LayerHop MCP server
com.layerhop/mcplayerhop.comstreamable-httpv0.5.0Scanned
Best-price cross-chain swap quotes across 70 chains (EVM + Solana). Holds no keys, never signs.
22 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 3 do something that can't be undone, 6 change things and 11 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 22
- Can send data out · 2
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things and 3 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the LayerHop MCP server can do
The LayerHop MCP server is published by layerhop.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 22 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: cancel_limit_order and disable_deposit_address), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (get_swap_link, submit_limit_order and create_deposit_address) and create or change data (6 tools: build_transaction, simulate_transaction, report_submitted, create_limit_order and 2 more). 11 tools only read.
22 tools bring in text other people can write (list_chains, list_tokens, get_quote and 19 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (get_swap_link and create_deposit_address).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.5.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
22 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
cancel_limit_orderCancel an open limit order: returns the UNSIGNED cancel transaction (Solana) or the cancellation typed data (EVM, no gas) for the maker's wallet to sign, then submit_limit_order.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "cancel_limit_order" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Cancel an open limit order: returns the UNSIGNED cancel transaction (Solana) or the cancellation typed data (EVM, no gas) for the maker's wallet to sign, then submit_limit_order. An order that was never submitted is cancelled at once (nothing to sign). Confirm with the user first. The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
disable_deposit_addressDisable a deposit address: LayerHop stops tracking it (no more orders or webhooks for it).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "disable_deposit_address" says "disable": a word for a change.
- The description says "Cannot be undone".
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Disable a deposit address: LayerHop stops tracking it (no more orders or webhooks for it). The provider may still process funds sent to it later, so the user must stop using it. Cannot be undone. Confirm with the user first. Needs a LayerHop API key.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
create_deposit_addressCreate an address the user sends tokens to; every deposit is swapped/bridged and delivered as toToken on toChain to recipient.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_deposit_address" says "create": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Create an address the user sends tokens to; every deposit is swapped/bridged and delivered as toToken on toChain to recipient. No wallet connection or signing needed. Non-custodial: the address belongs to the liquidity provider (Relay), LayerHop never holds funds. Tell the user: send ONLY srcToken on srcChain to the address (other tokens or chains may be lost for good), at least $1 worth; refundTo must be the user's own address on srcChain, never an exchange (CEX) deposit address. Needs a LayerHop API key; test keys (lh_test_) give a fake sandbox address that must never receive real funds. The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
get_swap_linkCreate a https://layerhop.com/swap link prefilled with the swap, which the user opens to review the live quote and fees and sign in their own wallet.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_swap_link" says "get": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "create" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "get_swap_link" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_swap_link" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a https://layerhop.com/swap link prefilled with the swap, which the user opens to review the live quote and fees and sign in their own wallet. This is the default, safest way to execute a swap. The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions. The amount is in human units.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
submit_limit_orderSend a limit order's create or cancel step AFTER the maker's own wallet signed it (from create_limit_order or cancel_limit_order): the signed Solana transaction, or the EIP-712 sig…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_limit_order" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a limit order's create or cancel step AFTER the maker's own wallet signed it (from create_limit_order or cancel_limit_order): the signed Solana transaction, or the EIP-712 signature of an EVM order. This only relays what the wallet signed; The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
build_transactionTurn a quoteId from get_quote into the UNSIGNED transaction the user's own wallet must sign: EVM {chainId, to, data, value in wei, optional ERC-20 approval to send first} or Solana…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn a quoteId from get_quote into the UNSIGNED transaction the user's own wallet must sign: EVM {chainId, to, data, value in wei, optional ERC-20 approval to send first} or Solana {serializedTx base64}. Includes plain-language signing steps. The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions. Only use this when the user has their own signer and explicitly wants raw transaction data, after they confirmed the quote; otherwise give them the swap link.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
create_limit_orderBuild a limit order: sell sellAmount of sellToken once the market gives at least minReceive of buyToken.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_limit_order" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Build a limit order: sell sellAmount of sellToken once the market gives at least minReceive of buyToken. Solana (default, Jupiter Trigger): returns an UNSIGNED transaction; LayerHop's fee applies when buyToken is SOL, USDC or USDT. EVM chains with CoW Protocol (Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Polygon, Avalanche, Gnosis, Linea, Plasma, Ink): returns EIP-712 typed data plus the token approval it needs; sellToken must be an ERC-20. Then the maker's own wallet signs and you call submit_limit_order. Worth at least $5. The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions. Confirm the price with the user first.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
refresh_deposit_addressAsk LayerHop to check a deposit address for new deposits right away (instead of waiting for the next scheduled check).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask LayerHop to check a deposit address for new deposits right away (instead of waiting for the next scheduled check). Call it when the user says they sent funds, then call get_deposit_address after ~15-30 s. Needs a LayerHop API key.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
