InsideOut (Riley) MCP server
com.luthersystems.insideout/mcpinsideout.luthersystems.comstreamable-httpv0.36.3Scanned
Designs, prices, and deploys AWS/GCP cloud infrastructure from plain-English requirements.
24 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 19 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 24
- Can send data out · 0
- 43 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server can do
The InsideOut (Riley) MCP server is published by insideout.luthersystems.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 24 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: tfdeploy and tfdestroy) and create or change data (19 tools: awsinspect, awsinspect_batch, convoinspect, convoopen and 15 more). 3 tools only read.
24 tools bring in text other people can write (awsinspect, awsinspect_batch, convoawait and 21 more).
The fixed checks matched 43 findings (credentials-mention, long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.36.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
24 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
tfdeployWORKFLOW: Step 4 of 4 - Deploy infrastructure to the cloud Deploy infrastructure by starting a Terraform job for an InsideOut session.Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "CREDENTIAL".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...en the existing run is provably wedged. CREDENTIAL FLOW (if credentials are missing): 1. R..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it WORKFLOW: Step 4 of 4 - Deploy infrastructure to the cloud Deploy infrastructure by starting a Terraform job for an InsideOut session. This tool initiates the actual deployment process after Terraform files have been generated. IMPORTANT: This starts a long-running job (15+ minutes). Use tfstatus to monitor progress. SINGLE-FLIGHT: only one TF job (apply/plan/destroy/drift) runs per session at a time. If another job is already in flight, tfdeploy returns tf_job_conflict with the live job_id — attach with tfstatus/tflogs instead of retrying, or pass force_new=true to override. Returns confirmation that the deployment has started. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: plan_id (string) — Apply a previously created plan from tfplan. Preview-then-apply workflow: tfplan → tflogs (review) → tfdeploy(plan_id=...). OPTIONAL: sandbox (boolean, default false) — deploys real generated Terraform. Set to true for cheap sandbox template (testing only). OPTIONAL: ignore_drift (boolean, default false) - when true, proceeds with deploy even if infrastructure drift is detected. By default, deploys fail on drift. Use after reviewing drift details via tfdrift or tflogs. OPTIONAL: force_new (boolean, default false) - bypass the session-level single-flight guard. Use only when the existing run is provably wedged. CREDENTIAL FLOW (if credentials are missing): 1. Response includes a connect_url — present it to the user 2. Call credawait(session_id=...) to poll for credentials 3. When credawait returns success, retry tfdeploy Do NOT call credawait without first showing the connect URL to the user.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
tfdestroyDESTROY: Tear down previously deployed infrastructure Destroys infrastructure by calling the Oracle destroy endpoint for a session that has a prior successful deployment.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "destroy": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The d..."
Description, as the server wrote it DESTROY: Tear down previously deployed infrastructure Destroys infrastructure by calling the Oracle destroy endpoint for a session that has a prior successful deployment. IMPORTANT: This starts a long-running job. Use tfstatus/tflogs to monitor progress. SINGLE-FLIGHT: only one TF job per session at a time. If another job is already in flight, tfdestroy returns tf_job_conflict with the live job_id — attach with tfstatus/tflogs, or pass force_new=true to override. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: force_new (boolean, default false) - bypass the single-flight guard. Use only when the existing run is provably wedged. PREREQUISITE: The session must have a prior successful deployment with a project_id. After destroy completes, the session is kept for historical record but hasDeployment is set to false.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 19Claude Code: ask
awsinspectINSPECTION: Inspect AWS infrastructure for a deployed project ⚠[U+FE0F] **PREREQUISITE**: This tool requires a prior deployment ATTEMPT (successful or failed).Reads text others write3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ructure. It fetches temporary read-only credentials securely and queries the AWS API direct..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Info
The description is 2,287 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...spect(session_id=..., service="rds", action="describe-db-instances", detail=true)"
