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Pagecuts MCP server

com.pagecuts/pagecutspagecuts.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Make a 15-second video ad, still images and ad copy from any web page. US$19 once per kit.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Pagecuts MCP server can do

The Pagecuts MCP server is published by pagecuts.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: make_ad), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (make_ad and get_ad); 1 tool can send data out of your system (make_ad).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • make_adBuild a 15-second video ad kit from a business's web page: its homepage, a product page, a restaurant's site.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a 15-second video ad kit from a business's web page: its homepage, a product page, a restaurant's site. It takes two calls, because the user's email address has to be proved first. Call it with url and email: a code is emailed to the user. Ask them for the code, then call it again with url, email and code: that returns an id and a page the user can open to watch the build. The ad takes about five minutes, so follow it with get_ad; the user is also emailed when it is ready.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_adThe state of an ad made with make_ad: its status (queued, running, preview_ready, done or failed) and current step, then the marked preview video, two still images, sample ad copy …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_ad" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The state of an ad made with make_ad: its status (queued, running, preview_ready, done or failed) and current step, then the marked preview video, two still images, sample ad copy and the checkout link; once the user has paid, the full kit.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 24, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://pagecuts.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including make_ad (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http pagecuts https://pagecuts.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http pagecuts https://pagecuts.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__pagecuts__get_ad"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__pagecuts__make_ad"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pagecuts. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__pagecuts__make_ad untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__pagecuts__get_ad untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.pagecuts/pagecuts/verify?hash=bdc925d58c7cd61d6c188ed5eed47d06f1f7ac2731a21b2fa3fedd6ee6d1b33b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bdc925d58c7c, from Nov 8, 2026, 22:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.pagecuts/pagecuts/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.pagecuts/pagecuts
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.pagecuts/pagecuts.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.pagecuts/pagecuts)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Pagecuts MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Pagecuts MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Pagecuts MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Pagecuts MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Pagecuts MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. make_ad and get_ad.

Does the Pagecuts MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Pagecuts MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): make_ad.

Has the Pagecuts MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.