Ripedeps MCP server
com.ripedeps/ripedepsripedeps.comstreamable-httpv1.4.9Scanned
Deterministic package.json upgrade plans: age gate, aligned peers, reasons per change. No AI.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Ripedeps MCP server can do
The Ripedeps MCP server is published by ripedeps.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: plan_upgrade), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (plan_upgrade).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.4.9.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
plan_upgradeRecommends version upgrades for a package.json: the newest versions that are old enough and within the allowed step size, kept aligned with each other (peer dependencies and the fi…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Recommends version upgrades for a package.json: the newest versions that are old enough and within the allowed step size, kept aligned with each other (peer dependencies and the first-level dependencies of the packages). Deterministic, no AI. Returns the new package.json, a unified diff (apply with `patch -p1`) and a per-package table with the reasons. Every package has an `explanation` sentence and `notes` lists other changes to the file (the `ripedeps` entry): relay them to the user as the rationale for each change. Send the file as `packageJson` (text) or as `packageJsonUrl` (https URL of a raw file), exactly one of them. Recommended: minAgeDays 7 (versions younger than 7 days are not proposed). The default is 0, or the `ripedeps` entry of the file. maxBump defaults to minor. Use `focus` to restrict the upgrade to some packages (and their direct neighbours). Try more than one level: a plan only suggests and writes nothing, so calling again is cheap. Start with minor; if a package is held with a `level-limit` reason (a newer major exists), call again with maxBump "major" (optionally with `focus`) and compare. A `held` result is a reasoned decision for that one package, not a ban on the level: its reason names what blocks it (a peer or dependency constraint). Apply a larger step only when the user approves it. Privacy: We do not keep your package.json: every upload is processed from scratch and discarded, nothing about its content or your IP address is remembered. Only anonymous statistics (file size, number of dependencies, number of changes) are counted.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 27, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.ripedeps.com/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including plan_upgrade (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.4.9. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ripedeps https://mcp.ripedeps.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http ripedeps https://mcp.ripedeps.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__ripedeps__plan_upgrade"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ripedeps. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__ripedeps__plan_upgrade untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ripedeps/ripedeps/verify?hash=16da0e2dfcdfda71bdece661c15297f463b7f98ee1d9788607aaecfaa1a39b4b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 16da0e2dfcdf, from Nov 9, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ripedeps/ripedeps/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ripedeps/ripedeps)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Ripedeps MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Ripedeps MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Ripedeps MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Ripedeps MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Ripedeps MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. plan_upgrade.
Does the Ripedeps MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Ripedeps MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Ripedeps MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.