Moltline Code Review MCP server
com.moltlinestudio/codereviewmoltlinestudio.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
Risk-scan a diff, flag AI-generated-code tells, find secrets. 5 of 7 tools need no account.
7 tools: 5 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 5 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Moltline Code Review MCP server can do
The Moltline Code Review MCP server is published by moltlinestudio.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: ai_code_smell_scan, complexity_report, secret_scan, review_checklist and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (review_diff and get_reviewer_persona).
The fixed checks matched 5 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
ai_code_smell_scanFlag the tells of unreviewed AI-generated code in a source file.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "ai_code_smell_scan" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Flag the tells of unreviewed AI-generated code in a source file. FREE. Detects comments that restate the next line, leaked assistant preambles, placeholder TODOs, shipped 'Example usage' blocks, over-broad try/except that swallows errors, and auto-named identifiers. Typical input {"code": "<file contents>"} returns {"reviewed_confidence": 0-100, "hits": [{"smell": "...", "evidence": "<quoted snippet>"}], "reading": "...", "note": "..."}. Use on a full source file suspected of unreviewed machine authorship. Not on a diff (review_diff), and the result is a signal to check, not proof of authorship. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Ai Code Smell Scan
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
complexity_reportReport structural complexity of a source file, function by function.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "complexity_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Report structural complexity of a source file, function by function. FREE. Measures per-function length, max nesting depth, and a cyclomatic-style branch count (if/for/while/case/&&/||/except), flagging functions too long or too deeply nested to review confidently. Typical input {"code": "<file contents>"} returns {"functions": N, "detail": [{"name": ..., "start": N, "lines": N, "branches": N, "max_depth": N}], "flags": ["..."], "note": "..."}. Use when structure rather than correctness is the question. Not for vulnerabilities (security_deep_dive). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Complexity Report
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
review_checklistProduce a focused pull-request review checklist for a language or stack.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Produce a focused pull-request review checklist for a language or stack. FREE. Covers the things that actually break in production, with extra items per language. Typical input {"language": "python"} returns {"language": "python", "checklist": ["...", ...], "note": "..."}. Use before a review, to decide what to look for. Not for reviewing actual code - pass code to review_diff or security_deep_dive. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Review Checklist
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
secret_scanScan text for accidentally-committed machine credentials and private-key material.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...text for accidentally-committed machine credentials and private-key material. FREE. Report..."
Description, as the server wrote it Scan text for accidentally-committed machine credentials and private-key material. FREE. Reports each match's location and category so it can be rotated before it leaks. Detection is pattern-based over the common leaked-credential formats; it never echoes the matched value back. Typical input {"text": "<file, diff, or config contents>"} returns {"leaked": bool, "count": N, "findings": [{"line": N, "type": "<category>"}], "note": "..."}. Pattern matching only - a clean result is not proof, and every hit needs human confirmation before anyone acts on it. Not a general security review (security_deep_dive). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Secret Scan
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
security_deep_diveRun an OWASP-oriented security pass over a source file.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "security_deep_dive" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Run an OWASP-oriented security pass over a source file. PREMIUM (license). Checks injection sinks, auth/session handling, crypto misuse, SSRF/deserialization, and unsafe file/path handling. Each finding cites the line, the OWASP risk class, and a concrete fix direction. Typical input {"code": "<file contents>"} returns {"issues": N, "findings": [{"line": N, "class": "A03 Injection", "fix": "...", "code": "..."}], "owasp_note": "..."}. Use on one source file when vulnerabilities are the question. Not for style or structure (complexity_report), and never a substitute for a security professional on high-risk code. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Security Deep Dive
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_reviewer_personaLoad the Senior Reviewer persona for consistent, high-signal reviews.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_reviewer_persona" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Load the Senior Reviewer persona for consistent, high-signal reviews. PREMIUM (license). The persona is a reviewing voice that is skeptical, specific, and kind: demands evidence over vibes and blocks only on real risk. Takes no arguments. Returns {"persona": ..., "identity": ..., "rules": ["...", ...], "opening_move": "..."} ready to adopt as a system prompt. Use to keep repeated reviews consistent in voice and rigor. Not for running a review - the scan tools do that. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Reviewer Persona
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
review_diffRisk-scan a unified diff the way a senior reviewer triages a PR.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "review_diff" says "diff": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe name "review_diff" says "diff" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...bled TLS, downloads piped into a shell, credential-store reads, broad deletes, persistence..."
Description, as the server wrote it Risk-scan a unified diff the way a senior reviewer triages a PR. FREE. Flags added lines matching known risk patterns (injection sinks, disabled TLS, downloads piped into a shell, credential-store reads, broad deletes, persistence, bare excepts, debug prints, TODOs, N+1 hints, leaked secrets) with the new-file line number and a severity (1 low - 4 high). Typical input {"diff": "<git diff output>"} returns {"added_lines": N, "risk_score": 0-100 (100 = no risky pattern found; lower = riskier), "verdict": "...", "secrets": [...], "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-4, "issue": "...", "code": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a unified diff, when only the change matters. Not for whole-file analysis (complexity_report, ai_code_smell_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Review Diff
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/codereview: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including ai_code_smell_scan (write), complexity_report (write), secret_scan (write), review_checklist (write), security_deep_dive (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "ai_code_smell_scan" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
The server marks "complexity_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
The server marks "security_deep_dive" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
- Inforeview_diff
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...bled TLS, downloads piped into a shell, credential-store reads, broad deletes, persistence..."
- Infosecret_scan
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...text for accidentally-committed machine credentials and private-key material. FREE. Report..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:review_diffOnly readsdescription
Tools7 changed.~7 changedView diff
- Changed:ai_code_smell_scanChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:complexity_reportChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:get_reviewer_personaOnly readsdescription
- Changed:review_checklistChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:review_diffOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:secret_scanChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:security_deep_diveChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http codereview https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/codereviewclaude mcp add --transport http codereview https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/codereviewRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__codereview__review_diff",
"mcp__codereview__get_reviewer_persona"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__codereview__ai_code_smell_scan",
"mcp__codereview__complexity_report",
"mcp__codereview__secret_scan",
"mcp__codereview__review_checklist",
"mcp__codereview__security_deep_dive"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as codereview. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__codereview__review_diff untrusted-input
- mcp__codereview__get_reviewer_persona untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.moltlinestudio/codereview/verify?hash=8009899508d458f745baebc581959d0119162b55e9dce6c88808b5e3b1c521b8" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 8009899508d4, from Nov 17, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.moltlinestudio/codereview/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.moltlinestudio/codereview)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:59 UTC.
Moltline Code Review MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Moltline Code Review MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Moltline Code Review MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Moltline Code Review MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Moltline Code Review MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 5 write, 2 read. ai_code_smell_scan, complexity_report, secret_scan, review_checklist, security_deep_dive, review_diff and get_reviewer_persona.
Does the Moltline Code Review MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Moltline Code Review MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Moltline Code Review MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.