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Moltline Agent Governance MCP server

com.moltlinestudio/governmoltlinestudio.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Audit MCP configs and skill files for over-broad scope and injection risk. 6 of 8 free.

8 tools: 7 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 7 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 6 findings, 3 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

7 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server can do

The Moltline Agent Governance MCP server is published by moltlinestudio.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: audit_mcp_config, scope_check, audit_skill_file, injection_scan and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 6 findings, 3 of them high severity (sensitive-path, credentials-mention, model-directed-text and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • agent_readiness_scanScore a public domain against 21 agent-readiness checks.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Score a public domain against 21 agent-readiness checks. FREE. Use when you need to know whether an autonomous agent can discover, read, use or pay a website - your own, or a vendor you are evaluating before recommending it. Typical input {"domain": "example.com"} returns {"score": 8, "total": 21, "grade": "F", "passed": [...], "failed": [{"title": "...", "detail": "...", "fix": "..."}], "report_url": "..."} where report_url is a permanent shareable page for the same result. Not for auditing an MCP client configuration (audit_mcp_config) and not for scanning text for injection (injection_scan) - this one reaches out over the network and fetches public URLs on a live domain. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"} (for example {"error": "The readiness scanner is not reachable right now."}). Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Agent Readiness Scan
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • audit_mcp_configAudit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings.3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to "mcp.json".

      Matched text

      description: "...Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} re..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that are..."

      What this check looks for
    • High

      The input schema at properties.config.description refers to "mcp.json".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.config.description: "...t, pasted as text or JSON (mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block)."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, dangerous auto-run flags, whole-disk or home-folder roots, wildcard allow-lists and remote servers over plain HTTP. In a client config (mcpServers or servers block) each server is checked on its own: unpinned packages and credentials written into the file are named. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Audit Mcp Config
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • audit_skill_fileAudit an agent skill or instruction file before you trust it.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • High

      The description contains "don't tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

      Matched text

      description: "...ss phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed c..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...r'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<S..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit an agent skill or instruction file before you trust it. FREE. Checks for governance smells: prompt-injection and guardrail-bypass phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<SKILL.md, system prompt, or tool description text>"} returns {"verdict": "reject: do not install" | "review before install: ..." | "no governance red flags on a pattern pass", "findings": [{"severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "line": N}], "note": "..."}. Also checks for approval-bypass steps and references to credential stores. Use before trusting a skill or instruction file that came from outside your own repository. Not for arbitrary untrusted input at run time (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Audit Skill File
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • governance_policyGenerate an audit-ready agent-governance policy for a fleet.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "governance_policy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate an audit-ready agent-governance policy for a fleet. PREMIUM (license). Covers inventory cadence, ownership rules, least-privilege approval gates, injection defense, logging/retention, and decommissioning triggers. Typical input {"fleet_context": "20 agents, 3 with shell access, one finance bot"} returns {"policy": ..., "sections": {...}, "context_note": ..., "audit_checklist": ["...", ...]}. Use when a fleet needs a written policy document. Not for assessing what the fleet currently does (inventory_report, audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Governance Policy
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • injection_scanScan untrusted text for prompt-injection patterns before ingestion.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan untrusted text for prompt-injection patterns before ingestion. FREE. Use on any web page, email, or document an agent is about to ingest to catch prompt-injection, concealment, approval-bypass and data-exfiltration patterns, and text addressed to AI agents, before they reach the agent's context. Typical input {"text": "<untrusted content>"} returns {"injection_suspected": bool, "count": N, "hits": [{"line": N, "pattern": "...", "text": "<flagged line>"}], "note": "..."}. Not for reviewing a skill file you control (audit_skill_file), and a clean result is not a guarantee of safety - it reports pattern matches only. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Injection Scan
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • inventory_reportBuild a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list. FREE. Turns a list of agents / MCP servers / skills into an audit-ready summary with critical/elevated/standard tiers and unowned-agent flags. Typical input {"items": "[{\"name\": \"deploy-bot\", \"owner\": \"ana\"}]"} returns {"total": N, "tiers": {"critical": N, ...}, "unowned_agents": [...], "inventory": [{"name": ..., "owner": ..., "tier": ..., "orphaned": bool}], "reading": "...", "note": "..."}. Use to turn a raw agent list into risk tiers. Not for auditing any single agent in depth (audit_mcp_config, scope_check). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Inventory Report
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • scope_checkScore the blast radius of every tool in a permission manifest.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Score the blast radius of every tool in a permission manifest. FREE. Ranks each tool by capability risk (command exec > money/delete > file-write/messaging/record changes > read > network) and flags the over-privileged ones that need approval gates. Typical input {"tools": "[\"run_shell\", \"read_docs\"]"} returns {"tools_scored": N, "high_risk_tools": N, "ranking": [{"tool": ..., "blast_radius": 0-5, "capabilities": [...]}], "recommendation": ["..."], "note": "..."}. Use on a permission manifest to rank tools by blast radius. Not for the configuration that mounts them (audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Scope Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_auditor_personaLoad the Governance Auditor persona for consistent fleet audits.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_auditor_persona" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Load the Governance Auditor persona for consistent fleet audits. PREMIUM (license). The persona is methodical, evidence-driven, and allergic to 'it's probably fine'. Takes no arguments. Returns {"persona": ..., "identity": ..., "rules": ["...", ...], "opening_move": "..."} ready to adopt as a system prompt. Use to keep repeated audits consistent in voice and rigor. Not for running an audit - the audit tools do that. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Auditor Persona
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_mcp_config (write), scope_check (write), audit_skill_file (write), injection_scan (write), inventory_report (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 high1 warn2 info
  • The description refers to "mcp.json".

    Matched text

    description: "...Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} re..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.config.description refers to "mcp.json".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.config.description: "...t, pasted as text or JSON (mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block)."

    What this check looks for
  • The description contains "don't tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

    Matched text

    description: "...ss phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed c..."

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "governance_policy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that are..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...r'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<S..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
  2. Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http govern https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern
claude mcp add --transport http govern https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__govern__get_auditor_persona"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__govern__audit_mcp_config",
      "mcp__govern__scope_check",
      "mcp__govern__audit_skill_file",
      "mcp__govern__injection_scan",
      "mcp__govern__inventory_report",
      "mcp__govern__governance_policy",
      "mcp__govern__agent_readiness_scan"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as govern. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.moltlinestudio/govern/verify?hash=e30ddebad3b7e3c5008cf62eb1304435b570ed79c7491d21315bb30238f3e809" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e30ddebad3b7, from Nov 17, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.moltlinestudio/govern/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.moltlinestudio/govern
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.moltlinestudio/govern.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.moltlinestudio/govern)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:59 UTC.

Moltline Agent Governance MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings (3 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server have?

8 tools: 7 write, 1 read. audit_mcp_config, scope_check, audit_skill_file, injection_scan, inventory_report, governance_policy, agent_readiness_scan and get_auditor_persona.

Does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.