Prax Data Services MCP server
com.orabrain/prax-data-servicesorabrain.comstreamable-httpv1.4.0Scanned
Screen banks, wires, sanctions, wallets and transfers before an agent moves money. Free tier.
21 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 15 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 19
- Can send data out · 1
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Prax Data Services MCP server can do
The Prax Data Services MCP server is published by orabrain.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 21 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (screen_transfer and screen_transfers_batch) and create or change data (15 tools: screen_wallet, screen_entity, screen_wallets_batch, screen_bank and 11 more), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
19 tools bring in text other people can write (screen_wallet, analyze_transaction, screen_transfer and 16 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (screen_transfer).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.4.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
21 tools
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
screen_transferPre-signature transfer check (payment screening): is it safe to send `amount` of `asset` from `from` to `to`?Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "screen_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "screen_transfer" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "screen_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-signature transfer check (payment screening): is it safe to send `amount` of `asset` from `from` to `to`? Returns allow / review / block with reasons - sanctioned or flagged parties, malicious or scam token, look-alike address poisoning, first-time payee. Works before the transaction exists; no chain lookup needed. Use in wallet, custody, payment and treasury flows.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Screen Transfer
screen_transfers_batchBulk transfer screening: screen_transfer for up to 50 transfers in one call (items of {from, to, amount, asset, chain}) - payout batches, payroll, exchange withdrawals.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "screen_transfers_batch" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "screen_transfers_batch" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "screen_transfers_batch" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
Description, as the server wrote it Bulk transfer screening: screen_transfer for up to 50 transfers in one call (items of {from, to, amount, asset, chain}) - payout batches, payroll, exchange withdrawals. Returns a verdict per item and a summary.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Screen Transfers Batch
Changes things 15Claude Code: ask
screen_adverse_mediaNegative news about a person or company from GDELT (global news index, 15-minute updates): articles that name the counterparty with a financial-crime theme (fraud, money laundering…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Negative news about a person or company from GDELT (global news index, 15-minute updates): articles that name the counterparty with a financial-crime theme (fraud, money laundering, sanctions, bribery and corruption, enforcement, terrorism financing, cyber, scam, insolvency). Returns adverse / possible / none with each article's title, date, source and link, counts by theme and by source. Use in KYC / KYB onboarding, periodic review and investigations. Prax reports headlines; it does not judge their truth.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Adverse media
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_bankCounterparty-bank and wire screening: give a BIC (SWIFT), IBAN, US ABA routing number or LEI, and/or a bank name and country, optionally the beneficiary name.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Counterparty-bank and wire screening: give a BIC (SWIFT), IBAN, US ABA routing number or LEI, and/or a bank name and country, optionally the beneficiary name. Returns allow / review / block with reasons: identifier checksum, the institution from GLEIF (legal name, country, status), jurisdiction lists (FATF call-for-action and increased monitoring, EU high-risk third countries, FinCEN Section 311 jurisdictions, comprehensive US sanctions programmes), the bank on sanctions lists, FinCEN 311 / 9714 institutions, and enforcement actions naming the bank. Use before releasing a wire, onboarding a correspondent or paying a new supplier's bank.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Screen bank / wire
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_companyDoes this counterparty exist, who runs it, is it active: legal entity from GLEIF (LEI, status, direct and ultimate parent, subsidiaries), UK Companies House (status, incorporation …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Does this counterparty exist, who runs it, is it active: legal entity from GLEIF (LEI, status, direct and ultimate parent, subsidiaries), UK Companies House (status, incorporation date, officers, persons with significant control, charges, insolvency, overdue filings; needs the free Companies House key in settings), US SEC EDGAR (CIK, SIC, state, tickers, former names, recent filings), plus the sanctions / export-control lists and enforcement history Prax already screens. Returns allow / review / block with entity_status (active, inactive, not_found, listed) and reasons. Use for KYB, vendor and partner onboarding, invoice and payee verification.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Company / counterparty check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_countryJurisdiction risk for a country (ISO code or name): FATF call-for-action and increased-monitoring lists, EU high-risk third countries, FinCEN Section 311 jurisdictions, OFAC compre…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Jurisdiction risk for a country (ISO code or name): FATF call-for-action and increased-monitoring lists, EU high-risk third countries, FinCEN Section 311 jurisdictions, OFAC comprehensive sanctions programmes, and how many entries with an address in that country sit on the US export-control and non-SDN lists (BIS Entity, Denied Persons, Unverified and Military End User lists, State nonproliferation and ITAR debarred, OFAC SSI / FSE / CMIC). Returns high / elevated / standard with reasons, the lists and references. Use for country-risk scoring, onboarding, payment corridors and trade compliance.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Country / jurisdiction risk