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] INSPECTION: Inspect AWS infrastructure for a deployed project ⚠[U+FE0F] **PREREQUISITE**: This tool requires a prior deployment ATTEMPT (successful or failed). Check convostatus for hasDeployAttempt=true before calling. Works even after failed deploys to inspect orphaned resources. Inspect deployed AWS resources after a deployment attempt. Use this tool when the user asks about the status or details of their deployed infrastructure. It fetches temporary read-only credentials securely and queries the AWS API directly. RESPONSE TIERS (default is summary for token efficiency): - Summary (default): Key fields only (~500 tokens). Set detail=false, raw=false or omit both. - Detail: Full metadata for a specific resource. Set detail=true + resource filter. - Raw: Complete unprocessed API response. Set raw=true. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). Supported services: account, acm, alb, apigateway, apprunner, backup, bedrock, cloudfront, cloudwatchlogs, cognito, cost-explorer, dynamodb, ebs, ec2, ecs, eks, elasticache, kms, lambda, msk, opensearch, rds, route53, s3, sagemaker, secretsmanager, sqs, vpc, waf For a specific service's actions, call with action="list-actions". METRICS: Use list-metrics to discover available metrics for a service (no credentials needed). Then use get-metrics to retrieve data (auto-discovers resources). Most services return CloudWatch time-series. KMS returns key health (rotation, state). SecretsManager returns secret health (rotation, last accessed/rotated). Optional filters JSON: {"hours":6,"period":300}. BILLING: Use service=cost-explorer to inspect AWS costs. Actions: get-cost-summary (last 30 days by service, filters: {"days":7,"granularity":"DAILY"}), get-cost-forecast (projected spend through end of month), get-cost-by-tag (costs grouped by tag, filters: {"tag_key":"Environment","days":30}). Requires ce:GetCostAndUsage and ce:GetCostForecast IAM permissions. EXAMPLES: - awsinspect(session_id=..., service="ec2", action="describe-instances") - awsinspect(session_id=..., service="cost-explorer", action="get-cost-summary") - awsinspect(session_id=..., service="ec2", action="get-metrics", filters="{\"hours\":6}") - awsinspect(session_id=..., service="rds", action="describe-db-instances", detail=true)
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
awsinspect_batchBATCH INSPECTION: run up to 32 AWS inspect probes in one call.Reads text others write4 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...3 resources. The backend fetches Oracle credentials ONCE per batch and fans out probes agai..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.subs.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.subs.description: "...s?, detail?, raw?}. The backend fetches credentials once per batch and fans out probes in p..."
- Info
The description is 2,130 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...\":6}"}, {"service":"rds","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}])"
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] BATCH INSPECTION: run up to 32 AWS inspect probes in one call. ⚠[U+FE0F] **PREREQUISITE**: Same as awsinspect — deploy attempt required. Check convostatus for hasDeployAttempt=true before calling. Use this when you need to check more than ~3 resources. The backend fetches Oracle credentials ONCE per batch and fans out probes against a single AWS config — for a 12-resource health check this is ~5–8× faster and 12× fewer Oracle round-trips than calling awsinspect 12 times. BUDGETS: - Up to 32 sub-probes per call (subs array length). - 30s per-sub timeout; 60s total batch wall-clock. - Concurrency cap 8 — sub-probes run in parallel but never saturate AWS. - 512 KB response cap: subs past the cap keep their envelope (index/service/action/ok) but have result replaced with truncated=true. PARTIAL FAILURE IS EXPECTED. The response is an ordered results array; each entry has {index, service, action, ok, result, error}. Inspect each result — do NOT abort on the first error. A credential fetch failure leaves cred-less probes (list-actions, list-metrics) succeeding anyway. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). Supported services: account, acm, alb, apigateway, apprunner, backup, bedrock, cloudfront, cloudwatchlogs, cognito, cost-explorer, dynamodb, ebs, ec2, ecs, eks, elasticache, kms, lambda, msk, opensearch, rds, route53, s3, sagemaker, secretsmanager, sqs, vpc, waf For a specific service's actions, use awsinspect (singular) with action="list-actions" — batch is not the place for discovery. Batch responses are always summarized (no detail/raw per-sub); use singular awsinspect when you need full metadata or raw API output for one resource. EXAMPLES: - awsinspect_batch(session_id=..., subs=[ {"service":"ec2","action":"describe-instances"}, {"service":"rds","action":"describe-db-instances"}, {"service":"vpc","action":"describe-vpcs"}, {"service":"s3","action":"list-buckets"}]) - awsinspect_batch(session_id=..., subs=[ {"service":"ec2","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}, {"service":"rds","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}])
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
convoinspectINSPECTION: View a session's conversation transcript and metadata Returns the full message history (user / assistant / tool turns) plus the session's meta — workflow step, cloud, d…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it INSPECTION: View a session's conversation transcript and metadata Returns the full message history (user / assistant / tool turns) plus the session's meta — workflow step, cloud, deployment status, drift state. This is the transcript-reader companion to the other read tools — combine it with: • `convostatus` for the live stack / config / pricing • `tfruns` for deployment history (apply / destroy / plan / drift) • `stackversions` for the stack-version ladder Use it when a user asks 'what did I say earlier?' or you need to retrace why the session ended up where it did. Read-only; never mutates session state. REQUIRES: session_id (format: sess_v2_...).
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
convoopenWORKFLOW: Step 1 of 4 - Start infrastructure design conversation Open an InsideOut V2 session and receive the assistant's intro message.Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...token=yyy) which is part of the session credential — without it, downstream tools fall bac..."
- Info
The description is 2,281 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...xamine workflow.usage prompt for more context on how to properly use these tools."
