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storefront MCP server

com.mystoq/storefrontmystoq.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Discover Algerian COD stores on Mystoq, or manage your own: products, prices, shipping/fraud tools.

12 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 3
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the storefront MCP server can do

The storefront MCP server is published by mystoq.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 12 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_product), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (publish) and create or change data (7 tools: platform_stats, cod_profit, yalidine_delivery, order_risk and 3 more). 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (search_stores); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_store); 3 tools can send data out of your system (order_risk, create_store and publish). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

12 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • delete_productDelete a product from the authenticated store (reversible cleanup — used by the agent's ephemeral live-demo).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_product" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete a product from the authenticated store (reversible cleanup — used by the agent's ephemeral live-demo). Requires Bearer token; only the owner's own product. WRITE/DESTRUCTIVE.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Delete product
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • publishPublish a product (set status=active) so it shows on the storefront.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "publish" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "publish" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Publish a product (set status=active) so it shows on the storefront. Requires Bearer token. WRITE.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Publish product
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • cod_profitCompute true CAC and net cash-on-delivery profit for an Algerian online store, accounting for the return/refusal rate.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute true CAC and net cash-on-delivery profit for an Algerian online store, accounting for the return/refusal rate. Returns base and confirmation-call scenarios.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: COD profit / CAC
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • create_productCreate a product in the authenticated merchant's store.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_product" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a product in the authenticated merchant's store. Requires Bearer token. WRITE.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create product
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • create_storeRegister a NEW Mystoq store (tenant).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_store" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register a NEW Mystoq store (tenant). Returns the store id, slug and an access token. No auth needed. WRITE.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create store
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • order_riskScore the fraud/return risk of an Algerian COD order from its signals (phone, history, etc.) — Mystoq FakeShield logic.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Score the fraud/return risk of an Algerian COD order from its signals (phone, history, etc.) — Mystoq FakeShield logic.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Order fraud-risk score
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • platform_statsMystoq network statistics: number of active stores and wilayas covered.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mystoq network statistics: number of active stores and wilayas covered.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Mystoq platform stats
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • set_priceUpdate a product's price (and optional compare_price) in the authenticated store.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "set_price" says "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Update a product's price (and optional compare_price) in the authenticated store. Requires Bearer token. WRITE.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Set product price
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • yalidine_deliveryEstimate delivery success/return rate and typical delivery time for a destination wilaya in Algeria (region-based network estimate).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Estimate delivery success/return rate and typical delivery time for a destination wilaya in Algeria (region-based network estimate).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Yalidine delivery estimate
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_storeGet a public Mystoq store by its slug: name, wilaya, storefront URL, plan tier and member-since.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_store" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get a public Mystoq store by its slug: name, wilaya, storefront URL, plan tier and member-since. Public info only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Mystoq store
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_plansList Mystoq subscription plans with monthly/yearly/lifetime prices (DZD) — useful to answer "how much does Mystoq cost".No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_plans" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List Mystoq subscription plans with monthly/yearly/lifetime prices (DZD) — useful to answer "how much does Mystoq cost".

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Mystoq plans
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_storesSearch the public Mystoq store directory (Algerian online shops).Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_stores" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "directory": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the public Mystoq store directory (Algerian online shops). Filter by keyword (store name), wilaya, or plan. Returns store name, wilaya, storefront URL and plan tier. Public business listings only — no merchant personal data.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search Mystoq stores
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__storefront__get_store"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:43 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mystoq.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_product (destructive), publish (irreversible), platform_stats (write), cod_profit (write), yalidine_delivery (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 9 to 8

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 9 -> 8.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 9 to 8

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http storefront https://mystoq.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http storefront https://mystoq.com/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__storefront__search_stores",
      "mcp__storefront__get_store",
      "mcp__storefront__list_plans"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__storefront__platform_stats",
      "mcp__storefront__cod_profit",
      "mcp__storefront__yalidine_delivery",
      "mcp__storefront__order_risk",
      "mcp__storefront__create_store",
      "mcp__storefront__create_product",
      "mcp__storefront__set_price",
      "mcp__storefront__publish"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__storefront__delete_product"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as storefront. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__storefront__search_stores private-data
  • mcp__storefront__get_store untrusted-input
  • mcp__storefront__order_risk outbound
  • mcp__storefront__create_store outbound
  • mcp__storefront__publish outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.mystoq/storefront/verify?hash=423642afea40b0fb81029deadde3a923550e64df6fc9d5dc6275c89c7ce0c382" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 423642afea40, from Nov 13, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.mystoq/storefront/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.mystoq/storefront
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.mystoq/storefront.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.mystoq/storefront)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:59 UTC.

storefront MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the storefront MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the storefront MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_product.

Can the storefront MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: publish.

What tools does the storefront MCP server have?

12 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read. delete_product, publish, platform_stats, cod_profit, yalidine_delivery, order_risk, create_store, create_product and 4 more.

Does the storefront MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the storefront MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): order_risk, create_store and publish.

Has the storefront MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.