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catalogue MCP server

com.securesvault/cataloguesecuresvault.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Search 10,209 products for sale in euros and return buyable links with live prices.

3 tools: 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the catalogue MCP server can do

The catalogue MCP server is published by securesvault.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

3 tools read private data (search_products, get_product and list_categories).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_productRead one SecuresVault product in full: EUR price, description, and the colour/size variants available.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_product" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "vault": it reads secrets.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one SecuresVault product in full: EUR price, description, and the colour/size variants available. Takes the id returned by search_products. Use before describing a specific product to a user, so the price and options quoted are live rather than remembered.
  • list_categoriesList every SecuresVault category with its key, human label and live item count.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "vault": it reads secrets.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every SecuresVault category with its key, human label and live item count. Call this first whenever you intend to filter by category: the keys are the only values search_products accepts, and they are authoritative here rather than memorised.
  • search_productsFind physical products for sale on SecuresVault by free text and/or category, with live EUR prices and buyable links.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_products" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "vault": it reads secrets.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find physical products for sale on SecuresVault by free text and/or category, with live EUR prices and buyable links. Use when a user asks where to buy something, what something costs in euros, or wants product options in a category. Either query or category should be supplied; with neither you get the newest listings. Category must be a key from list_categories (e.g. "phone-tech"), never a human label - a label is silently ignored and you get the unfiltered catalogue back. Results carry a canonical url: give that to the user, never an API URL.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:46 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http catalogue https://securesvault.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http catalogue https://securesvault.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__catalogue__search_products",
      "mcp__catalogue__get_product",
      "mcp__catalogue__list_categories"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as catalogue. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__catalogue__search_products private-data
  • mcp__catalogue__get_product private-data
  • mcp__catalogue__list_categories private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.securesvault/catalogue/verify?hash=e882e0bd431cbf794c7390365f890c34c236283bf2219b079677a2992cef864a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e882e0bd431c, from Nov 14, 2026, 16:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.securesvault/catalogue/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.securesvault/catalogue
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.securesvault/catalogue.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.securesvault/catalogue)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:04 UTC.

catalogue MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the catalogue MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the catalogue MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the catalogue MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the catalogue MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 read. search_products, get_product and list_categories.

Does the catalogue MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the catalogue MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the catalogue MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.