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] WORKFLOW: Step 1 of 4 - Start infrastructure design conversation Open an InsideOut V2 session and receive the assistant's intro message. The response contains a clean message from Riley (the infrastructure advisor) - display it to the user. ⚠[U+FE0F] Riley will ask questions - forward these to the user, DO NOT answer on their behalf. CRITICAL: This tool returns a session_id in the response metadata. You MUST use this session_id for ALL subsequent tool calls (convoreply, tfgenerate, tfdeploy, etc.). ⚠[U+FE0F] The session_id includes a ?token=... suffix (format: sess_v2_xxx?token=yyy) which is part of the session credential — without it, downstream tools fall back to a tokenless connect URL that 401s. Always pass session_id verbatim to subsequent tools and to the user; do NOT shorten, paraphrase, or strip the ?token= portion when summarizing the session in chat or in your own scratch notes. Use when the user mentions keywords like: 'setup my cloud infra', 'provision infrastructure', 'deploy infra', 'start insideout', 'use insideout', or similar intent to begin infra setup. OPTIONAL: project_context (string) - General tech stack summary so Riley can skip discovery questions and jump to recommendations. The agent should confirm this with the user before sending. Include whichever apply: language/framework, databases/services, container usage, existing IaC, CI/CD platform, cloud provider, Kubernetes usage, what the project does. Example: 'Next.js 14 + TypeScript, PostgreSQL, Redis, Docker Compose, deployed to AWS ECS, GitHub Actions CI/CD, ~50k MAU'. NEVER include credentials, secrets, API keys, PII, source code, or internal URLs/IPs -- only general metadata summaries useful to a cloud architect agent. IMPORTANT: source (string) - You MUST set this to identify which IDE/tool you are. Auto-detect from your environment: 'claude-code', 'codex', 'antigravity', 'kiro', 'vscode', 'web', 'mcp'. If unsure, use the name of your IDE/tool in lowercase. Do NOT omit this — it controls the 'Open {IDE}' button on the credential connect screen. OPTIONAL: github_username (string) - GitHub username for deploy commit attribution. Pre-populates the GitHub username field on the connect page. 💡 TIP: Examine workflow.usage prompt for more context on how to properly use these tools.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
convoreplyWORKFLOW: Step 2 of 4 - Continue infrastructure design conversation Send a user message to the active InsideOut session and receive the assistant reply.Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Info
The description is 2,029 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...tatus to check progress anytime. Examine workflow.usage prompt for more guidance."
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] WORKFLOW: Step 2 of 4 - Continue infrastructure design conversation Send a user message to the active InsideOut session and receive the assistant reply. The response contains a clean message from Riley - display it to the user. ⚠[U+FE0F] CRITICAL: DO NOT answer Riley's questions yourself! Forward questions to the user and wait for their response. NEVER fabricate or assume the user's answer, even if you think you know what they would say. Examples of questions Riley asks that YOU MUST forward to the user: - 'Any questions or tweaks to these details?' - 'Ready for the cost estimate?' - 'Do you want to change the stack/config?' - 'Ready to proceed to Terraform?' When Riley asks ANY question, STOP and wait for the user's answer! 📋 WORKFLOW PHASES: The typical flow is conversation → tfgenerate → tfdeploy When terraform_ready=true appears in THIS tool's response, THEN you can call tfgenerate. ⚠[U+FE0F] DO NOT call tfgenerate until this tool returns! Wait for the response first. 🎯 KEY SIGNALS IN RESPONSE: - `[TERRAFORM_READY: true]` → NOW you can call tfgenerate - `[[BUTTON_TF_APPLY: ...]]` → Deployment is ready! Ask user if they want to deploy, then use tfdeploy - `[[BUTTON_TF_DESTROY: ...]]` → User confirmed destroy intent! Ask user to confirm, then use tfdestroy - `[[BUTTON_TF_PLAN: ...]]` → User wants to preview changes! Use tfplan to run a plan, then tfdeploy with plan_id to apply REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: timeout (integer) - seconds to wait for response. For Cursor, use 50 (default). Max 55. OPTIONAL: project_context (string) - Only pass genuinely NEW project details the user shares after convoopen. Do NOT resend context already provided in convoopen — Riley remembers it. Do NOT scan files or directories to gather this — only use what the user explicitly tells you. Example: user reveals a new constraint like 'we also need HIPAA compliance' mid-conversation. 💡 TIP: Use convostatus to check progress anytime. Examine workflow.usage prompt for more guidance.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
convostatusINSPECTION: View the current infrastructure stack for a session Returns the current state of the user's infrastructure design including: **Components** - Selected infrastructure se…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it INSPECTION: View the current infrastructure stack for a session Returns the current state of the user's infrastructure design including: **Components** - Selected infrastructure services (VPC, databases, caching, etc.) • Shows what services the user has chosen (e.g., PostgreSQL, Redis, S3) • Includes architecture decisions (EKS vs EC2, monolith vs microservices) **Config** - Configuration details for each component • Database sizes, replica counts, storage amounts • Cache settings, queue configurations • Backup schedules and retention policies **Pricing** - Cost estimates (when available) • Monthly cost estimates per component • Total estimated monthly spend **Phase Indicators** - Where the user is in the design workflow: • hasComponents: User has selected infrastructure services • hasConfig: User has configured component details • hasPricing: Cost estimates have been calculated • hasTerraform: Ready for Terraform generation Use this tool when the user asks 'what is my current stack?', 'show my infrastructure', 'what have I selected?', or similar questions about their design progress. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...).
