Skip to content

OnChainDiligence MCP server

com.onchaindiligence/complianceonchaindiligence.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Payment evidence and policy preflight, plus paid sanctions and company Evidence Provider checks.

21 tools: 3 do something that can't be undone, 12 change things and 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 3 irreversible, 12 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 14
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 5 findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the OnChainDiligence MCP server can do

The OnChainDiligence MCP server is published by onchaindiligence.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 21 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (preflight_payment, preflight_swap and preflight_bridge) and create or change data (12 tools: screen_wallet, screen_name, verify_uk_company, verify_us_company and 8 more), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.

14 tools bring in text other people can write (screen_wallet, screen_name, verify_uk_company and 11 more); 3 tools can send data out of your system (preflight_payment, preflight_swap and preflight_bridge).

The fixed checks matched 5 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

21 tools

Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
  • preflight_bridgeCall BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to bridge Base USDC to Ethereum via Circle CCTP V2 (depositForBurn).Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.action.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.action.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "preflight_bridge" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to bridge Base USDC to Ethereum via Circle CCTP V2 (depositForBurn). OCD evaluates strict policy and returns a signed portable bridge artifact. ALLOW is policy only, never wallet authority.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • preflight_paymentCall BEFORE an agent authorizes an autonomous payment.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "preflight_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The input addresses people (input.action.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.action.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "preflight_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "preflight_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call BEFORE an agent authorizes an autonomous payment. Evaluates it against your policy (max amount, allowed networks/assets, expected recipient, allowed origins) and returns a signed PREFLIGHT receipt -- ALLOW, REQUIRE_APPROVAL, or BLOCK, with reasons -- independently verifiable by anyone. Policy evaluation only: OCD never holds, moves, or authorizes funds. The wallet/x402 client separately authorizes execution after; ALLOW does not guarantee it will proceed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • preflight_swapCall BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to execute a narrow Base USDC-to-WETH direct Uniswap V3 swap.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.action.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.action.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "preflight_swap" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to execute a narrow Base USDC-to-WETH direct Uniswap V3 swap. OCD returns a signed portable policy artifact. ALLOW is policy only, never wallet authority.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
Changes things 12Claude Code: ask
  • diligenceCombined counterparty due diligence in one call: an exact OFAC SDN digital-currency-address screen of an EVM wallet AND a UK Companies House KYB lookup (status, type, PSC / benefic…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Combined counterparty due diligence in one call: an exact OFAC SDN digital-currency-address screen of an EVM wallet AND a UK Companies House KYB lookup (status, type, PSC / beneficial owners), in parallel. Returns both independent results plus an explicit disclaimer that no verified link between the wallet and the company is established by the data. SDN only; a non-match is not clearance. Refused before payment if current sanctions data is unavailable.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • observe_allowanceGiven a signed OCD allowance preflight artifact and submitted Base transaction hash, independently inspect its canonical-USDC Approval event, Base safe-head finality, and historica…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given a signed OCD allowance preflight artifact and submitted Base transaction hash, independently inspect its canonical-USDC Approval event, Base safe-head finality, and historical allowance state. OCD never executes the transaction.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • observe_bridgeGiven a signed OCD bridge preflight artifact, the Base depositForBurn transaction hash, and (once available) the Ethereum receiveMessage transaction hash, independently observe bot…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given a signed OCD bridge preflight artifact, the Base depositForBurn transaction hash, and (once available) the Ethereum receiveMessage transaction hash, independently observe both chains, verify the CCTP message identity matches, and reconcile against the authorized action. Source-only observation is reported as an evidence gap, never as completion.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • observe_stakingGiven a signed OCD staking preflight artifact and Ethereum transaction hash, independently inspect the canonical Lido Submitted event, transaction sender/value, optional minted sha…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given a signed OCD staking preflight artifact and Ethereum transaction hash, independently inspect the canonical Lido Submitted event, transaction sender/value, optional minted shares, and Ethereum finalized-head finality. OCD never stakes ETH.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • observe_swapGiven a signed OCD swap preflight artifact and Base transaction hash, independently inspect direct Uniswap V3 exactInputSingle calldata, ERC-20 transfers, and Base safe-head finali…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given a signed OCD swap preflight artifact and Base transaction hash, independently inspect direct Uniswap V3 exactInputSingle calldata, ERC-20 transfers, and Base safe-head finality. OCD never executes the swap.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • preflight_allowanceCall BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to approve or revoke a Base USDC ERC-20 allowance.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "preflight_allowance" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to approve or revoke a Base USDC ERC-20 allowance. OCD evaluates strict policy and returns a signed portable allowance artifact. ALLOW is policy only, never wallet authority.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • preflight_stakingCall BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to submit ETH to Lido stETH.