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RepoAlerts MCP server

com.repoalerts/radarrepoalerts.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Rising GitHub repos with fake stars filtered out: search, trending, repo pages, alternatives.

4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the RepoAlerts MCP server can do

The RepoAlerts MCP server is published by repoalerts.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (find_alternatives) and create or change data (1 tool: trending_repos), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

3 tools read private data (search_repos, get_repo and find_alternatives); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_repo); 1 tool can send data out of your system (find_alternatives). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • find_alternativesOpen-source alternatives to an app, product or service ("Photoshop", "Notion", "Heroku", "Postman"), from the GitHub repos RepoAlerts tracks, with real star counts and growth.Reads private dataCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_alternatives" says "find": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "repo": it reads repositories.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "find_alternatives" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "find_alternatives" says "find": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open-source alternatives to an app, product or service ("Photoshop", "Notion", "Heroku", "Postman"), from the GitHub repos RepoAlerts tracks, with real star counts and growth. Optionally for a platform or constraint ("Mac", "self-hosted"). Repos whose own page lists that app as something they replace come first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Find open-source alternatives
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_repoEverything RepoAlerts knows about one GitHub repository (owner/name or URL): what it is and who it's for, stars and recent growth, a summary of its star curve, licence, last push, …Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_repo" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_repo" says "get" and "repo": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "repo": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe input names a repo (input.repo), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Everything RepoAlerts knows about one GitHub repository (owner/name or URL): what it is and who it's for, stars and recent growth, a summary of its star curve, licence, last push, the apps it can replace, Hacker News stories and similar repos. Use it to check a repo before recommending or installing it. If the repo isn't in the directory, it says so (it may be unknown or excluded for fake stars).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get a repo's RepoAlerts page
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_reposFind real, actively growing open-source GitHub repositories for a need described in plain words ("a calendar MCP server", "free Photoshop alternative for Mac", "self-hosted analyti…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_repos" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "search_repos" says "search" and "repo": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "repository": it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find real, actively growing open-source GitHub repositories for a need described in plain words ("a calendar MCP server", "free Photoshop alternative for Mac", "self-hosted analytics"). Semantic search over the RepoAlerts directory, which leaves out repos with fake (bought or farmed) stars. Use it instead of recalling package or repo names from memory, whenever the user asks for a tool, library, app, framework or MCP server. Returns for each repo: what it is, who it's for, stars and stars gained in 24 hours and 7 days, licence, last push, its RepoAlerts page and GitHub URL.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search GitHub repos
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__radar__find_alternatives"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:45 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://repoalerts.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including find_alternatives (irreversible), trending_repos (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "find_alternatives" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "find_alternatives" says "find": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http radar https://repoalerts.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http radar https://repoalerts.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__radar__search_repos",
      "mcp__radar__get_repo"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__radar__trending_repos",
      "mcp__radar__find_alternatives"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as radar. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__radar__search_repos private-data
  • mcp__radar__get_repo private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__radar__find_alternatives private-data, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.repoalerts/radar/verify?hash=71e78b42f0a7f435905863552e65936417635e1fd45d348b26afeee390d5a3aa" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 71e78b42f0a7, from Nov 14, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.repoalerts/radar/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.repoalerts/radar
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.repoalerts/radar.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.repoalerts/radar)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:01 UTC.

RepoAlerts MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the RepoAlerts MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the RepoAlerts MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the RepoAlerts MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: find_alternatives.

What tools does the RepoAlerts MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read. find_alternatives, trending_repos, search_repos and get_repo.

Does the RepoAlerts MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the RepoAlerts MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): find_alternatives.

Has the RepoAlerts MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.