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MiCompress MCP server

com.micompress/mcpmicompress.comstreamable-httpv0.1.3Scanned

Compress images, PDFs, video, audio, documents & archives via micompress.com

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the MiCompress MCP server can do

The MiCompress MCP server is published by micompress.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: compress_file_from_url), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (get_compression_result and list_supported_formats); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (compress_file_from_url and get_compression_result); 1 tool can send data out of your system (compress_file_from_url). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.1.3.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • compress_file_from_urlDownload a file from a public URL, compress it on micompress.com and return a download link to the smaller file (valid 24 hours) with the size before and after.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Download a file from a public URL, compress it on micompress.com and return a download link to the smaller file (valid 24 hours) with the size before and after. Works for images (JPG, PNG, WebP, GIF, HEIC, RAW…), PDF, video, audio, Office documents, EPUB and archives. Accepts direct links and Google Drive / Dropbox share links. Calls the MiCompress compression service; documentation: https://micompress.com/mcp-server

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Compress a file from a URL
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_compression_resultGet the result of a compression started by compress_file_from_url, by the job_id it returned (kept for 2 hours).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_compression_result" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "file": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the result of a compression started by compress_file_from_url, by the job_id it returned (kept for 2 hours). Use it when that call reported the job as still processing; returns the download link once it is done.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get compression result
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_supported_formatsList the file extensions MiCompress can compress, grouped by category, with the size limit for this connection.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_supported_formats" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the file extensions MiCompress can compress, grouped by category, with the size limit for this connection.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List supported formats
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__micompress__compress_file_from_url"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 5, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://micompress.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including compress_file_from_url (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http micompress https://micompress.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http micompress https://micompress.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__micompress__get_compression_result",
      "mcp__micompress__list_supported_formats"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__micompress__compress_file_from_url"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as micompress. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__micompress__compress_file_from_url untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__micompress__get_compression_result private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__micompress__list_supported_formats private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.micompress/mcp/verify?hash=99fff5e5b1b0f7382264876f17cf348b3b47d703848d48de6048d6cbccaecd5a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 99fff5e5b1b0, from Nov 17, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.micompress/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.micompress/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.micompress/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.micompress/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 4, 2026, 04:17 UTC.

MiCompress MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the MiCompress MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the MiCompress MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the MiCompress MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the MiCompress MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. compress_file_from_url, get_compression_result and list_supported_formats.

Does the MiCompress MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the MiCompress MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): compress_file_from_url.

Has the MiCompress MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.