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Ontario Protocol MCP server

com.ontarioprotocol/ontario-protocolontarioprotocol.comstreamable-httpv1.0.14Scanned

Find live x402 APIs for any task (0.005 USDC, no match no charge); Base balance, tx and gas reads.

20 tools: 3 do something that can't be undone, 15 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 3 irreversible, 15 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 20
  • Can send data out · 7
  • 17 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Ontario Protocol MCP server can do

The Ontario Protocol MCP server is published by ontarioprotocol.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 20 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (ontario_purchase_router, agent_can_pay and ontario_list-service) and create or change data (15 tools: ontario_find-api, ontario_base-balances, ontario_base-tx-check, ontario_base-gas and 11 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (ontario_list-agent); 20 tools bring in text other people can write (ontario_purchase_router, ontario_find-api, ontario_base-balances and 17 more); 7 tools can send data out of your system (agent_can_pay, x402_readiness_verify, bazaar_buyer_intent_gap and 4 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 17 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.14.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

20 tools

Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
  • agent_can_payFree pre-payment policy decision: allow, review, or deny for one x402 endpoint under strict, standard, or permissive policy, with reasons and report evidence.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "agent_can_pay" says "pay": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.endpoint.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.endpoint.description: "...evaluate before payment; never include credentials or private query parameters."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "agent_can_pay" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "agent_can_pay" says "pay": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free pre-payment policy decision: allow, review, or deny for one x402 endpoint under strict, standard, or permissive policy, with reasons and report evidence. require_audit_receipt adds a handoff to the optional settlement-backed receipt.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Agent Payment Preflight
  • ontario_list-servicePublish a provider-owned x402 API so AI agents can discover and buy it.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ontario_list-service" says "list": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.owner_contact.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.owner_contact.description: "...mit when unnecessary; never send wallet credentials."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Publish a provider-owned x402 API so AI agents can discover and buy it. After free validation and a Bazaar buyer-intent audit, the 0.50 USDC Launch Passport creates a public profile with a signed JSON twin, readiness and Coinbase indexing evidence, a five-query retrieval snapshot, badge, copy-ready MCP/catalog records, and 30 days of freshness maintenance. It can become eligible for strict Ontario discovery when evidence is ready and fresh. It does not guarantee Coinbase placement, ranking, traffic, purchases, a ready grade, or safety. [PAID: 0.50 USDC via x402 on Base. Two-step flow: a call without payment returns MCP PaymentRequired; the retry carries the signed PaymentPayload in params._meta['x402/payment']. The legacy _x402_payment base64 argument is also supported. Signing happens in the caller's wallet.]

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Publish your x402 API for agent discovery
  • ontario_purchase_routerFree deterministic routing of one public task to Ontario's free and paid tools.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ontario_purchase_router" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.task.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.task.description: "...ic task description only; never include credentials or private customer data."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "ontario_purchase_router" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_purchase_router" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free deterministic routing of one public task to Ontario's free and paid tools. Returns the matching tool and a decision (free_only, run_free_preflight, or paid_recommended with the tool's price, network and budget check). Natural endpoint-verification tasks route to the free readiness verifier, with the optional 0.002 USDC settlement-backed receipt disclosed. Provider jobs such as publishing, registering, or making an x402 endpoint discoverable route to the self-serve 0.50 USDC publication product and its free validator. Paid reads it can recommend: ontario_find-api (a live-checked paid API for a task), ontario_base-balances (Base wallet balances), ontario_base-tx-check (whether a Base transaction settled) and ontario_base-gas (current Base gas prices). Existing paid profiles route to the 0.10 USDC evidence refresh and its free refresh validator. Empty calls return task examples instead of guessing a purchase. This tool never invokes another tool, signs a payload, or spends funds.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Ontario Free/Paid Purchase Router
Changes things 15Claude Code: ask
  • bazaar_buyer_intent_gapFree read-only provider audit that runs Coinbase's indexing preflight and measures one public x402 endpoint across five live CDP Bazaar buyer-search variations.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.target_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.buyer_query.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.buyer_query.description: "...use in CDP Bazaar search; never include credentials or private customer text."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free read-only provider audit that runs Coinbase's indexing preflight and measures one public x402 endpoint across five live CDP Bazaar buyer-search variations. Returns retrieval coverage, observed sample ranks, alternatives, public 30-day call and unique-payer observations, Base USDC price bands, HTTP 402 and metadata readiness, and the activation boundary. Public quality counts may include owner-funded calls and are not revenue. It never signs or settles.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Bazaar Buyer Intent Gap
  • github_x402_repo_scanFree pre-deployment scan of one public GitHub repository for x402 implementation, HTTP 402 tests, payment configuration, buyer documentation, discovery metadata, CI gates, and sens…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free pre-deployment scan of one public GitHub repository for x402 implementation, HTTP 402 tests, payment configuration, buyer documentation, discovery metadata, CI gates, and sensitive filenames. Returns paths and remediation, never source contents.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: GitHub x402 Repo Scan
  • ontario_base-balancesBase wallet balance: ETH, USDC and about 25 widely held Base tokens for any address, plus up to 20 ERC-20 token contracts you name, each with symbol, decimals, raw and formatted am…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Base wallet balance: ETH, USDC and about 25 widely held Base tokens for any address, plus up to 20 ERC-20 token contracts you name, each with symbol, decimals, raw and formatted amount and the block number read, live from Base mainnet RPC. Required: address. $0.002 USDC on Base. Failed read, no charge. No account, no API key. Base mainnet only; no prices or USD values; tokens outside the list and your extras are not discovered. [PAID: 0.002 USDC via x402 on Base. Two-step flow: a call without payment returns MCP PaymentRequired; the retry carries the signed PaymentPayload in params._meta['x402/payment']. The legacy _x402_payment base64 argument is also supported. Signing happens in the caller's wallet.]