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
credawaitWait for the user to securely connect their cloud account and subscribe to Luther Systems.Reads text others write6 findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "wait": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The title mentions "Credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
title: "Await Cloud Credentials"
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ubscribe to Luther Systems. Polls until credentials appear on the session. 🎯 USE THIS TOO..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.timeout.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.timeout.description: "...the user to complete the browser-based credential connect flow. Default 300, max 600."
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Info
The input schema at properties.cloud.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.cloud.description: "Cloud provider whose credentials are awaited: 'aws' or 'gcp'. Defaults t..."
- Warn
The server marks "credawait" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "wait": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Wait for the user to securely connect their cloud account and subscribe to Luther Systems. Polls until credentials appear on the session. 🎯 USE THIS TOOL WHEN: tfdeploy returns an 'auth_required', 'no_credentials', or 'credentials_expired' error. The user needs to visit the connect URL to: 1. Connect their cloud credentials (AWS or GCP) 2. Sign up and subscribe to a Luther Systems plan (required for deployment) This secure connection allows InsideOut to deploy and manage infrastructure in the user's cloud account on their behalf. Credentials are handled securely and only used for deployment and management sessions. WORKFLOW: 1. FIRST: Present the connect URL and explanation to the user (from the tfdeploy error response) 2. THEN: Call this tool to begin polling for credentials 3. The user opens the URL in their browser to subscribe and add credentials 4. When credentials are found, inform the user and call tfdeploy to deploy IMPORTANT: Do NOT call this tool without first showing the connect URL to the user. The user needs to see the URL to complete the process. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: cloud ('aws' or 'gcp'), timeout (integer, seconds to wait, default 300, max 600).
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
gcpinspectINSPECTION: Inspect GCP infrastructure for a deployed project ⚠[U+FE0F] **PREREQUISITE**: This tool requires a prior deployment ATTEMPT (successful or failed).Reads text others write3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ructure. It fetches temporary read-only credentials securely and queries the GCP API direct..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Info
The description is 2,615 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...":6}") - gcpinspect(session_id=..., service="billing", action="get-billing-info")"
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] INSPECTION: Inspect GCP infrastructure for a deployed project ⚠[U+FE0F] **PREREQUISITE**: This tool requires a prior deployment ATTEMPT (successful or failed). Check convostatus for hasDeployAttempt=true before calling. Works even after failed deploys to inspect orphaned resources. Inspect deployed GCP resources after a deployment attempt. Use this tool when the user asks about the status or details of their deployed GCP infrastructure. It fetches temporary read-only credentials securely and queries the GCP API directly. RESPONSE TIERS (default is summary for token efficiency): - Summary (default): Key fields only (~500 tokens). Set detail=false, raw=false or omit both. - Detail: Full metadata for a specific resource. Set detail=true + resource filter. - Raw: Complete unprocessed API response. Set raw=true. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). Supported services: apigateway, bastion, billing, certificatemanager, cloudarmor, cloudbuild, cloudcdn, clouddeploy, clouddns, cloudfunctions, cloudkms, cloudlogging, cloudmonitoring, cloudrun, cloudsql, compute, firestore, gcs, gke, iam, identityplatform, loadbalancer, memorystore, pubsub, secretmanager, vertexai, vpc For a specific service's actions, call with action="list-actions". METRICS: Use list-metrics to see available Cloud Monitoring metrics for any service (no credentials needed — progressive disclosure). Use get-metrics to retrieve time-series data. Optional filters JSON: {"hours":6,"period":300}. Label breakdowns: Cloud Functions (by status), Load Balancer/API Gateway (by response_code_class), Cloud CDN (by cache_result). Secret Manager get-metrics returns operational health (version count, replication, create time) — no time-series. Bastion is an alias for Compute Engine metrics (SSH connection count not available as a GCP metric). BILLING: Use service=billing to inspect GCP billing. Actions: get-billing-info (check if billing enabled, which billing account), get-budgets (list budget alerts for the project — auto-fetches billing account). Requires roles/billing.viewer IAM role. Required IAM roles: Monitoring Viewer (roles/monitoring.viewer) for metrics, Secret Manager Viewer (roles/secretmanager.viewer) for secret health, Billing Viewer (roles/billing.viewer) for billing. EXAMPLES: - gcpinspect(session_id=..., service="compute", action="list-instances") - gcpinspect(session_id=..., service="gke", action="list-clusters") - gcpinspect(session_id=..., service="cloudsql", action="get-metrics", filters="{\"hours\":6}") - gcpinspect(session_id=..., service="billing", action="get-billing-info")
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
gcpinspect_batchBATCH INSPECTION: run up to 32 GCP inspect probes in one call.Reads text others write4 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...3 resources. The backend fetches Oracle credentials ONCE per batch and fans out probes agai..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.subs.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.subs.description: "...s?, detail?, raw?}. The backend fetches credentials once per batch and fans out probes in p..."
