lookalikes and domain age. Returns a 0-100 risk score and an allow/review/block verdict.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • lookup_phoneValidate a phone number worldwide against its national numbering plan.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_phone" says "lookup": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate a phone number worldwide against its national numbering plan. Returns E.164, country, line type (mobile/fixed/VoIP/toll-free/premium) and a risk score. Works globally, not US-only.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:41 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including score_ip (write), verify_email (write), score_domain (write), score_device (write), verify_agent (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http trust-api https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http trust-api https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__trust-api__lookup_phone"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__trust-api__score_ip",
      "mcp__trust-api__verify_email",
      "mcp__trust-api__score_domain",
      "mcp__trust-api__score_device",
      "mcp__trust-api__verify_agent",
      "mcp__trust-api__score_user"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as trust-api. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__trust-api__verify_agent outbound
  • mcp__trust-api__score_user outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.layercall/trust-api/verify?hash=88ff1a8ca03278911ff8d6266c409c9e95fa0672d33d2383f1fdb0a24f6b0439" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 88ff1a8ca032, from Nov 10, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.layercall/trust-api/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.layercall/trust-api
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.layercall/trust-api.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.layercall/trust-api)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:58 UTC.

LayerCall MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the LayerCall MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the LayerCall MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the LayerCall MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the LayerCall MCP server have?

7 tools: 6 write, 1 read. score_ip, verify_email, score_domain, score_device, verify_agent, score_user and lookup_phone.

Does the LayerCall MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the LayerCall MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): verify_agent and score_user.

Has the LayerCall MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.