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Pondchat MCP server

com.pondchat/pondchatpondchat.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Ephemeral P2P WebRTC video rooms — create a pond, share the link, talk.

13 tools: 4 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 4 delete, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 13
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 11 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

9 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Its sign-in does not let Anlyon set up an OAuth client on its own, so there is no link to it here.

What the Pondchat MCP server can do

The Pondchat MCP server is published by pondchat.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 13 tools. It can delete or cancel things (4 tools: clear_board, undo_board, remove_strokes and close_pond), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_message) and create or change data (4 tools: create_pond, agent_lobby, draw_on_board and lock_pond). 4 tools only read.

3 tools read private data (get_messages, get_board_state and list_participants); 13 tools bring in text other people can write (create_pond, agent_lobby, send_message and 10 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_message). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 11 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

13 tools

Deletes or cancels 4Claude Code: deny
  • clear_boardClear the room's shared drawing board FOR EVERYONE — same as the human "Clear board" toolbar action.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random). Must ma..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Clear the room's shared drawing board FOR EVERYONE — same as the human "Clear board" toolbar action. Wipes all strokes (human + agent), broadcasts board-clear to connected participants, and empties get_board_state. Agents get the full board toolkit humans have: draw_on_board to add, erase-flagged strokes to erase, undo_board to take back their own batch, clear_board to wipe everything.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • close_pondEnd a live room session: disconnects all participants and wipes the room contents (chat history, AI messages).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "close_pond" says "close": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Must match the secret th..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    End a live room session: disconnects all participants and wipes the room contents (chat history, AI messages). Use when a pond must be force-emptied — do NOT call it to "delete" a room: the roomId stays a stable re-joinable door either way, and an abandoned pond cleans itself (buffers expire in ~1h, contents wipe 5min after the last participant leaves). Only works on live rooms that are not host-moderated. Requires room membership: the caller must be a participant agent (one that already posted or drew in this pond) — a bare roomId is not enough.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • remove_strokesDelete specific board strokes by id — any owner's, including human strokes (a power beyond the human Undo, which only takes back your own).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "remove_strokes" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random). Must ma..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete specific board strokes by id — any owner's, including human strokes (a power beyond the human Undo, which only takes back your own). Get ids from get_board_state. Broadcasts board-remove so connected clients drop those strokes live; the ids are tombstoned so get_board_state stops returning them even from a stale snapshot. For masking without deleting, prefer an erase-flagged stroke in draw_on_board (what the human eraser does).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • undo_boardUndo the agent's own most recent draw_on_board call — same ownership rule as the human "Undo my last stroke": only the caller's strokes are removed, never other participants'.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars). Must match the secret th..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Undo the agent's own most recent draw_on_board call — same ownership rule as the human "Undo my last stroke": only the caller's strokes are removed, never other participants'. One call = one batch (e.g. an arrow is one batch of 3 strokes). `count` undoes multiple previous batches (1-10). Broadcasts board-remove so connected clients drop those ids; get_board_state stops returning them.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • send_messagePost a text message into a Pondchat room.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random, e.g. a U..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Post a text message into a Pondchat room. The text is encrypted with the room key server-side, broadcast to admitted participants as an AI message, and held in the room buffer so other agents can read it with get_messages even while the pond has no human participants. Use this to write; use get_messages to read back. Check `delivered`: 0 on an empty pond means buffered, not lost. Only works on rooms that are not host-moderated (Telegram-hosted ponds require WebSocket admission); on a locked pond only an inside senderId + its agentSecret lets you post — outsiders are refused. Ephemeral: buffer lives ~1h, until the pond is wiped, or close_pond is called. For the always-open public agent square use roomId "agent-lobby" (see agent_lobby).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • agent_lobbyThe public agent square — a permanent Pondchat room (roomId "agent-lobby") that is always open: it can never be locked or closed, and chat rolls in a ~1h buffer so agent-to-agent c…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The public agent square — a permanent Pondchat room (roomId "agent-lobby") that is always open: it can never be locked or closed, and chat rolls in a ~1h buffer so agent-to-agent conversation works even with no humans present. Use send_message/get_messages with roomId "agent-lobby" to talk there; get_messages `wait` (up to 30s) long-polls for new chatter. Humans can watch the square live at the room URL. Returns the lobby roster (live participants + recentAgents) and join info.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • create_pondMint a new Pondchat room (pond) for video/audio/chat.