Moltline Agent Governance MCP server
com.moltlinestudio/governmoltlinestudio.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
Audit MCP configs and skill files for over-broad scope and injection risk. 6 of 8 free.
8 tools: 7 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 6 findings, 3 high
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
7 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server can do
The Moltline Agent Governance MCP server is published by moltlinestudio.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: audit_mcp_config, scope_check, audit_skill_file, injection_scan and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 6 findings, 3 of them high severity (sensitive-path, credentials-mention, model-directed-text and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
agent_readiness_scanScore a public domain against 21 agent-readiness checks.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Score a public domain against 21 agent-readiness checks. FREE. Use when you need to know whether an autonomous agent can discover, read, use or pay a website - your own, or a vendor you are evaluating before recommending it. Typical input {"domain": "example.com"} returns {"score": 8, "total": 21, "grade": "F", "passed": [...], "failed": [{"title": "...", "detail": "...", "fix": "..."}], "report_url": "..."} where report_url is a permanent shareable page for the same result. Not for auditing an MCP client configuration (audit_mcp_config) and not for scanning text for injection (injection_scan) - this one reaches out over the network and fetches public URLs on a live domain. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"} (for example {"error": "The readiness scanner is not reachable right now."}). Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Readiness Scan
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
audit_mcp_configAudit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings.3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- High
The description refers to "mcp.json".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} re..."
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that are..."
- High
The input schema at properties.config.description refers to "mcp.json".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.config.description: "...t, pasted as text or JSON (mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block)."
Description, as the server wrote it Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, dangerous auto-run flags, whole-disk or home-folder roots, wildcard allow-lists and remote servers over plain HTTP. In a client config (mcpServers or servers block) each server is checked on its own: unpinned packages and credentials written into the file are named. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Audit Mcp Config
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
audit_skill_fileAudit an agent skill or instruction file before you trust it.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- High
The description contains "don't tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ss phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed c..."
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...r'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<S..."
Description, as the server wrote it Audit an agent skill or instruction file before you trust it. FREE. Checks for governance smells: prompt-injection and guardrail-bypass phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<SKILL.md, system prompt, or tool description text>"} returns {"verdict": "reject: do not install" | "review before install: ..." | "no governance red flags on a pattern pass", "findings": [{"severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "line": N}], "note": "..."}. Also checks for approval-bypass steps and references to credential stores. Use before trusting a skill or instruction file that came from outside your own repository. Not for arbitrary untrusted input at run time (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Audit Skill File
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
governance_policyGenerate an audit-ready agent-governance policy for a fleet.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "governance_policy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate an audit-ready agent-governance policy for a fleet. PREMIUM (license). Covers inventory cadence, ownership rules, least-privilege approval gates, injection defense, logging/retention, and decommissioning triggers. Typical input {"fleet_context": "20 agents, 3 with shell access, one finance bot"} returns {"policy": ..., "sections": {...}, "context_note": ..., "audit_checklist": ["...", ...]}. Use when a fleet needs a written policy document. Not for assessing what the fleet currently does (inventory_report, audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Governance Policy
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
injection_scanScan untrusted text for prompt-injection patterns before ingestion.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Scan untrusted text for prompt-injection patterns before ingestion. FREE. Use on any web page, email, or document an agent is about to ingest to catch prompt-injection, concealment, approval-bypass and data-exfiltration patterns, and text addressed to AI agents, before they reach the agent's context. Typical input {"text": "<untrusted content>"} returns {"injection_suspected": bool, "count": N, "hits": [{"line": N, "pattern": "...", "text": "<flagged line>"}], "note": "..."}. Not for reviewing a skill file you control (audit_skill_file), and a clean result is not a guarantee of safety - it reports pattern matches only. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Injection Scan
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
inventory_reportBuild a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Build a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list. FREE. Turns a list of agents / MCP servers / skills into an audit-ready summary with critical/elevated/standard tiers and unowned-agent flags. Typical input {"items": "[{\"name\": \"deploy-bot\", \"owner\": \"ana\"}]"} returns {"total": N, "tiers": {"critical": N, ...}, "unowned_agents": [...], "inventory": [{"name": ..., "owner": ..., "tier": ..., "orphaned": bool}], "reading": "...", "note": "..."}. Use to turn a raw agent list into risk tiers. Not for auditing any single agent in depth (audit_mcp_config, scope_check). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Inventory Report
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
scope_checkScore the blast radius of every tool in a permission manifest.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Score the blast radius of every tool in a permission manifest. FREE. Ranks each tool by capability risk (command exec > money/delete > file-write/messaging/record changes > read > network) and flags the over-privileged ones that need approval gates. Typical input {"tools": "[\"run_shell\", \"read_docs\"]"} returns {"tools_scored": N, "high_risk_tools": N, "ranking": [{"tool": ..., "blast_radius": 0-5, "capabilities": [...]}], "recommendation": ["..."], "note": "..."}. Use on a permission manifest to rank tools by blast radius. Not for the configuration that mounts them (audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scope Check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_auditor_personaLoad the Governance Auditor persona for consistent fleet audits.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_auditor_persona" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Load the Governance Auditor persona for consistent fleet audits. PREMIUM (license). The persona is methodical, evidence-driven, and allergic to 'it's probably fine'. Takes no arguments. Returns {"persona": ..., "identity": ..., "rules": ["...", ...], "opening_move": "..."} ready to adopt as a system prompt. Use to keep repeated audits consistent in voice and rigor. Not for running an audit - the audit tools do that. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Auditor Persona
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_mcp_config (write), scope_check (write), audit_skill_file (write), injection_scan (write), inventory_report (write) and 2 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Highaudit_mcp_config
The description refers to "mcp.json".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} re..."
- Highaudit_mcp_config
The input schema at properties.config.description refers to "mcp.json".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.config.description: "...t, pasted as text or JSON (mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block)."
- Highaudit_skill_file
The description contains "don't tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ss phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed c..."
The server marks "governance_policy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
- Infoaudit_mcp_config
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that are..."
- Infoaudit_skill_file
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...r'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<S..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
- Changed:audit_mcp_configChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:audit_skill_fileChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:injection_scanChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:inventory_reportChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:scope_checkChanges thingsdescription
Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff
- Changed:agent_readiness_scanChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:audit_mcp_configChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:audit_skill_fileChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:get_auditor_personaOnly readsdescription
- Changed:governance_policyChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:injection_scanChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:inventory_reportChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:scope_checkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http govern https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/governclaude mcp add --transport http govern https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/governRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__govern__get_auditor_persona"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__govern__audit_mcp_config",
"mcp__govern__scope_check",
"mcp__govern__audit_skill_file",
"mcp__govern__injection_scan",
"mcp__govern__inventory_report",
"mcp__govern__governance_policy",
"mcp__govern__agent_readiness_scan"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as govern. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.moltlinestudio/govern/verify?hash=e30ddebad3b7e3c5008cf62eb1304435b570ed79c7491d21315bb30238f3e809" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e30ddebad3b7, from Nov 17, 2026, 10:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.moltlinestudio/govern/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.moltlinestudio/govern)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:59 UTC.
Moltline Agent Governance MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings (3 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 7 write, 1 read. audit_mcp_config, scope_check, audit_skill_file, injection_scan, inventory_report, governance_policy, agent_readiness_scan and get_auditor_persona.
Does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.