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Base Wallet Balances
  • ontario_base-gasBase gas price: base fee, priority fee p25/p50/p90 over the last 20 blocks, ready-to-sign maxFeePerGas and maxPriorityFeePerGas for slow, normal and fast inclusion, an L1 data-fee …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Base gas price: base fee, priority fee p25/p50/p90 over the last 20 blocks, ready-to-sign maxFeePerGas and maxPriorityFeePerGas for slow, normal and fast inclusion, an L1 data-fee upper bound, and the estimated total cost in wei of an ETH transfer and an ERC-20 transfer, live from Base mainnet RPC with the block number. Required: none; optional blocks (5 to 50). $0.0015 USDC on Base. Failed read, no charge. No account, no API key. Estimates, not inclusion guarantees. [PAID: 0.0015 USDC via x402 on Base. Two-step flow: a call without payment returns MCP PaymentRequired; the retry carries the signed PaymentPayload in params._meta['x402/payment']. The legacy _x402_payment base64 argument is also supported. Signing happens in the caller's wallet.]

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Base Gas Price
  • ontario_base-tx-checkVerify Base transaction by hash: status, block, timestamp and confirmations, with USDC and ERC-20 Transfers decoded (token, from, to, amount; up to 100 listed, transfers_total give…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify Base transaction by hash: status, block, timestamp and confirmations, with USDC and ERC-20 Transfers decoded (token, from, to, amount; up to 100 listed, transfers_total gives the full count), any EIP-3009 authorization used, and match flags for an expected payTo and amount, so an x402 payment receipt or PAYMENT-RESPONSE can be checked as settled. Required: hash. $0.002 USDC on Base. Transaction not found, no charge. No account, no API key. Base mainnet only. [PAID: 0.002 USDC via x402 on Base. Two-step flow: a call without payment returns MCP PaymentRequired; the retry carries the signed PaymentPayload in params._meta['x402/payment']. The legacy _x402_payment base64 argument is also supported. Signing happens in the caller's wallet.]

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Base Transaction Check
  • ontario_find-apiWhich x402 API should my agent call?Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ontario_find-api" says "find": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.task.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.task.description: "...search for an AI agent'. Never include credentials or private data."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "ontario_find-api" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_find-api" says "find": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Which x402 API should my agent call? Live API finder for any task. Required: task. Returns up to 5 paid APIs that answered a fresh unpaid probe with a valid Base USDC 402, ranked by task fit, price and Bazaar-reported repeat buyers, each with live price, network and a ready-to-call request. Provider calls are paid separately. No live match, no charge. $0.005 USDC on Base. No account, no API key. Recommendations, not a safety guarantee. [PAID: 0.005 USDC via x402 on Base. Two-step flow: a call without payment returns MCP PaymentRequired; the retry carries the signed PaymentPayload in params._meta['x402/payment']. The legacy _x402_payment base64 argument is also supported. Signing happens in the caller's wallet.]

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Find a Live x402 API for a Task
  • ontario_list-agentSubmits a public directory listing for an agent the caller owns.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ontario_list-agent" says "list": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "submit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "directory": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submits a public directory listing for an agent the caller owns. Payload validation is free; payment does not guarantee approval, traffic, ranking, or safety. [PAID: 0.10 USDC via x402 on Base. Two-step flow: a call without payment returns MCP PaymentRequired; the retry carries the signed PaymentPayload in params._meta['x402/payment']. The legacy _x402_payment base64 argument is also supported. Signing happens in the caller's wallet.]