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "preflight_staking" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call BEFORE an agent asks its wallet to submit ETH to Lido stETH. OCD evaluates strict policy and returns a signed portable staking artifact. ALLOW is policy only, never wallet authority.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • screen_nameOFAC name screening: fuzzy-match a person or company name against the official US Treasury OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list (primary names + strong aliases).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    OFAC name screening: fuzzy-match a person or company name against the official US Treasury OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list (primary names + strong aliases). Returns scored candidate matches with the matched name, SDN type, and program. SCOPE: this is a screening aid for AML / KYC / sanctions compliance — a match is a candidate to investigate with secondary identifiers (DOB, nationality, ID), NOT a determination. Weak AKAs are not screened, per OFAC guidance.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • screen_walletExact match of an EVM wallet address against the digital currency address identifiers on the official US Treasury OFAC SDN List (validated snapshot, refreshed hourly).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Exact match of an EVM wallet address against the digital currency address identifiers on the official US Treasury OFAC SDN List (validated snapshot, refreshed hourly). Returns signed listed / not_listed, the SDN entry, dataset provenance and limits. SDN only: not EU/UN/UK lists, no ownership or 50% rule analysis; a non-match is not legal clearance. Refused before payment if current data is unavailable. Call before sending funds to an address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • verify_receiptIndependently checks whether a receipt is cryptographically VALID, INVALID, or UNVERIFIABLE, with a reason code.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Independently checks whether a receipt is cryptographically VALID, INVALID, or UNVERIFIABLE, with a reason code. Free, no payment. Pass EITHER receipt_id (looks it up first, must be public) OR a complete receipt envelope you already hold (verified directly, no publication needed). This is a convenient ONLINE check -- it trusts this server to have honestly fetched the real signing-key registry. Running the same check yourself offline (the published @onchaindiligence/agent-evidence package) is a strictly stronger trust position; this tool does not replace that option.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_uk_companyUK company KYB lookup via the official Companies House register.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    UK company KYB lookup via the official Companies House register. Given a UK registration number, returns legal status (active/dissolved), company type, incorporation date, registered office, and people with significant control (PSC / beneficial owners). Call to confirm a UK business is real, active, and who controls it, for KYB onboarding and counterparty due diligence. Authoritative UK government data.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
  • verify_us_companyUS public company verification via SEC EDGAR.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    US public company verification via SEC EDGAR. Given a ticker, CIK, or company name, returns entity name, CIK, industry (SIC), state of incorporation, exchanges/tickers, address, and latest SEC filing. Ambiguous names return candidates, never a silent selection. Covers SEC-registered PUBLIC companies and funds only -- not private US companies. Call for KYB and counterparty due diligence on listed US entities.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • paymentHint: true
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • get_receiptLook up a public OCD receipt by its exact receipt_id (format "OCD-RCP-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX").No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up a public OCD receipt by its exact receipt_id (format "OCD-RCP-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX"). Free, no payment. Returns the complete signed receipt envelope, or a structured not-found/unavailable reason -- never a guess. A private (unpublished) receipt and an unknown id are indistinguishable, both by design: this never confirms or denies that a private receipt exists.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • inspect_allowanceFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_allowance" says "inspect": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Deterministically inspect an ERC-20 allowance/revocation request against explicit network/token/spender/value policy. No wallet action, no signing, no chain read unless a separately requested preflight asks for it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • inspect_bridgeFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_bridge" says "inspect": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Deterministically inspect a narrow Circle CCTP V2 Base-to-Ethereum native-USDC bridge request against explicit policy. No wallet action, no signing, no chain read.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • inspect_paymentFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_payment" says "inspect": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Pure deterministic inspection of a proposed payment against structured policy (amount/network/asset/recipient/resource) — no external evidence, no sanctions screening, no cryptographic signing, no receipt. Returns the same ALLOW / REQUIRE_APPROVAL / BLOCK decision semantics as POST /x402/preflight-payment for the deterministic checks alone, so a caller can sanity-check a proposal before deciding whether the paid preflight (adds optional sanctions evidence and a signed, independently-verifiable receipt, $0.01) is worth paying for. This result is NOT cryptographically attested and carries no receipt — receipt is always null.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • inspect_stakingFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_staking" says "inspect": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Deterministically inspect a narrow Ethereum Lido stETH submit request against explicit policy. No wallet action, signing, or chain read.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • inspect_swapFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_swap" says "inspect": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Deterministically inspect a narrow Base USDC-to-WETH direct Uniswap V3 swap against explicit policy. No wallet action or signing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write14
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:43 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
402
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 402.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