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
screen_cveWhat is this vulnerability and does it matter now: OSV advisory records (summary, severity, affected open-source packages and fixed versions, references) for a CVE, GHSA or OSV id,…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it What is this vulnerability and does it matter now: OSV advisory records (summary, severity, affected open-source packages and fixed versions, references) for a CVE, GHSA or OSV id, whether CISA lists it as exploited in the wild (KEV: date added, remediation due date, ransomware use) and its EPSS exploit probability and percentile. Returns exploited / known / unknown with reasons. Use for patch prioritisation, vendor security questionnaires, incident triage and third-party risk reviews.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Vulnerability check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_domainIs this domain, URL or sender domain safe to trust, pay or onboard: malware URL and host lists (URLhaus), hijacked netblocks (Spamhaus DROP), botnet C2 and active-threat IPs behind…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Is this domain, URL or sender domain safe to trust, pay or onboard: malware URL and host lists (URLhaus), hijacked netblocks (Spamhaus DROP), botnet C2 and active-threat IPs behind it, disposable e-mail domains, domain age and registrar from RDAP, MX / SPF / DMARC posture (for an e-mail address: can it receive mail, can it be spoofed), hosting country against the FATF, EU, FinCEN 311 and OFAC lists. Returns allow / review / block with reasons. Use for vendor onboarding, payment-instruction and bank-detail change requests, invoice fraud and phishing triage.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Screen domain / URL / e-mail
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_enforcementRegulatory enforcement history for a bank, fintech, money services business, crypto firm or individual: consent orders, civil money penalties, fines, final notices, bars and charge…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Regulatory enforcement history for a bank, fintech, money services business, crypto firm or individual: consent orders, civil money penalties, fines, final notices, bars and charges from the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, FinCEN, SEC, CFTC and the UK FCA, pulled continuously from the regulators' own releases. Returns match / possible_match / no_match with each action's authority, date, type, title and link. Use in vendor onboarding, correspondent due diligence, KYB and partner reviews.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Enforcement history
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
screen_entitySanctions and export-control screening for people, companies, vessels and crypto addresses: fuzzy name match (aliases, transliterations) or exact wallet / contract lookup against t…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Sanctions and export-control screening for people, companies, vessels and crypto addresses: fuzzy name match (aliases, transliterations) or exact wallet / contract lookup against the lists Prax pulls continuously: US OFAC (SDN and Consolidated), UK OFSI, EU, UN and Swiss SECO, every crypto address they list on any chain, plus the US Consolidated Screening List (BIS Entity List, Denied Persons, Unverified and Military End User lists, State nonproliferation and ITAR debarred parties, OFAC sectoral, FSE, CAPTA, menu-based and Chinese military-industrial lists). Returns match / possible_match / no_match with hits (entity, type, programs, list, authority, aliases, addresses, licence requirement, Federal Register notice, score). Use for KYC / KYB onboarding, payment screening and trade compliance. Free plan.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Screen Entity
screen_ipIs this IP address a known threat: botnet C2 (Feodo Tracker), hijacked / criminal netblocks (Spamhaus DROP), active attackers (CINS), Tor exit nodes, URLhaus hosts, plus the alloca…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Is this IP address a known threat: botnet C2 (Feodo Tracker), hijacked / criminal netblocks (Spamhaus DROP), active attackers (CINS), Tor exit nodes, URLhaus hosts, plus the allocation (network, organisation, country from RDAP) and the country against the FATF, EU, FinCEN 311 and OFAC lists. Returns allow / review / block with reasons. Use for login and session risk, instruction-change requests, API callers and SOC triage.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Screen IP address
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_licenceIs this payments or digital-asset firm registered or licensed, where, and is it active: FinCEN MSB registrations (US), NY DFS virtual-currency licensees and trust charters, the EU …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Is this payments or digital-asset firm registered or licensed, where, and is it active: FinCEN MSB registrations (US), NY DFS virtual-currency licensees and trust charters, the EU MiCA register of authorised crypto-asset service providers and the entities national authorities have named as non-compliant (ESMA), Dubai VARA licensed VASPs, Hong Kong SFC licensed virtual asset trading platforms, the UK FCA Financial Services Register (live), plus the firm's LEI record. Returns licensed / flagged / possible_match / not_found with every registration found (authority, number, status, activities, link) and the registries covered, so absence is reported as absence from those registries, not as proof. Use for fintech and VASP onboarding, partner due diligence and crypto-to-bank flows.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Licence / registration check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_packageKnown vulnerabilities in an open-source package at a given version (software supply chain): PyPI, npm, Go, Maven, crates.io, NuGet, RubyGems, Packagist, Pub, Hex, Debian, Alpine an…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Known vulnerabilities in an open-source package at a given version (software supply chain): PyPI, npm, Go, Maven, crates.io, NuGet, RubyGems, Packagist, Pub, Hex, Debian, Alpine and more, from OSV (live API plus Prax's local copy), each advisory with severity, whether it is exploited in the wild (CISA KEV), EPSS, and the fixed version. Returns allow / review / block with reasons. Use for dependency reviews, SBOM checks, vendor stack assessments and change approvals.