OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server
com.ofacscreen/screeningofacscreen.comstreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned
Screen names and addresses on US, UN, EU, UK and other sanctions and export-control lists. Free.
5 tools: 2 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server can do
The OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server is published by ofacscreen.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: screen_entity and screen_address), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool can send data out of your system (screen_entity).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
screen_addressScreen a street address against the addresses recorded on 14 sanctions and export-control lists: OFAC SDN, OFAC Non-SDN, EU Financial Sanctions, UN Security Council, UK Sanctions L…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a street address against the addresses recorded on 14 sanctions and export-control lists: OFAC SDN, OFAC Non-SDN, EU Financial Sanctions, UN Security Council, UK Sanctions List, Canada SEMA, Swiss SECO, Australia DFAT, BIS Denied Persons, BIS Entity List, BIS Unverified List, BIS Military End-User, ITAR Debarred and State Nonproliferation. Returns the number of listed parties whose recorded address resembles it and the ten highest scoring, each with matched_address (the listed address it matched on), its score, list and program, plus jurisdiction_flags: an embargoed or high-risk country or region the address points to. A jurisdiction flag says where, not who: it is not a sanctions match and never counts as one. The lists record addresses for only some of the parties on them, so no match clears no one at the address: screen their names with screen_entity too. The address must name a street or a building, e.g. "Tverskaya 7, Moscow"; a city or a country alone is refused. Free, no account, 25 screenings a day from each internet address, shared by screen_entity and screen_address; in ChatGPT, each user has their own 25. A screening is not recorded and produces no document: its report_url opens the same search on ofacscreen.com, where a timestamped PDF record of it can be bought. The price is in report_price. Calling this tool is free. Searched only when named in lists: UAE Local Terrorist List, UFLPA Entity List, FBI Most Wanted, FinCEN Special Measures, France Registre des gels, Israel NBCTF crypto wallets, Japan MOF, Mexico SAT 69-B, Poland MSWiA.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
screen_entityScreen a person or company name against 14 sanctions and export-control lists: OFAC SDN, OFAC Non-SDN, EU Financial Sanctions, UN Security Council, UK Sanctions List, Canada SEMA, …Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a person or company name against 14 sanctions and export-control lists: OFAC SDN, OFAC Non-SDN, EU Financial Sanctions, UN Security Council, UK Sanctions List, Canada SEMA, Swiss SECO, Australia DFAT, BIS Denied Persons, BIS Entity List, BIS Unverified List, BIS Military End-User, ITAR Debarred and State Nonproliferation. Fuzzy name matching, so transliterations and spelling variants still surface. Returns the number of potential matches and the ten highest scoring, each with its score, list, program, aliases and addresses. A score is name similarity, not a finding that a match is the same party: confirm a date of birth, an address or an ID document before acting on it. Free, no account, 25 screenings a day from each internet address, shared by screen_entity and screen_address; in ChatGPT, each user has their own 25. A screening is not recorded and produces no document: its report_url opens the same search on ofacscreen.com, where a timestamped PDF record of it can be bought. The price is in report_price. Calling this tool is free. Searched only when named in lists: UAE Local Terrorist List, UFLPA Entity List, FBI Most Wanted, FinCEN Special Measures, France Registre des gels, Israel NBCTF crypto wallets, Japan MOF, Mexico SAT 69-B, Poland MSWiA.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
fetchOne listed entry, by the id a search result gave: its name, list, program, entry type, up to 5 aliases and 3 locations, and when the list was last updated.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it One listed entry, by the id a search result gave: its name, list, program, entry type, up to 5 aliases and 3 locations, and when the list was last updated. Free, no account, 200 lookups a day from each internet address.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
list_sanctions_sourcesEvery list OFACScreen screens against, each with its code (the value the lists argument of screen_entity and screen_address takes), its name and issuing authority, whether it is co…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_sanctions_sources" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Every list OFACScreen screens against, each with its code (the value the lists argument of screen_entity and screen_address takes), its name and issuing authority, whether it is core (searched when a screening names no lists), when it was last updated and how many entries it holds. Calling this tool is free.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
searchSearch the 14 sanctions and export-control lists for a person or company name.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the 14 sanctions and export-control lists for a person or company name. Returns up to 10 listed entries, closest match first, each with an id for fetch and a link to cite. A result is name similarity, not a finding that it is the same party, and an empty result does not clear the name. Free, no account, 100 searches a day from each internet address.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:43 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_entity (write), screen_address (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http screening https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http screening https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__screening__list_sanctions_sources",
"mcp__screening__search",
"mcp__screening__fetch"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__screening__screen_entity",
"mcp__screening__screen_address"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as screening. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__screening__screen_entity outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ofacscreen/screening/verify?hash=cffcbc13e5546a6f43b8595c0e51f04ffee3427e6601d280f2f998214ab170f7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash cffcbc13e554, from Nov 13, 2026, 23:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ofacscreen/screening/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ofacscreen/screening)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:59 UTC.
OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 2 write, 3 read. screen_entity, screen_address, list_sanctions_sources, search and fetch.
Does the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): screen_entity.
Has the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.