report_submittedTell LayerHop that the user's wallet broadcast the transaction for a quoteId, so the order is tracked (status, webhooks).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Tell LayerHop that the user's wallet broadcast the transaction for a quoteId, so the order is tracked (status, webhooks). Call this once after broadcasting, with the EVM tx hash (0x + 64 hex) or Solana signature. Idempotent. Does not sign or send anything.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
simulate_depositTEST MODE ONLY (lh_test_ key and a test deposit address): record a fake deposit so the integration can be tested end to end; it becomes a test order that settles with webhooks.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it TEST MODE ONLY (lh_test_ key and a test deposit address): record a fake deposit so the integration can be tested end to end; it becomes a test order that settles with webhooks. The amount decides the outcome: base units ending in 4001 -> refunded, 4002 -> failed, anything else -> filled. Moves no real funds. Fails with a live key.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
simulate_transactionBuild the transaction for a quoteId and dry-run it on-chain (EVM eth_call + gas estimate from the sender; Solana simulateTransaction) without sending anything or recording an order…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Build the transaction for a quoteId and dry-run it on-chain (EVM eth_call + gas estimate from the sender; Solana simulateTransaction) without sending anything or recording an order. Reports whether it would succeed, gas / compute units, whether an ERC-20 approval is still needed, and the error if it would fail. Read-only: The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 11Show 11 read-only tools
get_deposit_addressGet one deposit address with its 20 most recent deposits (orders, quoteId starting with dep_): amount deposited and delivered, status (submitted, pending, filled, refunded, failed)…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_deposit_address" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get one deposit address with its 20 most recent deposits (orders, quoteId starting with dep_): amount deposited and delivered, status (submitted, pending, filled, refunded, failed) and tx hashes. Tell the user: send ONLY srcToken on srcChain to the address (other tokens or chains may be lost for good), at least $1 worth; refundTo must be the user's own address on srcChain, never an exchange (CEX) deposit address. Needs a LayerHop API key; test keys (lh_test_) give a fake sandbox address that must never receive real funds. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_limit_orderGet one limit order with its fills (each fill is an order whose quoteId starts with lof_).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_limit_order" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get one limit order with its fills (each fill is an order whose quoteId starts with lof_). Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_order_statusCheck the status of a swap or bridge after the source transaction was sent: pending, filled (funds delivered), refunded, failed, or unknown (some same-chain providers; check the tx…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_order_status" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check the status of a swap or bridge after the source transaction was sent: pending, filled (funds delivered), refunded, failed, or unknown (some same-chain providers; check the tx on an explorer). Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_quoteGet the best price to swap or bridge tokens, within one chain or across chains (EVM <-> Solana).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_quote" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the best price to swap or bridge tokens, within one chain or across chains (EVM <-> Solana). Asks every liquidity provider and returns the best quote plus alternatives with human-readable amounts, minimum received after slippage, fees (LayerHop fee, partner fee, provider fee, gas) and ETA. Returns a quoteId (valid until expiresAt) and a layerhop.com swapLink a human can open to review and sign. Read-only: The LayerHop MCP server holds no private keys and never signs or broadcasts transactions. Always show the user the fees and output and get confirmation before proceeding.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_token_riskSafety report for a token before the user buys or receives it: honeypot (can't sell), buy/sell/transfer taxes, owner powers (mint, blacklist, pause, freeze), unpublished code, few …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_token_risk" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Safety report for a token before the user buys or receives it: honeypot (can't sell), buy/sell/transfer taxes, owner powers (mint, blacklist, pause, freeze), unpublished code, few holders, and fake majors (a token calling itself USDC/ETH/SOL at the wrong address). level is ok, caution, danger or unknown (no source answered; never block a swap on unknown alone). On danger, warn the user and get explicit confirmation before get_quote. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_chainsList every blockchain LayerHop can swap from or to: slug, numeric chain id, name, VM type (evm or svm = Solana) and native coin.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_chains" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List every blockchain LayerHop can swap from or to: slug, numeric chain id, name, VM type (evm or svm = Solana) and native coin. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_deposit_addressesList the deposit addresses of the API key's account and mode (live or test), newest first: address, route, status, deposit count.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_deposit_addresses" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List the deposit addresses of the API key's account and mode (live or test), newest first: address, route, status, deposit count. Needs a LayerHop API key. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_limit_ordersList limit orders (Solana: Jupiter Trigger; EVM: CoW Protocol) of a wallet, or of the API key's account without a wallet: what is sold, the minimum received, status (built, open, f…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_limit_orders" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List limit orders (Solana: Jupiter Trigger; EVM: CoW Protocol) of a wallet, or of the API key's account without a wallet: what is sold, the minimum received, status (built, open, filled, cancelled, expired, failed) and fills. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_ordersList LayerHop orders (swaps built or submitted through LayerHop) where the address is the sender or recipient, newest first, with status.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_orders" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List LayerHop orders (swaps built or submitted through LayerHop) where the address is the sender or recipient, newest first, with status. Public data (addresses only). Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_tokensList LayerHop's built-in tokens on one chain (symbol, contract address or mint, decimals).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_tokens" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List LayerHop's built-in tokens on one chain (symbol, contract address or mint, decimals). Symbols can be used directly in get_quote; other tokens can be quoted by address. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
