Rotten America Petitions MCP server
com.rottenamerica/petitionsrottenamerica.comstreamable-httpv0.4.0Scanned
Find, draft and start verified petitions from a chat; follow signatures and post updates.
2 tools: 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, OAuth metadata published. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Rotten America Petitions MCP server can do
The Rotten America Petitions MCP server is published by rottenamerica.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (find_petitions and get_petition).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in and publishes OAuth metadata.
Last scanned Nov 7, 2026, version 0.4.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
find_petitionsSearches live Rotten America petitions by words in the title or ask.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_petitions" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Searches live Rotten America petitions by words in the title or ask. Use it before starting a new petition: if one already asks for the same thing, suggest signing and sharing it instead of splitting support.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find live petitions
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
get_petitionOne live petition: its exact wording, who it goes to, its verified signature count and goal, and the links to sign and to check the count.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_petition" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it One live petition: its exact wording, who it goes to, its verified signature count and goal, and the links to sign and to check the count.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Read one petition
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 8, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 401
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- https://rottenamerica.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://rottenamerica.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://rottenamerica.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http petitions https://rottenamerica.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http petitions https://rottenamerica.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__petitions__find_petitions",
"mcp__petitions__get_petition"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as petitions. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__petitions__find_petitions untrusted-input
- mcp__petitions__get_petition untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.rottenamerica/petitions/verify?hash=99c4d4699b07907aeb640f82d4122a567dc4d7b76804155dd38e17c482a9315b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 99c4d4699b07, from Nov 7, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.rottenamerica/petitions/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.rottenamerica/petitions)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
Rotten America Petitions MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Rotten America Petitions MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Rotten America Petitions MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Rotten America Petitions MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Rotten America Petitions MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 read. find_petitions and get_petition.
Does the Rotten America Petitions MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 401 without credentials, and it publishes OAuth protected resource metadata (RFC 9728); its authorization server supports dynamic client registration.
Does the Rotten America Petitions MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Rotten America Petitions MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 7, 2026.