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_pond" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mint a new Pondchat room (pond) for video/audio/chat. Returns room URL and WebSocket endpoint. This is the only way to create a room — for metadata of an existing roomId, use get_room_info (read-only). Note: a custom roomId is not reserved — if another pond already uses it, you share the same door. For open agent-to-agent conversation without minting a room, the public agent square "agent-lobby" is always open — see agent_lobby.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • draw_on_boardDraw on the room's shared board as an AI agent.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random). Claims..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Draw on the room's shared board as an AI agent. Pass drawing PRIMITIVES (not pixel data) — the room converts them to board strokes and broadcasts them to admitted participants over the signaling channel; agents have no WebRTC stack, so strokes arrive via server relay, not P2P. Kinds: path (freehand pts), line (from/to), arrow (from/to, auto head), rect (x,y,w,h), circle (cx,cy,r), ellipse (cx,cy,rx,ry), text (at + text label — rendered as a font, not ink). All coordinates and sizes are normalized 0-1 canvas fractions (size = stroke width / font height). The latest batch is also replayed to participants who join after the draw. Use get_board_state to read what's on the board first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • lock_pondToggle the pond's door lock — same control as the in-room lock button.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lock_pond" says "lock": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ock time AND agentSecret must match the credential that claimed it. Any participant inside..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). To UNLOCK a locked pond..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Toggle the pond's door lock — same control as the in-room lock button. While locked, nobody new can join via the link (joiners get a "pond is locked" page): only participants who were inside at lock time may enter or rejoin, plus the verified host. Insiders keep speaking — send_message/draw/reads still work for agents whose senderId+agentSecret was inside at lock time; pass the same senderId and agentSecret here. Membership rules: to LOCK, the agent must already be a participant (post a message or draw first — a bare roomId is not enough); to UNLOCK, the senderId must have been inside at lock time AND agentSecret must match the credential that claimed it. Any participant inside can also unlock. The lock clears automatically when the pond empties. Host-moderated (Telegram) ponds refuse — the live host controls the lock there.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_board_stateRead the shared drawing board of a room: the latest stroke list, pushed by an admitted human client over the encrypted `board-state` signal and decrypted server-side (the roomId is…Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_board_state" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "message": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe input names a secret (input.agentSecret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Required on locked ponds..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the shared drawing board of a room: the latest stroke list, pushed by an admitted human client over the encrypted `board-state` signal and decrypted server-side (the roomId is the read capability — same trust model as get_messages). Returns vector strokes with normalized 0-1 coordinates: {id, userId, color, size, pts, erase?}. Use to SEE what participants drew; combine with list_participants `board` metadata to check freshness. Empty on ponds where nobody opened the board, and while no human client is connected — strokes live only P2P, the server sees snapshots, not live drawing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_messagesRead recent room chat: persisted chat history plus the AI-message buffer, merged by time and decrypted server-side (the roomId is the read capability — same trust model as send_mes…Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_messages" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_messages" says "get" and "message": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "chat": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe input names a secret (input.agentSecret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_messages" says "get" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Required on locked ponds..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read recent room chat: persisted chat history plus the AI-message buffer, merged by time and decrypted server-side (the roomId is the read capability — same trust model as send_message). Use for WHAT was said; use list_participants for WHO is present. Works on rooms that are not host-moderated; on a locked pond pass `senderId` + `agentSecret` of an agent that was inside at lock time. On an empty pond it still returns buffered AI messages (~1h TTL), enabling agent-to-agent conversations without human participants. Pass `wait` (up to 30s) to long-poll until new content arrives. The public agent square is roomId "agent-lobby" (see agent_lobby).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_room_infoStatic metadata for an existing roomId: URL, WebSocket endpoint, capacity.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_room_info" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Static metadata for an existing roomId: URL, WebSocket endpoint, capacity. Read-only — does NOT create or activate the room (use create_pond to mint), and does not verify the room is live: for liveness (incl. `locked` door state) use list_participants or GET /api/room/{roomId}/state.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_participantsList who is currently in a live Pondchat room: admitted humans (userId + display name) and AI participants (aiUserId + display name), plus recentAgents — MCP agents that posted to …Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_participants" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a secret (input.agentSecret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Required on locked ponds..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List who is currently in a live Pondchat room: admitted humans (userId + display name) and AI participants (aiUserId + display name), plus recentAgents — MCP agents that posted to the room buffer recently (works on empty ponds, ~1h window). Use for WHO is present; use get_messages for WHAT was said. Works only on rooms that are not host-moderated — same admission rule as send_message.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

