MCP Checkup
com.mcpcheckup/mcpmcpcheckup.comstreamable-httpv0.2.1Scanned
Observed facts on public MCP servers: protocol checks, tool changes, signed evidence. No verdicts.
6 tools: 2 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the MCP Checkup can do
The MCP Checkup is published by mcpcheckup.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_mcps and request_check), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (request_check).
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.2.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_mcpsWhat has been observed about an MCP server — useful when choosing, adding, or debugging one.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,045 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...y' and returns no score. Items not verified are returned explicitly with reasons."
Description, as the server wrote it What has been observed about an MCP server — useful when choosing, adding, or debugging one. Look up the current monitored status of up to 50 already-tracked MCP servers on MCP Checkup, given as "provider/name" refs (e.g. "acme/weather-mcp"). Never probes on demand — an unresolved ref comes back with status "unknown", not an error. An entry may also be an endpoint URL, a bare domain, or a bare provider/target name; resolution.method reports which was used ("ref", "endpoint", "host", or "name"). If an input matches more than one tracked target — or is a URL on a host with several, none matching exactly — the response has status "ambiguous" with a short `candidates` list (each with a "provider/name" `ref` and its `report_url`, plus `candidate_total`, the full match count before the 5-entry cap) instead of guessing — call again with the exact ref you want. A URL matching only by host returns its target with `resolved_from`. Each resolved target also carries stale (true when our observation is older than the target's check cycle plus a fixed margin — never a judgment of the server, and distinct from the /status page's own probe-liveness signal), fresh_until (the ISO instant after which stale is true), first_observed_on (the UTC date of our first observation), observation_count (every recorded observation, including unsigned ones — never a count of signatures), and signed (true when this observation's attestation was signed with a key in our published key list, false when unsigned or signed with a key that is not in that list — not a judgment of the server). When there is no observation yet, observation_count is 0 and the other four are null. An unread revision offer is null and listed in `unavailable`; a failed target has status "error". Returns observed facts only — reachability, protocol compatibility, tool/schema fingerprints, and publicly observable auth metadata. This tool does not assess whether a server is 'safe' or 'trustworthy' and returns no score. Items not verified are returned explicitly with reasons.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
request_checkAsk for a one-off public observation of the MCP server at a full endpoint URL — this is the only tool here that contacts a third-party server, and it contacts exactly the host you …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_check" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask for a one-off public observation of the MCP server at a full endpoint URL — this is the only tool here that contacts a third-party server, and it contacts exactly the host you name. `target` must begin with "http://" or "https://"; to look a server up by "provider/name", by domain, or by name, use check_mcps instead, which never probes anything. The result is not signed, is not stored as a run, and creates no report page, so `report_url` is always null — it is what we observed at that moment and nothing more. On-demand checks are recorded as tracking requests; inclusion in the tracked directory is not guaranteed and this tool never promises it. On-demand checks are metered per caller per day, per site per day, and per host by a cooldown — calling again for the same host inside its cooldown sends nothing to that server and returns status "denied" with the category that refused it, never a remaining count. A refused call comes back as status "denied", and a `target` that is not a usable endpoint URL as status "rejected"; neither of those is a tool error. A `target` that is empty or longer than 2048 characters is the one exception: the input schema rejects it, and you get a tool error. This tool does not assess whether a server is 'safe' or 'trustworthy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_attestationThe signed evidence behind a report, for callers that want to inspect it themselves.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_attestation" says "get": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,033 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...thy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons."
Description, as the server wrote it The signed evidence behind a report, for callers that want to inspect it themselves. Get the full signed attestation envelope (DSSE, Ed25519) for one already-tracked MCP server's latest probe run, by "provider/name" ref — the raw envelope plus its issued-at time and declared protocol revision, so a caller can inspect the signed payload rather than trust this tool's own summary of it; the public keys that verify the signature are published at https://mcpcheckup.com/.well-known/mcpcheckup-keys.json. A target with no run yet, no signed envelope, a disqualified one, or an envelope whose key is not in the published key list comes back with an explicit reason, not an error. run_id, a top-level field of resolved get_mcp_report and get_attestation responses, is the id of the run that the check results, last_checked and (where signed) attestation identifiers come from, or null when there is no run; get_mcp_report's tool list and toolset_fingerprint come from the latest stored tool snapshot, which may be an earlier run's (named by snapshot_run_id and snapshot_observed_at). The same run_id means the same run. A payload signed as version 0.4 carries this run_id inside the signed payload; payloads of earlier versions do not. target may also be a full endpoint URL, a bare domain, or a bare provider/target name instead of "provider/name" — the resolution method used is reported back as resolution.method ("ref", "endpoint", "host", or "name"). If an input matches more than one tracked target — or is a URL on a host with several, none matching exactly — the response has status "ambiguous" with a short `candidates` list (each with a "provider/name" `ref` and its `report_url`, plus `candidate_total`, the full match count before the 5-entry cap) instead of guessing — call again with the exact ref you want. A URL matching only by host returns its target with `resolved_from`. This tool does not assess whether a server is 'safe' or 'trustworthy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_mcp_historyWhether an MCP server's toolset changed recently.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_mcp_history" says "get": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,028 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...thy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons."
