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Parlel MCP server

com.parlel/parlelparlel.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Search people, companies and open roles on Parlel, an open professional network.

8 tools: 1 change things and 7 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Parlel MCP server can do

The Parlel MCP server is published by parlel.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: search_jobs), but cannot delete data. 7 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_person and search_agents).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • search_jobsOpen roles on Parlel, newest first.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_jobs" says "search": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open roles on Parlel, newest first. `q` matches the TITLE only. Filter by working arrangement, seniority and a pay floor. Returns {items, next_cursor}; each item has a `role_url` you can cite.
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • get_agentOne published agent by slug: its brief, schedule and recent findings with sources.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One published agent by slug: its brief, schedule and recent findings with sources.
  • get_companyOne company by handle, with its open roles inline.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_company" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One company by handle, with its open roles inline.
  • get_jobOne role by id, with its full description, skills, pay and the hiring company.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_job" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One role by id, with its full description, skills, pay and the hiring company. Works for closed roles too; read `status`.
  • get_personOne published profile by handle: headline, bio, work history, education, skills, recent posts and the agents they publish.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_person" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One published profile by handle: headline, bio, work history, education, skills, recent posts and the agents they publish. Free MCP access can read only the fixed 10-profile sample; Pro company keys can read all.
  • search_agentsPublished watch agents -- standing searches people run against the open web -- with a preview of what each has found.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_agents" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Published watch agents -- standing searches people run against the open web -- with a preview of what each has found. No text filter; walk the list. `sort` is `recent` or `popular`.
  • search_companiesCompanies with a published page.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_companies" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Companies with a published page. `q` matches name, tagline or industry; `industry` is an exact label; `hiring=true` narrows to companies with at least one open role. Each item has `open_role_count`.
  • search_peoplePublished profiles.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_people" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Published profiles. `q` matches name, headline, company, role and work history (not skills, not bio). `skills` are exact tags, AND-ed. `based_in` is where the person is; `location` also matches where they would move to. Contact details are never returned. Free access searches the same 10-profile sample; an API key linked to Pro searches all profiles.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:44 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.parlel.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including search_jobs (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http parlel https://api.parlel.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http parlel https://api.parlel.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__parlel__get_job",
      "mcp__parlel__search_companies",
      "mcp__parlel__get_company",
      "mcp__parlel__search_people",
      "mcp__parlel__get_person",
      "mcp__parlel__search_agents",
      "mcp__parlel__get_agent"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__parlel__search_jobs"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as parlel. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__parlel__get_person untrusted-input
  • mcp__parlel__search_agents untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.parlel/parlel/verify?hash=f084505346b56b97986da913e6dec7f0f01cd484176370baae76d63fb08068b5" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f084505346b5, from Nov 10, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.parlel/parlel/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.parlel/parlel
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.parlel/parlel.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.parlel/parlel)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:00 UTC.

Parlel MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Parlel MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Parlel MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Parlel MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Parlel MCP server have?

8 tools: 1 write, 7 read. search_jobs, get_job, search_companies, get_company, search_people, get_person, search_agents and get_agent.

Does the Parlel MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Parlel MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Parlel MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 29, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.