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SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server

com.scriptmasterlabs/verdictscriptmasterlabs.comstreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned

Verdict Protocol MCP: five-juror Jev decisions. Seal settle-proven 2026-11-02 (SELF-PROOF).

6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server can do

The SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server is published by scriptmasterlabs.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: verdict_compile_capsule, verdict_verify_capsule and verdict_decide), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (verdict_contract and verdict_decide).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • verdict_compile_capsuleFreeze caller-supplied research state into a timestamped SHA256 capsule using the production compiler.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Freeze caller-supplied research state into a timestamped SHA256 capsule using the production compiler. Stateless: no persistence, Jev call, signature, paid receipt, trade approval or settlement. The timestamp changes each compilation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • title: Compile a decision capsule
  • verdict_decideInvoke the existing /decide service: five Jev jurors over a frozen capsule, with persisted signed receipt.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "invoke": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Invoke the existing /decide service: five Jev jurors over a frozen capsule, with persisted signed receipt. Without payment returns the fresh x402 challenge. Requires caller Jev key in X-JEV-API-KEY and a caller-created PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header or payment_signature argument. Never creates a wallet signature or submits trades. model_spend_authorized=true is required before paid execution. Paid: $0.25 USDC via x402 on Base.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Run paid BYOK Jev verdict
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
  • verdict_verify_capsuleRecompute the hash of a supplied frozen capsule.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recompute the hash of a supplied frozen capsule. A matching hash proves internal integrity only, not source truth, SML issuance, receipt authenticity, Jev execution or payment. No model or wallet call.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Check capsule hash integrity
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • verdict_contractRead the live Verdict Protocol OpenAPI contract and separate paid HTTP service requirements.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the live Verdict Protocol OpenAPI contract and separate paid HTTP service requirements. This tool never calls /decide or /seal and cannot authorize payments or forward keys. Paid HTTP tiers: /decide is $0.25 USDC, /seal is $0.01 USDC, /evidence is $0.05 USDC and /dispute is $0.25 USDC via x402 on Base and Arc.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Verdict API contract
  • verdict_review_juryValidate five uniquely identified caller-supplied juror votes and recompute the production jury aggregation.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate five uniquely identified caller-supplied juror votes and recompute the production jury aggregation. No new Jev evaluation occurs. The report is untrusted input: aggregation does not authenticate issuance, correctness, independence, trade approval or payment.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Review supplied Jev jury votes
  • verdict_statusRead current readiness and decision-only service identity.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "verdict_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read current readiness and decision-only service identity. Configuration readiness is not proof of a fresh Jev evaluation or settlement. No model, wallet or trade call.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Verdict runtime status

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 26, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://verdict.scriptmasterlabs.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including verdict_compile_capsule (write), verdict_verify_capsule (write), verdict_decide (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
  2. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http verdict https://verdict.scriptmasterlabs.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http verdict https://verdict.scriptmasterlabs.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__verdict__verdict_status",
      "mcp__verdict__verdict_contract",
      "mcp__verdict__verdict_review_jury"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__verdict__verdict_compile_capsule",
      "mcp__verdict__verdict_verify_capsule",
      "mcp__verdict__verdict_decide"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as verdict. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__verdict__verdict_contract untrusted-input
  • mcp__verdict__verdict_decide untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.scriptmasterlabs/verdict/verify?hash=f1eb2d64c08502aa60a6e2905f00d92faa6cfc438546e89ae6bc8c5ca03aee46" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f1eb2d64c085, from Nov 18, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.scriptmasterlabs/verdict/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.scriptmasterlabs/verdict
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.scriptmasterlabs/verdict.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.scriptmasterlabs/verdict)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server have?

6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. verdict_compile_capsule, verdict_verify_capsule, verdict_decide, verdict_status, verdict_contract and verdict_review_jury.

Does the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the SCRIPTMASTERLABS — Verdict Protocol MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.