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: List an Agent
  • ontario_refresh-listingAttaches a fresh live readiness observation to an existing paid Ontario provider profile's canonical HTML, JSON twin, and badge.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "attach": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Attaches a fresh live readiness observation to an existing paid Ontario provider profile's canonical HTML, JSON twin, and badge. This tool cannot edit provider metadata, improve a grade by payment, or buy ranking or traffic. Freshness maintenance is automatic and included during the launch passport's first 30 days. [PAID: 0.10 USDC via x402 on Base. Two-step flow: a call without payment returns MCP PaymentRequired; the retry carries the signed PaymentPayload in params._meta['x402/payment']. The legacy _x402_payment base64 argument is also supported. Signing happens in the caller's wallet.]

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Refresh an x402 Service Profile
  • ontario_task_fitFree task-to-tool matching with an optional Jev second opinion.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free task-to-tool matching with an optional Jev second opinion. With allow_typesafe=true, your public task and Ontario's public tool descriptions are sent to TypeSafe for Jev inference. Do not supply secrets, personal data, private URLs, or customer content. Ontario does not persist task text here. TypeSafe processing is subject to its policies; zero retention is not promised. Without consent, only Ontario's deterministic router is used. Returns a callable tool and input schema, or abstains. Never executes tools or authorizes payment. Model quota exhaustion falls back to deterministic routing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Match a public task to an Ontario tool
  • ontario_validate-agentValidate an agent listing payload for free before publication.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ontario_validate-agent" says "validate": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "ontario_validate-agent" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_validate-agent" says "validate": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate an agent listing payload for free before publication. Never publishes, signs or spends.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Ontario Validate Agent
  • ontario_validate-refreshCheck an existing paid provider profile's refresh eligibility for free, including cooldown.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ontario_validate-refresh" says "validate": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "ontario_validate-refresh" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_validate-refresh" says "validate": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an existing paid provider profile's refresh eligibility for free, including cooldown. Never refreshes, signs or spends.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Ontario Validate Refresh
  • ontario_validate-serviceFree provider listing preflight for the 0.50 USDC Ontario launch passport.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ontario_validate-service" says "validate": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.owner_contact.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.owner_contact.description: "...mit when unnecessary; never send wallet credentials."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "ontario_validate-service" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_validate-service" says "validate": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free provider listing preflight for the 0.50 USDC Ontario launch passport. Validates public service metadata, runs a live readiness scan (8 s budget) that saves a public signed readiness report, and an exact-URL Bazaar lookup. Returns a summary with grade, score, report_published, Bazaar presence and the top findings, or endpoint_unreachable with the fix when the endpoint returns no HTTP response. verify_now=false skips the scan and the report. Never publishes a listing, signs or spends.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Validate an x402 Service Listing Free
  • x402_launch_kitGenerate a validated listing payload, x402 resource draft, MCP descriptor, GitHub readiness workflow, README snippet, and registry copy for one paid endpoint.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.owner_contact.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.owner_contact.description: "...s. Omit private addresses; never supply credentials."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "x402_launch_kit" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a validated listing payload, x402 resource draft, MCP descriptor, GitHub readiness workflow, README snippet, and registry copy for one paid endpoint.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: X402 Launch Kit
  • x402_readiness_verifyFree check for whether a paid endpoint is ready for agent discovery and x402 payment.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.target_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.target_url.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.target_url.description: "...inspect without payment. Do not submit credentials, private hosts, or sensitive query para..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free check for whether a paid endpoint is ready for agent discovery and x402 payment. Returns a readiness grade, a free end-to-end buyer-path diagnostic handoff and a grade-aware provider handoff that states whether the endpoint is ready-grade for the optional 0.50 USDC publication and links the free listing validator.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: x402 Readiness Verify
  • x402_verification_reportsPublic ledger of recent x402 readiness reports.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Public ledger of recent x402 readiness reports.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: X402 Verification Reports
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • agent_trust_previewFree live, rate-limited agent trust preview for one public endpoint.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "agent_trust_preview" says "preview": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.target_url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.target_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.target_url.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.target_url.description: "...payment; never include private hosts or credentials."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free live, rate-limited agent trust preview for one public endpoint. Returns safe signals and issues without the paid evidence bundle or attestation; the paid trust scan adds them.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Agent Trust Preview
  • find_x402_toolFree buyer-side search across Ontario's fresh strict-ready paid profiles, Agentic Market, and Coinbase CDP Bazaar.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_x402_tool" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.query.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.query.description: "Public task text only; never include credentials or private customer data."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free buyer-side search across Ontario's fresh strict-ready paid profiles, Agentic Market, and Coinbase CDP Bazaar. Returns unverified marketplace candidates ranked by task relevance plus bounded source-reported recent activity, with optional Base/USDC budget filtering; nothing is probed, so listings may be dead or mispriced. ontario_find-api returns live-checked candidates. Paid Ontario publication adds no ranking score. Provider-side publication queries return the free listing validator and the 0.50 USDC publication workflow.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Find a task-matched x402 tool