lookup_tokenGet one token's symbol, name, decimals, USD price and verified flag from its contract address or SPL mint.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_token" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get one token's symbol, name, decimals, USD price and verified flag from its contract address or SPL mint. The chain is optional: LayerHop finds it (Solana for a mint, else the EVM chain where the token has the most liquidity). verified false means it is on no curated list: confirm the address with the user before swapping. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write22
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:41 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 11
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (2 destructive, 3 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.layerhop.com/mcp: tools/list returned 22 tools to an anonymous client, including cancel_limit_order (destructive), disable_deposit_address (destructive), get_swap_link (irreversible), submit_limit_order (irreversible), create_deposit_address (irreversible) and 6 more
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 11
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnget_swap_link
The server marks "get_swap_link" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_swap_link" says "get": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 -> 11.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 11
Tools7 added, 2 changed.+7 added~2 changedView diff
- Added:cancel_limit_orderDeletes or cancels
- Added:create_limit_orderChanges things
- Added:get_limit_orderOnly reads
- Added:get_token_riskOnly reads
- Added:list_limit_ordersOnly reads
- Added:lookup_tokenOnly reads
- Added:submit_limit_orderCan't be undone
- Changed:get_quoteOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:list_ordersOnly readsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.5.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http layerhop https://mcp.layerhop.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http layerhop https://mcp.layerhop.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__layerhop__list_chains",
"mcp__layerhop__list_tokens",
"mcp__layerhop__get_quote",
"mcp__layerhop__get_order_status",
"mcp__layerhop__list_orders",
"mcp__layerhop__lookup_token",
"mcp__layerhop__get_token_risk",
"mcp__layerhop__list_limit_orders",
"mcp__layerhop__get_limit_order",
"mcp__layerhop__list_deposit_addresses",
"mcp__layerhop__get_deposit_address"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__layerhop__build_transaction",
"mcp__layerhop__simulate_transaction",
"mcp__layerhop__report_submitted",
"mcp__layerhop__get_swap_link",
"mcp__layerhop__create_limit_order",
"mcp__layerhop__submit_limit_order",
"mcp__layerhop__create_deposit_address",
"mcp__layerhop__refresh_deposit_address",
"mcp__layerhop__simulate_deposit"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__layerhop__cancel_limit_order",
"mcp__layerhop__disable_deposit_address"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as layerhop. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 22 rules
- mcp__layerhop__list_chains untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__list_tokens untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__get_quote untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__build_transaction untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__simulate_transaction untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__report_submitted untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__get_order_status untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__list_orders untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__get_swap_link untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__layerhop__lookup_token untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__get_token_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__list_limit_orders untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__get_limit_order untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__create_limit_order untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__submit_limit_order untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__cancel_limit_order untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__create_deposit_address untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__layerhop__list_deposit_addresses untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__get_deposit_address untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__refresh_deposit_address untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__disable_deposit_address untrusted-input
- mcp__layerhop__simulate_deposit untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.layerhop/mcp/verify?hash=0fd6e3b37d41fd4fb986d801260a08e3bb22b7b571c300b12bf34e8494178ab7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 0fd6e3b37d41, from Nov 10, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.layerhop/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.layerhop/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:58 UTC.
LayerHop MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the LayerHop MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 22 tools, 11 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the LayerHop MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: cancel_limit_order and disable_deposit_address.
Can the LayerHop MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: get_swap_link, submit_limit_order and create_deposit_address.
What tools does the LayerHop MCP server have?
- 22 tools: 2 destructive, 3 irreversible, 6 write, 11 read. cancel_limit_order, disable_deposit_address, get_swap_link, submit_limit_order, create_deposit_address, build_transaction, simulate_transaction, report_submitted and 14 more.
Does the LayerHop MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the LayerHop MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_swap_link and create_deposit_address.
Has the LayerHop MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.