5 warn
  • The server marks "preflight_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "preflight_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "preflight_allowance" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "preflight_swap" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "preflight_bridge" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "preflight_staking" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 402; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http compliance https://mcp.onchaindiligence.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http compliance https://mcp.onchaindiligence.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__compliance__inspect_payment",
      "mcp__compliance__inspect_allowance",
      "mcp__compliance__inspect_swap",
      "mcp__compliance__inspect_bridge",
      "mcp__compliance__inspect_staking",
      "mcp__compliance__get_receipt"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__compliance__screen_wallet",
      "mcp__compliance__screen_name",
      "mcp__compliance__verify_uk_company",
      "mcp__compliance__verify_us_company",
      "mcp__compliance__diligence",
      "mcp__compliance__preflight_payment",
      "mcp__compliance__preflight_allowance",
      "mcp__compliance__observe_allowance",
      "mcp__compliance__preflight_swap",
      "mcp__compliance__observe_swap",
      "mcp__compliance__preflight_bridge",
      "mcp__compliance__observe_bridge",
      "mcp__compliance__preflight_staking",
      "mcp__compliance__observe_staking",
      "mcp__compliance__verify_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as compliance. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 14 rules
  • mcp__compliance__screen_wallet untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__screen_name untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__verify_uk_company untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__verify_us_company untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__diligence untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__preflight_payment untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__compliance__preflight_allowance untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__observe_allowance untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__preflight_swap untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__compliance__observe_swap untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__preflight_bridge untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__compliance__observe_bridge untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__preflight_staking untrusted-input
  • mcp__compliance__observe_staking untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.onchaindiligence/compliance/verify?hash=bead25c753bad600b69f4cb8eaf389bc80f04caad4ee069789fe517e18172e4e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bead25c753ba, from Nov 13, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.onchaindiligence/compliance/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.onchaindiligence/compliance
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.onchaindiligence/compliance.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.onchaindiligence/compliance)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:59 UTC.

OnChainDiligence MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the OnChainDiligence MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 21 tools, 15 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the OnChainDiligence MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the OnChainDiligence MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: preflight_payment, preflight_swap and preflight_bridge.

What tools does the OnChainDiligence MCP server have?

21 tools: 3 irreversible, 12 write, 6 read. preflight_payment, preflight_swap, preflight_bridge, screen_wallet, screen_name, verify_uk_company, verify_us_company, diligence and 13 more.

Does the OnChainDiligence MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the OnChainDiligence MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): preflight_payment, preflight_swap and preflight_bridge.

Has the OnChainDiligence MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.