- Info
The description is 2,098 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "..."}, {"service":"cloudrun","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}])"
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] BATCH INSPECTION: run up to 32 GCP inspect probes in one call. ⚠[U+FE0F] **PREREQUISITE**: Same as gcpinspect — deploy attempt required. Check convostatus for hasDeployAttempt=true before calling. Use this when you need to check more than ~3 resources. The backend fetches Oracle credentials ONCE per batch and fans out probes against a single GCP credentials blob — a 12-resource health check is ~5–8× faster and 12× fewer Oracle round-trips than calling gcpinspect 12 times. BUDGETS: - Up to 32 sub-probes per call (subs array length). - 30s per-sub timeout; 60s total batch wall-clock. - Concurrency cap 8. - 512 KB response cap: subs past the cap keep their envelope (index/service/action/ok) but have result replaced with truncated=true. PARTIAL FAILURE IS EXPECTED. The response is an ordered results array; each entry has {index, service, action, ok, result, error}. Inspect each result — do NOT abort on the first error. A credential fetch failure leaves cred-less probes (list-actions, list-metrics) succeeding anyway. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). Supported services: apigateway, bastion, billing, certificatemanager, cloudarmor, cloudbuild, cloudcdn, clouddeploy, clouddns, cloudfunctions, cloudkms, cloudlogging, cloudmonitoring, cloudrun, cloudsql, compute, firestore, gcs, gke, iam, identityplatform, loadbalancer, memorystore, pubsub, secretmanager, vertexai, vpc For a specific service's actions, use gcpinspect (singular) with action="list-actions" — batch is not the place for discovery. Batch responses are always summarized (no detail/raw per-sub); use singular gcpinspect when you need full metadata or raw API output for one resource. EXAMPLES: - gcpinspect_batch(session_id=..., subs=[ {"service":"compute","action":"list-instances"}, {"service":"gke","action":"list-clusters"}, {"service":"cloudsql","action":"list-instances"}]) - gcpinspect_batch(session_id=..., subs=[ {"service":"compute","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}, {"service":"cloudrun","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}])
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
stackdiffStructured diff showing what would be deployed if the user ran tfdeploy now.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it Structured diff showing what would be deployed if the user ran tfdeploy now. Returns component-level changes (added/removed/modified), field-level details, and pricing deltas. Defaults (#1392): with no version arguments, compares the LAST SUCCESSFULLY DEPLOYED version against the user's CURRENT LIVE DESIGN (the same data the UI shows). Empty baseline if nothing has been deployed or after a destroy. Pending drafts are NOT used as the target — they go stale once the user edits past them; live IR via chat history is always current. Pass explicit `from_version` and/or `to_version` integers to compare any two saved versions (e.g. v3 → v5). REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...).
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
stackrollbackCreate a draft version by reverting to a previous version's config.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it Create a draft version by reverting to a previous version's config. Copies components, config, and pricing from the target version. If a draft already exists, updates it in-place (single-draft rule). Use `stackversions` first to find available version numbers. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...), version (target version number).
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
submit_feedbackFEEDBACK: Submit feedback, bug reports, or feature requests to Luther Systems Use this tool to forward user feedback directly to the Luther Systems team.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_feedback" says "submit": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. Ident..."