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Package / dependency check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_packagesUp to 50 packages in one call ({ecosystem, name, version} each), for an SBOM or a lock file: per-package verdict, advisories, fixed versions, and a summary (block / review / allow …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Up to 50 packages in one call ({ecosystem, name, version} each), for an SBOM or a lock file: per-package verdict, advisories, fixed versions, and a summary (block / review / allow counts). Same sources as screen_package.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Batch package check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_securitiesCan this instrument or issuer be traded, custodied or accepted as collateral: ISIN / CUSIP / SEDOL / ticker resolved through OpenFIGI to the issuer, then the issuer against OFAC NS…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Can this instrument or issuer be traded, custodied or accepted as collateral: ISIN / CUSIP / SEDOL / ticker resolved through OpenFIGI to the issuer, then the issuer against OFAC NS-CMIC (Chinese military-industrial complex: no purchase or sale of their securities), OFAC sectoral sanctions (new debt / equity restrictions), the sanctions lists, SEC trading suspensions and enforcement history. Returns allow / review / block with reasons and references. Use for pre-trade compliance, onboarding of collateral and tokenised securities, and investment restriction lists.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Screen security / issuer
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
screen_walletWallet and smart-contract risk screening (KYT / AML): check any address (EVM chains for full analysis; Bitcoin, Tron, Solana, Litecoin, Monero and other chains against the sanction…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Wallet and smart-contract risk screening (KYT / AML): check any address (EVM chains for full analysis; Bitcoin, Tron, Solana, Litecoin, Monero and other chains against the sanctions lists) against Prax threat intelligence - OFAC and global sanctions, exploits, hacks, phishing, scams, drainers, mixers, malicious contracts, and first-hop exposure to them. Returns risk band, labels, roles, alerts naming it, counterparties and a plain-language story. Use before onboarding, paying or interacting with an address. Free plan. Set live=true for live on-chain screening too.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Screen Wallet
screen_wallets_batchBulk wallet screening: screen_wallet for up to 50 addresses in one call - portfolio, customer-base or deposit-address sweeps.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Bulk wallet screening: screen_wallet for up to 50 addresses in one call - portfolio, customer-base or deposit-address sweeps. Returns per-address risk band and labels plus a summary.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Screen Wallets Batch
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
analyze_transactionTransaction risk analysis: given an EVM transaction hash, returns status, value, counterparties and the risk of both sides (sanctions, exploit, phishing, scam exposure) with flags.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_transaction" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Transaction risk analysis: given an EVM transaction hash, returns status, value, counterparties and the risk of both sides (sanctions, exploit, phishing, scam exposure) with flags. Use for post-trade monitoring, incident triage and fraud investigation.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Analyze Transaction
fetchFetch the full Prax intelligence record for an id returned by search (address:<chain>:<addr>, tx:<chain>:<hash>, alert:<id>).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the full Prax intelligence record for an id returned by search (address:<chain>:<addr>, tx:<chain>:<hash>, alert:<id>).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Fetch
get_alertsThreat-intelligence alert feed: approved Prax alerts from the last 24 hours (new exploits, attacker wallets, malicious contracts, phishing campaigns, sanctions updates), newest fir…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_alerts" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Threat-intelligence alert feed: approved Prax alerts from the last 24 hours (new exploits, attacker wallets, malicious contracts, phishing campaigns, sanctions updates), newest first, same payload as the webhook feed. Use for SOC / compliance monitoring and watchlist updates.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Get Alerts
searchSearch Prax threat intelligence in plain words (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search Prax threat intelligence in plain words (e.g. 'critical attacker wallets on base this week', 'phishing contracts created by 0x...'). Returns COUNTS of matching addresses (by band, chain, role) plus approved alerts from the last 24 h; address lists are not enumerable - look a specific address up with screen_wallet. Filters: chain (eth, base...), risk band (critical, high), role (attacker wallet, malicious contract, deployer, funding ancestry, clone), period (today, last 7 days, since 2026-10-01), free text (bytecode clone, phishing), 'created by 0x...', 'counterparties of 0x...'. An exact address or tx hash returns that record's id. Use fetch(id) for the full record.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Search
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write19
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 17
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.orabrain.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://mcp.orabrain.com/portal
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 17 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 15 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.orabrain.com/mcp: tools/list returned 21 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_transfer (irreversible), screen_transfers_batch (irreversible), screen_wallet (write), screen_entity (write), screen_wallets_batch (write) and 12 more