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

140 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Can send data out7
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_list-agent"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:43 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
18
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 18 tools that change things (3 irreversible, 15 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://ontarioprotocol.com/mcp: tools/list returned 20 tools to an anonymous client, including ontario_purchase_router (irreversible), agent_can_pay (irreversible), ontario_list-service (irreversible), ontario_find-api (write), ontario_base-balances (write) and 13 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 to 18

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

7 warn10 info
  • The server marks "ontario_purchase_router" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_purchase_router" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "ontario_find-api" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_find-api" says "find": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "agent_can_pay" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "agent_can_pay" says "pay": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "x402_launch_kit" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "ontario_validate-service" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_validate-service" says "validate": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "ontario_validate-agent" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_validate-agent" says "validate": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
Show 11 more findings
  • The server marks "ontario_validate-refresh" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "ontario_validate-refresh" says "validate": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.task.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.task.description: "...ic task description only; never include credentials or private customer data."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.task.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.task.description: "...search for an AI agent'. Never include credentials or private data."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.endpoint.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.endpoint.description: "...evaluate before payment; never include credentials or private query parameters."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.target_url.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.target_url.description: "...inspect without payment. Do not submit credentials, private hosts, or sensitive query para..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.buyer_query.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.buyer_query.description: "...use in CDP Bazaar search; never include credentials or private customer text."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.query.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.query.description: "Public task text only; never include credentials or private customer data."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.owner_contact.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.owner_contact.description: "...s. Omit private addresses; never supply credentials."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.owner_contact.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.owner_contact.description: "...mit when unnecessary; never send wallet credentials."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.owner_contact.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.owner_contact.description: "...mit when unnecessary; never send wallet credentials."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.target_url.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.target_url.description: "...payment; never include private hosts or credentials."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools15 changed.~15 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 -> 18.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 to 18
  3. Tools3 added, 5 changed.+3 added~5 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.14. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ontario-protocol https://ontarioprotocol.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http ontario-protocol https://ontarioprotocol.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__find_x402_tool"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_purchase_router",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_find-api",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_base-balances",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_base-tx-check",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_base-gas",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_task_fit",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__agent_can_pay",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__x402_readiness_verify",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__bazaar_buyer_intent_gap",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__x402_launch_kit",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_validate-service",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_list-service",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_refresh-listing",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__agent_trust_preview",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__github_x402_repo_scan",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_list-agent",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_validate-agent",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_validate-refresh",
      "mcp__ontario-protocol__x402_verification_reports"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ontario-protocol. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 20 rules
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_purchase_router untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_find-api untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_base-balances untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_base-tx-check untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_base-gas untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_task_fit untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__agent_can_pay untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__x402_readiness_verify untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__bazaar_buyer_intent_gap untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__find_x402_tool untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__x402_launch_kit untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_validate-service untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_list-service untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_refresh-listing untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__agent_trust_preview untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__github_x402_repo_scan untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_list-agent private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_validate-agent untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__ontario_validate-refresh untrusted-input
  • mcp__ontario-protocol__x402_verification_reports untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ontarioprotocol/ontario-protocol/verify?hash=e4d7f8dfad156640067bcbfd9788f5e83717530cd9ccebc539e8d1ad07a7564d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e4d7f8dfad15, from Nov 13, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ontarioprotocol/ontario-protocol/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.ontarioprotocol/ontario-protocol
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.ontarioprotocol/ontario-protocol.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ontarioprotocol/ontario-protocol)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 31, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Ontario Protocol MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Ontario Protocol MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 20 tools, 18 of which can change, send or delete something, and 17 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Ontario Protocol MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Ontario Protocol MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: ontario_purchase_router, agent_can_pay and ontario_list-service.

What tools does the Ontario Protocol MCP server have?

20 tools: 3 irreversible, 15 write, 2 read. ontario_purchase_router, agent_can_pay, ontario_list-service, ontario_find-api, ontario_base-balances, ontario_base-tx-check, ontario_base-gas, ontario_task_fit and 12 more.

Does the Ontario Protocol MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Ontario Protocol MCP server send data to outside services?

7 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): agent_can_pay, x402_readiness_verify, bazaar_buyer_intent_gap, x402_launch_kit, ontario_validate-service, ontario_list-service and 1 more.

Has the Ontario Protocol MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 31, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.