Description, as the server wrote it FEEDBACK: Submit feedback, bug reports, or feature requests to Luther Systems Use this tool to forward user feedback directly to the Luther Systems team. This includes bug reports, feature requests, questions, or general feedback about InsideOut. The agent itself can also use this tool to report issues it encounters during operation. REQUIRES: session_id, category, message OPTIONAL: user_email (for follow-up), user_name, source (default: 'mcp'), initiator ('user' or 'agent') Categories: bug_report, feature_request, general_feedback, question, security The 'initiator' field tracks who triggered the report: - 'user' — the user explicitly reported the issue or requested feedback submission - 'agent' — Riley detected an issue and initiated the feedback flow Examples: - User says 'the deploy button is broken' → submit_feedback(category='bug_report', message='...', initiator='user') - User says 'I wish it had dark mode' → submit_feedback(category='feature_request', message='...', initiator='user') - Deployment failed with Terraform error → submit_feedback(category='bug_report', message='Deployment failed: Terraform apply error on aws_alb resource — timeout waiting for ALB provisioning', initiator='agent')
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
tfdriftDRIFT CHECK: Run a read-only drift detection check Checks whether deployed infrastructure has drifted from the expected Terraform state.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it DRIFT CHECK: Run a read-only drift detection check Checks whether deployed infrastructure has drifted from the expected Terraform state. This is a read-only operation — it does NOT modify any infrastructure. Returns job_id. Use tflogs to stream the drift check results. SINGLE-FLIGHT: only one TF job per session at a time. If another job is already in flight, tfdrift returns tf_job_conflict with the live job_id — attach with tfstatus/tflogs, or pass force_new=true to override. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). PREREQUISITE: The session must have a prior deployment with a project_id. OPTIONAL: force_new (boolean, default false) - bypass the single-flight guard. Use only when the existing run is provably wedged. If drift is detected, the user can either fix the drift or use tfdeploy(ignore_drift=true) to proceed.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
tfgenerateWORKFLOW: Step 3 of 4 - Generate Terraform files from completed design Generate Terraform files from an InsideOut session that has completed infrastructure design.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. Riley..."
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] WORKFLOW: Step 3 of 4 - Generate Terraform files from completed design Generate Terraform files from an InsideOut session that has completed infrastructure design. ⚠[U+FE0F] PREREQUISITE: Only call this AFTER convoreply returns with `terraform_ready=true` in the response metadata. DO NOT call this while convoreply is still running or before terraform_ready is confirmed! If you get 'session has not reached terraform-ready state', wait for convoreply to complete first. 🎯 USE THIS TOOL WHEN: convoreply has returned with terraform_ready=true, OR the user asks to 'see the terraforms', 'generate terraform', 'show me the code', etc. **DEFAULT RESPONSE**: Returns summary table + download URL (keeps code out of LLM context). **FALLBACK**: Set `include_code: true` to get full code inline if curl/unzip fails. **CRITICAL WORKFLOW** (default mode): 1. Call this tool to get file summary and download URL 2. ASK the user: 'Where would you like me to save the Terraform files? Default: ./insideout-infra/' 3. WAIT for user confirmation before running the download command 4. Run the curl/unzip command with the user's chosen directory 5. If curl/unzip FAILS (sandbox, security, platform issues), retry with `include_code: true` **AFTER GENERATION**: Ask user if they want to review the files and then deploy with tfdeploy REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: include_code (boolean) - set true to return full code inline as fallback. 💡 TIP: Examine workflow.usage prompt for more context on how to properly use these tools.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
tflogsMONITORING: Fetch Terraform deployment logs with pagination Fetches logs from a running or completed Terraform deployment job.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] MONITORING: Fetch Terraform deployment logs with pagination Fetches logs from a running or completed Terraform deployment job. For **completed jobs**: uses REST endpoint for instant retrieval (supports `tail` for server-side filtering). For **running jobs**: streams via SSE with timeout-based pagination. **PAGINATION** (running jobs only): Use `last_event_id` from the response to fetch more: 1. First call: `tflogs(session_id='...')` → get logs + `last_event_id` 2. Next call: `tflogs(session_id='...', last_event_id='...')` → get NEW logs only 3. Repeat until `complete: true` in response **RESPONSE FIELDS**: - `logs`: Array of log messages collected - `last_event_id`: Pass this back to get more logs (pagination cursor, SSE only) - `complete`: true if job finished, false if more logs may be available - `total_logs`: total log entries before tail truncation REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: job_id to target a specific deployment (use tfruns to discover IDs), timeout (default 50s, max 55s), last_event_id (for pagination), tail (return only last N entries) ⚠[U+FE0F] CONTEXT WARNING: Deploy logs can be hundreds of lines. Use tail: 50 for completed jobs to avoid blowing up the context window.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tfoutputsINSPECTION: Retrieve Terraform outputs from a completed deployment Returns structured output values (VPC IDs, endpoints, cluster names, etc.) after a successful deploy.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it INSPECTION: Retrieve Terraform outputs from a completed deployment Returns structured output values (VPC IDs, endpoints, cluster names, etc.) after a successful deploy. Sensitive outputs are redacted (shown as '(sensitive)'). By default returns outputs for the latest successful deploy. Optionally specify job_id to get outputs for a specific deployment. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: job_id (specific deployment), lifecycle (filter by step e.g. 'cloud-provision').
