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Perceptlayer MCP server

com.perceptlayer/web-dataperceptlayer.comstreamable-httpv1.1.1Scanned

Live web data for AI agents: structured JSON from 425 websites through one API key.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Perceptlayer MCP server can do

The Perceptlayer MCP server is published by perceptlayer.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: call_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (search_endpoints, get_endpoint and call_endpoint); 2 tools can send data out of your system (get_endpoint and call_endpoint).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • call_endpointRun one endpoint and return its JSON response.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run one endpoint and return its JSON response. Spends the call's credits from the user's balance on success only; failed calls are free. Pass parameters exactly as get_endpoint lists them (array parameters as JSON arrays). The result reports credits used and remaining. Errors come back with a code: invalid_parameters (fix the parameters and retry), not_found (no data for these parameters), rate_limited or temporarily_unavailable (wait and retry), insufficient_credits, restricted_endpoint (the user must accept the restricted-endpoint terms in their dashboard), invalid_api_key (the MCP server config needs a valid API key). Responses over 100,000 characters are truncated; use paging or limit parameters to fetch less.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Call a data endpoint
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_endpointGet the full parameter list for one endpoint: each parameter's name, type, whether it is required, allowed values and limits, plus an example set of parameters, the credit cost and…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_endpoint" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the full parameter list for one endpoint: each parameter's name, type, whether it is required, allowed values and limits, plus an example set of parameters, the credit cost and tier. Call this before call_endpoint unless you already know the parameters. Free; no API key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get endpoint details
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_endpointsFind Perceptlayer endpoints for a website or kind of data.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_endpoints" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find Perceptlayer endpoints for a website or kind of data. The catalogue has 2582 endpoints across 428 sources, so search before calling. Query with the site and the data you want, e.g. "amazon product reviews", "airbnb listing", "linkedin company", "google maps places", "zillow property". Returns compact matches: endpoint ID (pass it to get_endpoint or call_endpoint), name, HTTP method, credits per call (credits_max when the price depends on the call), tier ("restricted" endpoints need the account's restricted-endpoint terms accepted) and required parameters. Free; no API key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search data endpoints
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://api.perceptlayer.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://perceptlayer.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.perceptlayer.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including call_endpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 18, 2026
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://api.perceptlayer.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
    • Authorization servers: none to https://perceptlayer.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://api.perceptlayer.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp; Authorization servers: none -> https://perceptlayer.com; Dynamic client registration: not observed …View diff
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://api.perceptlayer.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
    • Authorization servers: none to https://perceptlayer.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  3. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http web-data https://api.perceptlayer.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http web-data https://api.perceptlayer.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__web-data__search_endpoints"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__web-data__get_endpoint",
      "mcp__web-data__call_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as web-data. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__web-data__search_endpoints untrusted-input
  • mcp__web-data__get_endpoint untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__web-data__call_endpoint untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.perceptlayer/web-data/verify?hash=e25e3a8f8207daad4a1f0b51800314c60ff09c7aee520dd1b5f0a10f5461941f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e25e3a8f8207, from Nov 17, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.perceptlayer/web-data/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.perceptlayer/web-data
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.perceptlayer/web-data.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.perceptlayer/web-data)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Perceptlayer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Perceptlayer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Perceptlayer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Perceptlayer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Perceptlayer MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. call_endpoint, search_endpoints and get_endpoint.

Does the Perceptlayer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Perceptlayer MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_endpoint and call_endpoint.

Has the Perceptlayer MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.