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registry MCP server

com.policylayer/registrypolicylayer.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

The MCP server that vets MCP servers: identity, risk grade and per-tool risk before you install.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the registry MCP server can do

The registry MCP server is published by policylayer.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_mcp_server, check_mcp_stack and check_tool), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Oct 29, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_mcp_serverCheck an MCP server against the PolicyLayer registry BEFORE installing or allowing it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an MCP server against the PolicyLayer registry BEFORE installing or allowing it. Accepts a registry slug, an npm package name (scoped or not), a remote server URL (https://…), or a server name. Returns the full published record: identity verification with its evidence, risk grade, auth posture, freshness, and the tool surface listed riskiest-first. A server the registry does not know is queued for scanning by this very call — check back shortly.
  • check_mcp_stackCheck a whole MCP stack against the PolicyLayer registry in one call — up to 25 servers, each given as candidate identifiers (npm package name, registry slug, or remote URL) tried …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a whole MCP stack against the PolicyLayer registry in one call — up to 25 servers, each given as candidate identifiers (npm package name, registry slug, or remote URL) tried in order until one resolves. Returns the published record for every hit — plus a deterministic verdict (attention signals and a suggested action) — and the lookup status for every miss; counts, grades and flagged tools come from the published records only. Costs one rate-limit unit per server.
  • check_toolOne tool's full risk classification on a published MCP server: category, severity, risk analysis and evidence, OWASP classes, parameter schema and the recommended policy default.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One tool's full risk classification on a published MCP server: category, severity, risk analysis and evidence, OWASP classes, parameter schema and the recommended policy default. Use when deciding whether to allow a specific tool call, e.g. "should execute_sql on this server be permitted?"
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_change_eventsThe registry change feed: tool-surface drift, auth-posture flips, impostor flags, version bumps — every event the freshness watchers emit, id-cursored so a consumer resumes exactly…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_change_events" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The registry change feed: tool-surface drift, auth-posture flips, impostor flags, version bumps — every event the freshness watchers emit, id-cursored so a consumer resumes exactly where it stopped. Requires a Registry Licence key (Authorization: Bearer plr_...); self-serve at https://policylayer.com/registry/pricing.
  • search_registrySearch the PolicyLayer registry of published MCP servers by name, slug or package substring.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_registry" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the PolicyLayer registry of published MCP servers by name, slug or package substring. Returns candidate matches with risk grade, identity confidence (verified / unverified / mismatch — mismatch means it claims to be an official server with no verifiable link to the brand) and tool count — follow up with check_mcp_server on the match you meant.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:44 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: The operation was aborted due to timeout

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http registry https://api.policylayer.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http registry https://api.policylayer.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__registry__search_registry",
      "mcp__registry__get_change_events"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__registry__check_mcp_server",
      "mcp__registry__check_mcp_stack",
      "mcp__registry__check_tool"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as registry. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.policylayer/registry/verify?hash=1d0f0551814432b589ef561cc2ddf13b12c83b33b437bc67aaa6ec3b9fceeb0a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1d0f05518144, from Oct 29, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.policylayer/registry/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.policylayer/registry
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.policylayer/registry.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.policylayer/registry)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:00 UTC.

registry MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the registry MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the registry MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the registry MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the registry MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. check_mcp_server, check_mcp_stack, check_tool, search_registry and get_change_events.

Does the registry MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the registry MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the registry MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 29, 2026.