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tfplanPREVIEW: Run terraform plan to preview infrastructure changes Runs a terraform plan for an InsideOut session without applying any changes.Reads text others write3 findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "preview": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "CREDENTIAL".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...en the existing run is provably wedged. CREDENTIAL HANDLING: Same as tfdeploy - credential..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Warn
The server marks "tfplan" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "preview": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it PREVIEW: Run terraform plan to preview infrastructure changes Runs a terraform plan for an InsideOut session without applying any changes. This lets the user review what will be created/changed/destroyed before committing. Returns job_id, plan_id, and project_id. Use tflogs to stream the plan output. After the plan completes, use tfdeploy with plan_id to apply the exact plan. SINGLE-FLIGHT: only one TF job per session at a time. If another job is already in flight, tfplan returns tf_job_conflict with the live job_id — attach with tfstatus/tflogs, or pass force_new=true to override. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: sandbox (boolean, default false) — plans real generated Terraform. Set to true for cheap sandbox template (testing only). OPTIONAL: force_new (boolean, default false) - bypass the single-flight guard. Use only when the existing run is provably wedged. CREDENTIAL HANDLING: Same as tfdeploy - credentials must be configured first.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
tfrunsINSPECTION: List all Terraform deployment runs for a session Returns job IDs, statuses, types (apply/destroy), and timestamps for every run.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. Retur..."
Description, as the server wrote it INSPECTION: List all Terraform deployment runs for a session Returns job IDs, statuses, types (apply/destroy), and timestamps for every run. Use this to see deployment history, find job IDs for log inspection, or check which deployments succeeded or failed. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...).
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tfstatusMONITORING: Quick status check for Terraform deployments Check the current status of a Terraform deployment job.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it MONITORING: Quick status check for Terraform deployments Check the current status of a Terraform deployment job. Use this tool to quickly check if a deployment is running, completed, or failed. Returns job status, job_id, and other metadata without streaming logs. Use tflogs to stream the actual deployment logs. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...). OPTIONAL: job_id to target a specific deployment (use tfruns to discover IDs). **LIVENESS**: The response carries two distinct timestamps: - `updated_at` — last semantic change (only bumped when status / drift / version actually differ). Useful for sorting deployments; NOT a per-poll heartbeat. - `last_refresh_at` — last successful Oracle decode (stamped on every poll where reliable reached Oracle, even if nothing in the row changed). Use this to confirm reliable is still actively talking to Oracle for a long-running RUNNING job. Absent on rows that haven't been refreshed since the column was added. 💡 TIP: Examine workflow.usage prompt for more context on how to properly use these tools.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
convoawaitWait for a pending response from Riley after a convoreply timeout.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "wait": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it Wait for a pending response from Riley after a convoreply timeout. 🎯 USE THIS TOOL WHEN: convoreply returned a timeout error. This allows you to continue waiting for the response without resending the message. REQUIRES: - session_id: from convoopen response OPTIONAL: - message_id: if known (from convoreply timeout error) - timeout (integer): seconds to wait. For Cursor, use 50 (default). Max 55. Returns the same format as convoreply when successful.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
helpGet workflow guidance for using InsideOut infrastructure tools.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get workflow guidance for using InsideOut infrastructure tools. Call help() for a compact overview, or help(section=...) for a detailed guide. Sections: workflow, tools, examples, inspect. Responses include hints with next_actions and related_tools.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
stackversionsList all stack versions for a session (newest first).Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
Description, as the server wrote it List all stack versions for a session (newest first). Shows version history including version number, status (draft/confirmed/applied), change summaries, and timestamps. Use this tool to see the design history, review what changed between iterations, or find a version number to roll back to. REQUIRES: session_id from convoopen response (format: sess_v2_...).
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write24
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:42 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 21
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 21 tools that change things (2 destructive, 19 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://app.luthersystems.com/v1/insideout-mcp: tools/list returned 24 tools to an anonymous client, including tfdeploy (destructive), tfdestroy (destructive), awsinspect (write), awsinspect_batch (write), convoinspect (write) and 16 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncredawait
The server marks "credawait" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "wait": a word for reading.
- Warntfplan
The server marks "tfplan" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "preview": a word for reading.
- Infoawsinspect
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ructure. It fetches temporary read-only credentials securely and queries the AWS API direct..."
- Infoawsinspect
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Infoawsinspect
The description is 2,287 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...spect(session_id=..., service="rds", action="describe-db-instances", detail=true)"
- Infoawsinspect_batch
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...3 resources. The backend fetches Oracle credentials ONCE per batch and fans out probes agai..."
Show 37 more findingsShow fewer
- Infoawsinspect_batch
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Infoawsinspect_batch
The input schema at properties.subs.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.subs.description: "...s?, detail?, raw?}. The backend fetches credentials once per batch and fans out probes in p..."
- Infoawsinspect_batch
The description is 2,130 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...\":6}"}, {"service":"rds","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}])"
- Infoconvoawait
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infoconvoinspect
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infoconvoopen
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...token=yyy) which is part of the session credential — without it, downstream tools fall bac..."