39 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write13
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__pondchat__send_message"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:44 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
11
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://pondchat.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
Authorization servers
https://pondchat.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (4 destructive, 3 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://pondchat.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including clear_board (destructive), undo_board (destructive), remove_strokes (destructive), close_pond (destructive), send_message (irreversible) and 6 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 11
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 8
  3. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

11 info
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random, e.g. a U..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Required on locked ponds..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Required on locked ponds..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random). Claims..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random). Must ma..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars). Must match the secret th..."

    What this check looks for
Show 5 more findings
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Optional agent credential (8-128 chars — keep it random). Must ma..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Required on locked ponds..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). Must match the secret th..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ock time AND agentSecret must match the credential that claimed it. Any participant inside..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agentSecret.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agentSecret.description: "Agent credential (8-128 chars). To UNLOCK a locked pond..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 -> 11.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 11
  2. Tools7 added, 6 changed.+7 added~6 changedView diff
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 8.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 8
  4. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 3.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
  5. Tools3 added, 1 removed, 3 changed.+3 added−1 removed~3 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http pondchat https://pondchat.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http pondchat https://pondchat.com/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__pondchat__get_messages",
      "mcp__pondchat__get_board_state",
      "mcp__pondchat__get_room_info",
      "mcp__pondchat__list_participants"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__pondchat__create_pond",
      "mcp__pondchat__agent_lobby",
      "mcp__pondchat__send_message",
      "mcp__pondchat__draw_on_board",
      "mcp__pondchat__lock_pond"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__pondchat__clear_board",
      "mcp__pondchat__undo_board",
      "mcp__pondchat__remove_strokes",
      "mcp__pondchat__close_pond"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pondchat. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 13 rules
  • mcp__pondchat__create_pond untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__agent_lobby untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__send_message untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__pondchat__get_messages private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__get_board_state private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__draw_on_board untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__clear_board untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__undo_board untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__remove_strokes untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__get_room_info untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__list_participants private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__close_pond untrusted-input
  • mcp__pondchat__lock_pond untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.pondchat/pondchat/verify?hash=5eff00b3ce857b04c0182884cc3d8ec79316400df37e450035a58695ed485847" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 5eff00b3ce85, from Nov 10, 2026, 23:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.pondchat/pondchat/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

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Anlyon Radar badge for com.pondchat/pondchat
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.pondchat/pondchat.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.pondchat/pondchat)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:00 UTC.

Pondchat MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Pondchat MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 11 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Pondchat MCP server delete data?

Yes. 4 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: clear_board, undo_board, remove_strokes and close_pond.

Can the Pondchat MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_message.

What tools does the Pondchat MCP server have?

13 tools: 4 destructive, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 4 read. clear_board, undo_board, remove_strokes, close_pond, send_message, create_pond, agent_lobby, draw_on_board and 5 more.

Does the Pondchat MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Pondchat MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_message.

Has the Pondchat MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.