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SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server

com.scriptmasterlabs/provider-trustscriptmasterlabs.comstreamable-httpv1.3.4Scanned

Verify providers before agents trust them. Settle-proven end-to-end 2026-11-02 (SELF-PROOF).

7 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 7
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server can do

The SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server is published by scriptmasterlabs.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (check_payment) and create or change data (4 tools: verify_provider, check_identity, check_history and canon_registry_bulk_lookup), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

7 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_provider, compare_providers, check_identity and 4 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.3.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_paymentCheck live x402 payment readiness and real settlement evidence: the canonical x402 payment contract, the readiness endpoint, and recorded settlement evidence, returned as separate …Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check live x402 payment readiness and real settlement evidence: the canonical x402 payment contract, the readiness endpoint, and recorded settlement evidence, returned as separate envelopes. A 402 challenge, a signature, a readiness flag, or an HTTP 200 alone does not prove settled, accepted delivery — only settlement evidence does. Free, read-only; never signs or spends.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Check Payment
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • canon_registry_bulk_lookupPAID tool ($0.01 USDC via x402, Base).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "canon_registry_bulk_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "canon_registry_bulk_lookup" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "canon_registry_bulk_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID tool ($0.01 USDC via x402, Base). Resolve up to 100 artifact freshness records in one call against live registries and cryptographically verified CANON publisher manifests: detects stale mirrors, superseded artifacts, and publisher/registry conflicts. Send the x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header on the /mcp request; without payment the call returns the canonical x402 challenge (HTTP 402, amount 10000 = $0.01 USDC, payTo of the CANON endpoint). Settlement is performed by the canonical CANON endpoint on SqueezeOS; this MCP never holds funds and never pays on your behalf.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: CANON Registry Bulk Lookup
  • check_historyCheck recent evidence-backed provider history.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check recent evidence-backed provider history. Traffic volume is context only and is never presented as buyers, trust, or reputation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Check History
  • check_identityCheck live provider identity evidence: the published ERC-8004 agent identity document and its source/status envelope, returned exactly as observed.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check live provider identity evidence: the published ERC-8004 agent identity document and its source/status envelope, returned exactly as observed. A successful fetch shows declared identity only — it is not external certification and not settlement verification — and missing evidence stays unknown rather than being filled in. Free, read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Check Identity
  • verify_providerPAID tool ($0.001 USDC via x402, Base).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID tool ($0.001 USDC via x402, Base). Verify a provider or source before an AI agent trusts or uses it. Returns live evidence only; unknown stays unknown. Send the x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header on the /mcp request; without payment the call returns the canonical x402 challenge (HTTP 402, amount 1000 = $0.001 USDC, payTo of the canonical SML receiver). Settlement is performed by the canonical CANON endpoint on SqueezeOS; this MCP never holds funds and never pays on your behalf.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Verify Provider
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_statusCheck whether the Provider Trust backend is live: returns the authoritative backend status envelope for the service that powers verify_provider, compare_providers, and the other ch…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether the Provider Trust backend is live: returns the authoritative backend status envelope for the service that powers verify_provider, compare_providers, and the other checks. Use it to distinguish a Provider Trust outage from a target-side evidence gap before relying on any check result. Free, read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Check Status
  • compare_providersCompare 2-5 providers side by side using live evidence gathered the same way verify_provider gathers it — identity, payment-readiness, and status evidence for each target, returned…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "compare_providers" says "compare": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compare 2-5 providers side by side using live evidence gathered the same way verify_provider gathers it — identity, payment-readiness, and status evidence for each target, returned as a separate envelope per provider. No composite score is computed and no winner is declared; unknown evidence stays unknown for every target. Free, read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Compare Providers

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write7
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:46 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://provider-trust-mcp.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including check_payment (irreversible), verify_provider (write), check_identity (write), check_history (write), canon_registry_bulk_lookup (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 5
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 4

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "check_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "canon_registry_bulk_lookup" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "canon_registry_bulk_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 5.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 5
  3. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
  4. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 4.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 4
  5. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  6. Tools1 added, 6 changed.+1 added~6 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http provider-trust https://provider-trust-mcp.onrender.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http provider-trust https://provider-trust-mcp.onrender.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__provider-trust__compare_providers",
      "mcp__provider-trust__check_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__provider-trust__verify_provider",
      "mcp__provider-trust__check_identity",
      "mcp__provider-trust__check_payment",
      "mcp__provider-trust__check_history",
      "mcp__provider-trust__canon_registry_bulk_lookup"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as provider-trust. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__provider-trust__verify_provider untrusted-input
  • mcp__provider-trust__compare_providers untrusted-input
  • mcp__provider-trust__check_identity untrusted-input
  • mcp__provider-trust__check_payment untrusted-input
  • mcp__provider-trust__check_history untrusted-input
  • mcp__provider-trust__check_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__provider-trust__canon_registry_bulk_lookup untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.scriptmasterlabs/provider-trust/verify?hash=b36659b7a505112d3764bdd702d2c9a5ab5ff863b2bae325cf6182afc0789e22" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b36659b7a505, from Nov 18, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.scriptmasterlabs/provider-trust/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.scriptmasterlabs/provider-trust
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.scriptmasterlabs/provider-trust.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.scriptmasterlabs/provider-trust)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: check_payment.

What tools does the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server have?

7 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read. check_payment, verify_provider, check_identity, check_history, canon_registry_bulk_lookup, compare_providers and check_status.

Does the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Provider Trust + CANON MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.