Posture changes
- Nov 21, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 14 to 17
- Nov 14, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 14
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnscreen_transfer
The server marks "screen_transfer" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "screen_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
The server marks "screen_transfers_batch" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "screen_transfers_batch" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 14 -> 17.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 14 to 17
Tools9 added, 11 changed.+9 added~11 changedView diff
- Added:screen_adverse_mediaChanges things
- Added:screen_companyChanges things
- Added:screen_countryChanges things
- Added:screen_cveChanges things
- Added:screen_domainChanges things
- Added:screen_ipChanges things
- Added:screen_packageChanges things
- Added:screen_packagesChanges things
- Added:screen_securitiesChanges things
- Changed:analyze_transactionOnly readsdescription
- Changed:fetchOnly readsdescription
- Changed:get_alertsOnly readsdescription
- Changed:screen_bankChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:screen_enforcementChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:screen_entityChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:screen_licenceChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:screen_transferCan't be undonedescription
- Changed:screen_transfers_batchCan't be undonedescription
- Changed:screen_wallets_batchChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:searchOnly readsdescription
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 -> 14.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 14
Tools3 added.+3 addedView diff
- Added:screen_bankChanges things
- Added:screen_enforcementChanges things
- Added:screen_licenceChanges things
Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff
- Changed:screen_entityChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:screen_transfers_batchCan't be undoneinputSchema
- Changed:screen_walletChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:screen_wallets_batchChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http prax-data-services https://mcp.orabrain.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http prax-data-services https://mcp.orabrain.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__prax-data-services__analyze_transaction",
"mcp__prax-data-services__get_alerts",
"mcp__prax-data-services__search",
"mcp__prax-data-services__fetch"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_wallet",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_transfer",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_entity",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_wallets_batch",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_transfers_batch",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_bank",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_enforcement",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_licence",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_country",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_company",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_adverse_media",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_domain",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_ip",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_securities",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_cve",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_package",
"mcp__prax-data-services__screen_packages"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as prax-data-services. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 19 rules
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_wallet untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__analyze_transaction untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_transfer untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_entity untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_wallets_batch untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_transfers_batch untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__get_alerts untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__search untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__fetch untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_bank untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_licence untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_company untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_adverse_media untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_domain untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_ip untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_securities untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_cve untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_package untrusted-input
- mcp__prax-data-services__screen_packages untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.orabrain/prax-data-services/verify?hash=9fbe8dac06ab102b05e054dab4a5023e393d3e6565c67967a28a44cb93133971" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9fbe8dac06ab, from Nov 18, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.orabrain/prax-data-services/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.orabrain/prax-data-services)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
Prax Data Services MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Prax Data Services MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 21 tools, 17 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Prax Data Services MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Prax Data Services MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: screen_transfer and screen_transfers_batch.
What tools does the Prax Data Services MCP server have?
- 21 tools: 2 irreversible, 15 write, 4 read. screen_transfer, screen_transfers_batch, screen_wallet, screen_entity, screen_wallets_batch, screen_bank, screen_enforcement, screen_licence and 13 more.
Does the Prax Data Services MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Prax Data Services MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): screen_transfer.
Has the Prax Data Services MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.