- Infoconvoopen
The description is 2,281 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...xamine workflow.usage prompt for more context on how to properly use these tools."
- Infoconvoreply
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infoconvoreply
The description is 2,029 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...tatus to check progress anytime. Examine workflow.usage prompt for more guidance."
- Infoconvostatus
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infocredawait
The title mentions "Credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
title: "Await Cloud Credentials"
- Infocredawait
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ubscribe to Luther Systems. Polls until credentials appear on the session. 🎯 USE THIS TOO..."
- Infocredawait
The input schema at properties.timeout.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.timeout.description: "...the user to complete the browser-based credential connect flow. Default 300, max 600."
- Infocredawait
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infocredawait
The input schema at properties.cloud.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.cloud.description: "Cloud provider whose credentials are awaited: 'aws' or 'gcp'. Defaults t..."
- Infogcpinspect
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ructure. It fetches temporary read-only credentials securely and queries the GCP API direct..."
- Infogcpinspect
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Infogcpinspect
The description is 2,615 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...":6}") - gcpinspect(session_id=..., service="billing", action="get-billing-info")"
- Infogcpinspect_batch
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...3 resources. The backend fetches Oracle credentials ONCE per batch and fans out probes agai..."
- Infogcpinspect_batch
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The s..."
- Infogcpinspect_batch
The input schema at properties.subs.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.subs.description: "...s?, detail?, raw?}. The backend fetches credentials once per batch and fans out probes in p..."
- Infogcpinspect_batch
The description is 2,098 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "..."}, {"service":"cloudrun","action":"get-metrics","filters":"{\"hours\":6}"}])"
- Infostackdiff
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infostackrollback
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infostackversions
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infosubmit_feedback
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. Ident..."
- Infotfdeploy
The description mentions "CREDENTIAL".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...en the existing run is provably wedged. CREDENTIAL FLOW (if credentials are missing): 1. R..."
- Infotfdeploy
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infotfdestroy
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. The d..."
- Infotfdrift
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infotfgenerate
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. Riley..."
- Infotflogs
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infotfoutputs
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infotfplan
The description mentions "CREDENTIAL".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...en the existing run is provably wedged. CREDENTIAL HANDLING: Same as tfdeploy - credential..."
- Infotfplan
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
- Infotfruns
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing. Retur..."
- Infotfstatus
The input schema at properties.session_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.session_id.description: "...n=*). The suffix is part of the session credential; never strip it when summarizing."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.36.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http insideout https://app.luthersystems.com/v1/insideout-mcpclaude mcp add --transport http insideout https://app.luthersystems.com/v1/insideout-mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__insideout__convoawait",
"mcp__insideout__help",
"mcp__insideout__stackversions"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__insideout__awsinspect",
"mcp__insideout__awsinspect_batch",
"mcp__insideout__convoinspect",
"mcp__insideout__convoopen",
"mcp__insideout__convoreply",
"mcp__insideout__convostatus",
"mcp__insideout__credawait",
"mcp__insideout__gcpinspect",
"mcp__insideout__gcpinspect_batch",
"mcp__insideout__stackdiff",
"mcp__insideout__stackrollback",
"mcp__insideout__submit_feedback",
"mcp__insideout__tfdrift",
"mcp__insideout__tfgenerate",
"mcp__insideout__tflogs",
"mcp__insideout__tfoutputs",
"mcp__insideout__tfplan",
"mcp__insideout__tfruns",
"mcp__insideout__tfstatus"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__insideout__tfdeploy",
"mcp__insideout__tfdestroy"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as insideout. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 24 rules
- mcp__insideout__awsinspect untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__awsinspect_batch untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__convoawait untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__convoinspect untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__convoopen untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__convoreply untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__convostatus untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__credawait untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__gcpinspect untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__gcpinspect_batch untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__help untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__stackdiff untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__stackrollback untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__stackversions untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__submit_feedback untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfdeploy untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfdestroy untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfdrift untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfgenerate untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tflogs untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfoutputs untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfplan untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfruns untrusted-input
- mcp__insideout__tfstatus untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.luthersystems.insideout/mcp/verify?hash=a131997ab9aaf8f89d8d5ebd9586d49b8c69c5402c88b9ef53395fbd6ccbf3fb" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a131997ab9aa, from Nov 10, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.luthersystems.insideout/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.luthersystems.insideout/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:58 UTC.
InsideOut (Riley) MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 24 tools, 21 of which can change, send or delete something, and 43 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: tfdeploy and tfdestroy.
Can the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server have?
- 24 tools: 2 destructive, 19 write, 3 read. tfdeploy, tfdestroy, awsinspect, awsinspect_batch, convoinspect, convoopen, convoreply, convostatus and 16 more.
Does the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the InsideOut (Riley) MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.