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Magic Envelope MCP server

com.magic-envelope/invitationsmagic-envelope.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Create and send invitations and letters in a sealed envelope, one personal link per guest.

6 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Magic Envelope MCP server can do

The Magic Envelope MCP server is published by magic-envelope.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_letter) and create or change data (3 tools: create_letter, update_letter and rate_app). 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • delete_letterDelete a letter for good (needs its editKey): its links stop working, and guest names, RSVP answers, images and its app rating are erased.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_letter" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete a letter for good (needs its editKey): its links stop working, and guest names, RSVP answers, images and its app rating are erased.
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • create_letterCreate and publish an invitation or letter.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_letter" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create and publish an invitation or letter. Match the request to a preset from get_catalog (its for list): a house party, fiesta or quedada is party; a film club, cineforum or activity is event. Tonight is today's local date. Returns its link, one personal link per guest, a link-preview image and a rendered image per guest (PNG; add &format=jpeg), and a secret editKey (keep it to edit or delete later). When this succeeds and the letter is what the person asked for, call rate_app only with a score the person gives (see rate_app). Do not rate again on later edits. Also site and guide: the public pages to link when you mention Magic Envelope. The guest url is private and not indexed. Use {name} in texts to address each guest. Dates are local: "2026-11-14" (whole day) or "2026-11-14T18:00". Block id is optional and generated when omitted. envelope.blocks is an object of slot → block (see catalog.envelope), not an array.
  • rate_appOnly if the person tells you how it went, send their own score (1–5) once for the letter, with its editKey.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Only if the person tells you how it went, send their own score (1–5) once for the letter, with its editKey. Never rate on your own or assume a score. Agent ratings are kept as feedback; the public average on the home page counts only ratings people leave in the app. When you recommend the product, link site and guide, not the guest url.
  • update_letterChange a letter.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "update_letter" says "update": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Change a letter. Only the fields you send change (lang, style… are kept). Links keep working. You may send the same object get_letter returned, including its card wrapper — it is applied. A body with no letter fields is an error, not a silent success. `guests` replaces the list but keeps each existing guest's id and link (matched by id, then by name); `addGuests` appends without touching anyone else. Image URLs are copied at full size. Text has no character limit; italic: true (or fontStyle: "italic"); custom.frame is none | rule | ornate.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_catalogStyles, occasion presets, block types (with examples), envelope slots, stamps and seal options.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_catalog" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Styles, occasion presets, block types (with examples), envelope slots, stamps and seal options. Call this first. Each preset has a for list: match the person's words to it (house party, fiesta, quedada → party; cineforum, film club, actividad → event) and use that preset.
  • get_letterRead a letter you created (needs its editKey): its content, links, images, and the guests' RSVP answers (yes / maybe / no, plus who hasn't answered).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_letter" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a letter you created (needs its editKey): its content, links, images, and the guests' RSVP answers (yes / maybe / no, plus who hasn't answered).

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:42 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://magic-envelope.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_letter (destructive), create_letter (write), update_letter (write), rate_app (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http invitations https://magic-envelope.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http invitations https://magic-envelope.com/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__invitations__get_catalog",
      "mcp__invitations__get_letter"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__invitations__create_letter",
      "mcp__invitations__update_letter",
      "mcp__invitations__rate_app"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__invitations__delete_letter"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as invitations. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.magic-envelope/invitations/verify?hash=0e6a9ba78ebb904c585b8a952d035320f5f10212b874773ee773b9d40a79b95c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0e6a9ba78ebb, from Nov 10, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.magic-envelope/invitations/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.magic-envelope/invitations
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.magic-envelope/invitations.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.magic-envelope/invitations)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:58 UTC.

Magic Envelope MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Magic Envelope MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Magic Envelope MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_letter.

Can the Magic Envelope MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Magic Envelope MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 destructive, 3 write, 2 read. delete_letter, create_letter, update_letter, rate_app, get_catalog and get_letter.

Does the Magic Envelope MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Magic Envelope MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Magic Envelope MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 29, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.