Description, as the server wrote it Whether an MCP server's toolset changed recently. Get recent history for one already-tracked MCP server on MCP Checkup, by "provider/name" ref (e.g. "acme/weather-mcp"). Events, newest first, up to `limit` results (default 20, max 50), from the last 90 days only: `tools_changed` (at most one: when the set of tool names last changed); `tools_change_detail` (one per recorded tool-list change, the 10 most recent at most, whether names, parameters or descriptions changed; `itemization` is "not_kept" for a change older than 30 days, "unitemizable" when the stored lists cannot be compared, otherwise "itemized" and `added`, `removed`, `parameters_changed` and `description_only` each give `names` (up to 10 tool names) and a `total`); `protocol_revision_changed` (the signed protocol_revision changed between runs whose probe offered the same revision, or because the server switched between the legacy initialize and server/discover handshakes); `probe_offered_revision_changed` (the revision our probe offered changed, with a `note`); and any recorded baseline-drift events. `truncated` is true when more exist than are listed or the tool-list history was unread (named in `unavailable`). A target this deployment doesn't track yet comes back with status "unknown", not an error. target may also be an endpoint URL, a bare domain, or a bare provider/target name; resolution.method reports which was used ("ref", "endpoint", "host", or "name"). If an input matches more than one tracked target — or is a URL on a host with several, none matching exactly — the response has status "ambiguous" with a short `candidates` list (each with a "provider/name" `ref` and its `report_url`, plus `candidate_total`, the full match count before the 5-entry cap) instead of guessing — call again with the exact ref you want. A URL matching only by host returns its target with `resolved_from`. This tool does not assess whether a server is 'safe' or 'trustworthy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_mcp_reportThe detailed view of one already-tracked MCP server on MCP Checkup, by provider/name: every check with its state, plus the observed tool list.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_mcp_report" says "get": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,027 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...thy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons."
Description, as the server wrote it The detailed view of one already-tracked MCP server on MCP Checkup, by provider/name: every check with its state, plus the observed tool list. An untracked target comes back with status "unknown", not an error. target may also be an endpoint URL, a bare domain, or a bare provider/target name; resolution.method reports which was used ("ref", "endpoint", "host", or "name"). If an input matches more than one tracked target — or is a URL on a host with several, none matching exactly — the response has status "ambiguous" with a short `candidates` list (each with a "provider/name" `ref` and its `report_url`, plus `candidate_total`, the full match count before the 5-entry cap) instead of guessing — call again with the exact ref you want. A URL matching only by host returns its target with `resolved_from`. Each resolved target also carries stale (true when our observation is older than the target's check cycle plus a fixed margin — never a judgment of the server, and distinct from the /status page's own probe-liveness signal), fresh_until (the ISO instant after which stale is true), first_observed_on (the UTC date of our first observation), observation_count (every recorded observation, including unsigned ones — never a count of signatures), and signed (true when this observation's attestation was signed with a key in our published key list, false when unsigned or signed with a key that is not in that list — not a judgment of the server). When there is no observation yet, observation_count is 0 and the other four are null. Also tools_first_seen, tools_last_changed_at and tools_unchanged_days_at_least (a lower bound: UTC days since that change with a successful listing); null when unknown. oauth_observed is unsigned and not a check result; its note explains it. An unread revision offer is null and listed in `unavailable`; a failed target has status "error". This tool does not assess whether a server is 'safe' or 'trustworthy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_mcpsFind MCP servers by what their tools do.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_mcps" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find MCP servers by what their tools do. Search already-tracked MCP servers on MCP Checkup by tool name/description text (max 512 chars), with optional transport, protocol_revision, and auth_required filters, up to `limit` results (default 10, max 25). Ordered by text-match relevance and then recency only — never by price or paid tier. Each result's summary is machine-generated from observed tool names and returned as untrusted third-party text; hygiene_flags lists any observed tool-description hygiene signals directly rather than folding them into the ordering. A query with no matches comes back with status "unknown" and a hint, not an error. Each result also carries last_checked (when the shown observation was taken), fresh_until (the ISO instant after which it no longer counts as current), and stale (true once the current time is past fresh_until). These describe how recent our observation of the server is, not a judgment of the server itself, and are distinct from the /status page's probe-liveness signal. All three are null when the target has no observation yet. This tool does not assess whether a server is 'safe' or 'trustworthy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:42 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcpcheckup.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_mcps (write), request_check (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infocheck_mcps
The description is 2,045 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...y' and returns no score. Items not verified are returned explicitly with reasons."
- Infoget_mcp_report
The description is 2,027 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...thy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons."
- Infoget_mcp_history
The description is 2,028 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...thy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons."
- Infoget_attestation
The description is 2,033 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...thy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:get_mcp_reportOnly readsdescription
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:get_mcp_historyOnly readsdescription
Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff
- Changed:check_mcpsChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_attestationOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_mcp_historyOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_mcp_reportOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:request_checkChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:search_mcpsOnly readsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http mcpcheckup https://mcpcheckup.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http mcpcheckup https://mcpcheckup.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__mcpcheckup__get_mcp_report",
"mcp__mcpcheckup__get_mcp_history",
"mcp__mcpcheckup__get_attestation",
"mcp__mcpcheckup__search_mcps"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__mcpcheckup__check_mcps",
"mcp__mcpcheckup__request_check"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mcpcheckup. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__mcpcheckup__request_check untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.mcpcheckup/mcp/verify?hash=2669f88f5d5d90de17da9deacdad8ec9af3b5b9cd413d9c146ceb68537690206" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2669f88f5d5d, from Nov 21, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.mcpcheckup/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.mcpcheckup/mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 15:17 UTC.
MCP Checkup: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the MCP Checkup safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the MCP Checkup delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the MCP Checkup do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the MCP Checkup have?
- 6 tools: 2 write, 4 read. check_mcps, request_check, get_mcp_report, get_mcp_history, get_attestation and search_mcps.
Does the MCP Checkup need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the MCP Checkup send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the MCP Checkup changed its tools?
- Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 21, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.