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searchcode MCP server

com.searchcode/mcpsearchcode.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Code intelligence for LLMs. Analyze, search, and retrieve code from any public git repository.

7 tools: 7 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 7
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 5 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the searchcode MCP server can do

The searchcode MCP server is published by searchcode.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

7 tools read private data (code_analyze, code_search, code_get_file and 4 more).

The fixed checks matched 5 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • code_analyzeInstant repo overview — languages, complexity, file count, tech stack, code quality findings, and secret scanning.Reads private data2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "code_analyze" says "analyze": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "repo": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe input names a repository (input.repository), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "CREDENTIALS".

      Matched text

      description: "...This is the tool that scans for LEAKED CREDENTIALS: security_summary is a dedicated secret..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.tests.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.tests.description: "...ust them. They are kept, not deleted: a credential committed in a test fixture is still a..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Instant repo overview — languages, complexity, file count, tech stack, code quality findings, and secret scanning. Use as your first call to understand any remote public codebase. This is the tool that scans for LEAKED CREDENTIALS: security_summary is a dedicated secret and credential scanner covering API keys, access tokens, private keys and connection strings, each with a file, a line and a confidence grade. Prefer it over grepping for key prefixes with code_search — a pattern search only finds what you thought to spell, and finds nothing at all in the repositories where you guessed wrong. Supports language filtering and path scoping (for large monorepos, analyze a subdirectory instead of the full repo). When analysing multiple repositories, call in parallel rather than sequentially. Dependency/build directories excluded by default.
  • code_file_treeList files and directories in any public git repo.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "code_file_tree" says "tree": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "code_file_tree" says "tree" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe input names a repository (input.repository), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List files and directories in any public git repo. Supports fuzzy file search (query parameter), language/path filtering, and depth control. Combine query with path_filter to search within a directory subset. Use to explore project layout, find files by name, or browse specific directories. Results capped at 1000 files; response includes total_files, files_shown, and truncated fields. Use language or path_filter to narrow large repos. Dependency/build directories excluded by default.
  • code_find_usagesFind which files in a repository use a given technology, library or framework — with the line number and the import keyword that proves it.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "code_find_usages" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe input names a repository (input.repository), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find which files in a repository use a given technology, library or framework — with the line number and the import keyword that proves it. Use after code_analyze reports a technology in tech_stack and you need to know which files it is actually in, rather than searching for import statements by hand. Returns file, line, evidence keyword and language. COVERAGE LIMIT: technology detection reads only the first 150 lines of each file, so a file that imports the technology further down, or uses it without a top-of-file import, does not appear. Absence from these results is not proof the file does not use the technology. The count matches the files_using value code_analyze reports for the same technology. Shares the analysis cache with code_analyze — no duplicate work if analyze already ran.
  • code_get_fileGet code from a remote public git repository — either a specific function/class by name, a line range, or a full file.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "code_get_file" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "code_get_file" says "get" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "repository": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe input names a repository (input.repository), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get code from a remote public git repository — either a specific function/class by name, a line range, or a full file. PREFERRED WORKFLOW: When search results or findings have already identified a specific function, method, or class, use symbol_name to extract just that declaration. This avoids fetching entire files and keeps context focused. Only fetch full files when you need a broad understanding of a file you haven't seen before. For supported languages (Go, Python, TypeScript, JavaScript, Java, C, C++, C#, Kotlin, Swift, Rust) the response includes a symbols list of declarations with line ranges. This is not a first-call tool — use code_analyze or code_search first to identify targets, then extract precisely what you need.
  • code_get_filesGet contents of multiple files from a remote public git repository in a single call.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "code_get_files" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "code_get_files" says "get" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe input names a repository (input.repository), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get contents of multiple files from a remote public git repository in a single call. Reduces round-trips when you need to read several related files. Max 10 files per batch, 5000 total lines budget across all files. Each file supports optional line ranges. Failed files return per-file errors without blocking other files.
  • code_get_findingsGet detailed code quality findings from a remote public git repository.Reads private data2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "code_get_findings" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "repository": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe input names a repository (input.repository), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...a leaked API key or private key. Leaked credentials are code_analyze.security_summary, whic..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.tests.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.tests.description: "...ust them. They are kept, not deleted: a credential committed in a test fixture is still a..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get detailed code quality findings from a remote public git repository. Returns rule IDs, line numbers, severity, category, descriptions, and source snippets. Supports filtering by file path, severity (error, warning, info), category (security, deprecated, safety, correctness, maintainability, accessibility, modernization, performance, concurrency), and kind (security, quality) — kind=security is every security-category finding in one call, kind=quality is everything else. code_analyze.top_findings shows only the quality half; use kind=security here to see the security-category findings it leaves out. THIS IS NOT THE SECRET SCANNER. kind=security means insecure code — weak hashes, unsafe deserialization, injection-shaped patterns — and it will not find a leaked API key or private key. Leaked credentials are code_analyze.security_summary, which is a different scanner over different rules; the two sets do not overlap, so an audit wants both. Use after code_analyze to drill into specific findings. Shares the same analysis cache — no duplicate work if analyze already ran.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data7
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:46 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

5 info
  • The description mentions "CREDENTIALS".

    Matched text

    description: "...This is the tool that scans for LEAKED CREDENTIALS: security_summary is a dedicated secret..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.tests.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.tests.description: "...ust them. They are kept, not deleted: a credential committed in a test fixture is still a..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ity_summary — it runs a real secret and credential scanner over the whole repository, wher..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...a leaked API key or private key. Leaked credentials are code_analyze.security_summary, whic..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.tests.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.tests.description: "...ust them. They are kept, not deleted: a credential committed in a test fixture is still a..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http searchcode https://api.searchcode.com/v1/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http searchcode https://api.searchcode.com/v1/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__searchcode__code_analyze",
      "mcp__searchcode__code_search",
      "mcp__searchcode__code_get_file",
      "mcp__searchcode__code_file_tree",
      "mcp__searchcode__code_get_files",
      "mcp__searchcode__code_get_findings",
      "mcp__searchcode__code_find_usages"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as searchcode. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__searchcode__code_analyze private-data
  • mcp__searchcode__code_search private-data
  • mcp__searchcode__code_get_file private-data
  • mcp__searchcode__code_file_tree private-data
  • mcp__searchcode__code_get_files private-data
  • mcp__searchcode__code_get_findings private-data
  • mcp__searchcode__code_find_usages private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.searchcode/mcp/verify?hash=351628a4e411fa143b205b719fd9541c884cbfe5dfb88e4667df68b6f8096987" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 351628a4e411, from Nov 14, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.searchcode/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.searchcode/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.searchcode/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.searchcode/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:04 UTC.

searchcode MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the searchcode MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, all of which only read, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the searchcode MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the searchcode MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the searchcode MCP server have?

7 tools: 7 read. code_analyze, code_search, code_get_file, code_file_tree, code_get_files, code_get_findings and code_find_usages.

Does the searchcode MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the searchcode MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the searchcode MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.