Let Agents In MCP server
com.letagentsin/scannerletagentsin.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Scan agent readiness, or find measured providers an unattended AI agent can finish with.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Let Agents In MCP server can do
The Let Agents In MCP server is published by letagentsin.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: scan_domain), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (find_providers); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_domain and find_providers).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
scan_domainScores a domain across 5 funnel stages using 16 deterministic HTTP checks.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Scores a domain across 5 funnel stages using 16 deterministic HTTP checks. 18 points exist on paper; the score is out of the points that both applied to the domain and could be evaluated. Returns a per-check breakdown with the reason for each result and a permanent link.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
find_providersDescribe the problem in your own words, for example "let users upload images" or "send transactional email".Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_providers" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "describe" and "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "describe" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Describe the problem in your own words, for example "let users upload images" or "send transactional email". Returns the vendors we have measured in that category, split by whether an unattended run clears every barrier we test, stops at one, or was never measurable, each with the date and a link to the evidence. This is not a recommendation: it does not know whether a vendor suits your job, only where an agent stops. Routing a sentence to a category is by far the weakest thing here, and the numbers below are the ones to plan around. Measured on 40 questions written by an agent with no access to this repository and no sight of the category list, labelled before the first run, and built to be hard: fourteen of them ask about the caller own code in commercial words (a billing module, a payments table, a notifications worker), and six ask for something real that a catalogue this size does not hold. It got 29 of the 40 right, said nothing on 8 it should have answered, sent 0 to the wrong category and answered 3 that it should have refused. Put another way: it gave an answer to 14 of the 40, and 3 of those answers were wrong, while refusing 18 of the 21 it should have refused. It is deliberately quiet. One vocabulary word inside a long question decides nothing, and a question shaped like a request for code rather than for a vendor is refused outright. Silence means we could not read the question, not that the category is empty. The tool reads English. Name the category yourself when you know it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:41 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://letagentsin.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_domain (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http scanner https://letagentsin.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http scanner https://letagentsin.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__scanner__find_providers"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__scanner__scan_domain"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as scanner. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__scanner__scan_domain untrusted-input
- mcp__scanner__find_providers private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.letagentsin/scanner/verify?hash=573677fcd23824c9d8edb44ea5463e5e9ce755ae99623496c3442e93432b4d43" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 573677fcd238, from Nov 13, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.letagentsin/scanner/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.letagentsin/scanner)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:58 UTC.
Let Agents In MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Let Agents In MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Let Agents In MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Let Agents In MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Let Agents In MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. scan_domain and find_providers.
Does the Let Agents In MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Let Agents In MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Let Agents In MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.