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Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server

com.penetrationtestservices/sitepenetrationtestservices.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Request a penetration test, grade a website's HTTP security headers, and search pentest guides.

5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 0 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server can do

The Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server is published by penetrationtestservices.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (request_pentest), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (how_to_contact); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (how_to_contact, request_pentest and check_security_headers); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_security_headers). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • request_pentestSend a request for a penetration test or an AI application security assessment to Excession Labs on behalf of a person who asked for it.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_pentest" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.targets.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.targets.description: "...API base URLs or short descriptions. No credentials."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.notes.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.notes.description: "...the person, up to 2,000 characters. No credentials or customer data."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a request for a penetration test or an AI application security assessment to Excession Labs on behalf of a person who asked for it. Needs an agent key (POST /agent/auth, then Authorization: Bearer <key>). Excession Labs replies to the person by email to agree scope; testing starts only after a written scope and written authorization from the system owner. Never include passwords, API keys or customer data. Limits: 5 requests a day per key, 3 a day per email address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • check_security_headersFetch one public web page (one GET per redirect, like a browser visit) and grade its HTTP security headers: HTTPS, HSTS, Content-Security-Policy, clickjacking protection, X-Content…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch one public web page (one GET per redirect, like a browser visit) and grade its HTTP security headers: HTTPS, HSTS, Content-Security-Policy, clickjacking protection, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, COOP, version disclosure and cookie flags. Reads headers only. This is not a penetration test.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_pageReturn the Markdown text of a page on penetrationtestservices.com, given its path (for example /guides/).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_page" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the Markdown text of a page on penetrationtestservices.com, given its path (for example /guides/).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • how_to_contactReturn the form URL and email address a person can use to contact Excession Labs.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "how_to_contact" says "contact": it reads contacts.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "email": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the form URL and email address a person can use to contact Excession Labs. This tool does not send anything.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_siteSearch the guides, service pages and research on penetrationtestservices.com.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_site" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the guides, service pages and research on penetrationtestservices.com. Returns titles, URLs and one-line summaries.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__site__check_security_headers"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://penetrationtestservices.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including request_pentest (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info
  • The input schema at properties.targets.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.targets.description: "...API base URLs or short descriptions. No credentials."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.notes.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.notes.description: "...the person, up to 2,000 characters. No credentials or customer data."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
  2. Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http site https://penetrationtestservices.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http site https://penetrationtestservices.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__site__search_site",
      "mcp__site__get_page",
      "mcp__site__how_to_contact"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__site__request_pentest",
      "mcp__site__check_security_headers"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as site. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__site__how_to_contact private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__site__request_pentest untrusted-input
  • mcp__site__check_security_headers untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.penetrationtestservices/site/verify?hash=3aa165cecf505c9be65ad654f1258963a686fc5a66359c4beb1e1c5439b3c7e5" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3aa165cecf50, from Nov 10, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.penetrationtestservices/site/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.penetrationtestservices/site
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.penetrationtestservices/site.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.penetrationtestservices/site)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: request_pentest.

What tools does the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 read. request_pentest, search_site, get_page, how_to_contact and check_security_headers.

Does the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_security_headers.

Has the Pentest requests, security headers checker, guides MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.