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Ripedeps MCP server

com.ripedeps/ripedepsripedeps.comstreamable-httpv1.4.9Scanned

Deterministic package.json upgrade plans: age gate, aligned peers, reasons per change. No AI.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Ripedeps MCP server can do

The Ripedeps MCP server is published by ripedeps.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: plan_upgrade), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (plan_upgrade).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.4.9.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • plan_upgradeRecommends version upgrades for a package.json: the newest versions that are old enough and within the allowed step size, kept aligned with each other (peer dependencies and the fi…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recommends version upgrades for a package.json: the newest versions that are old enough and within the allowed step size, kept aligned with each other (peer dependencies and the first-level dependencies of the packages). Deterministic, no AI. Returns the new package.json, a unified diff (apply with `patch -p1`) and a per-package table with the reasons. Every package has an `explanation` sentence and `notes` lists other changes to the file (the `ripedeps` entry): relay them to the user as the rationale for each change. Send the file as `packageJson` (text) or as `packageJsonUrl` (https URL of a raw file), exactly one of them. Recommended: minAgeDays 7 (versions younger than 7 days are not proposed). The default is 0, or the `ripedeps` entry of the file. maxBump defaults to minor. Use `focus` to restrict the upgrade to some packages (and their direct neighbours). Try more than one level: a plan only suggests and writes nothing, so calling again is cheap. Start with minor; if a package is held with a `level-limit` reason (a newer major exists), call again with maxBump "major" (optionally with `focus`) and compare. A `held` result is a reasoned decision for that one package, not a ban on the level: its reason names what blocks it (a peer or dependency constraint). Apply a larger step only when the user approves it. Privacy: We do not keep your package.json: every upload is processed from scratch and discarded, nothing about its content or your IP address is remembered. Only anonymous statistics (file size, number of dependencies, number of changes) are counted.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 27, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.ripedeps.com/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including plan_upgrade (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.4.9. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ripedeps https://mcp.ripedeps.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http ripedeps https://mcp.ripedeps.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ripedeps__plan_upgrade"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ripedeps. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__ripedeps__plan_upgrade untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ripedeps/ripedeps/verify?hash=16da0e2dfcdfda71bdece661c15297f463b7f98ee1d9788607aaecfaa1a39b4b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 16da0e2dfcdf, from Nov 9, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ripedeps/ripedeps/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.ripedeps/ripedeps
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.ripedeps/ripedeps.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ripedeps/ripedeps)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

Ripedeps MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Ripedeps MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Ripedeps MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Ripedeps MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Ripedeps MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. plan_upgrade.

Does the Ripedeps MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Ripedeps MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Ripedeps MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.