SELISE Signature MCP server
com.selisesignature/signatureselisesignature.comstreamable-httpv0.4.2Scanned
Prepare and send documents for electronic signature with SELISE Signature.
4 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 2
- 9 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the SELISE Signature MCP server can do
The SELISE Signature MCP server is published by selisesignature.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: send_prepared_signature_document and prepare_and_send_free_signature_document) and create or change data (1 tool: prepare_free_signature_document). 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (get_signature_document_status); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (prepare_free_signature_document, send_prepared_signature_document and prepare_and_send_free_signature_document); 2 tools can send data out of your system (send_prepared_signature_document and prepare_and_send_free_signature_document). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 9 findings (credentials-mention and long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.4.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
prepare_and_send_free_signature_documentPrepare a NEW free-signature document from one PDF, add placements, and send it in one workflow.Reads text others writeCan send data out3 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_and_send_free_signature_document" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "prepare_and_send_free_signature_document" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.storageFileId.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.storageFileId.description: "...cessible using this server's configured credentials. It is not a documentId, client-specifi..."
- Info
The description is 6,499 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...dentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments."
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare a NEW free-signature document from one PDF, add placements, and send it in one workflow. Accept Base64, a public HTTPS download URL, an existing SELISE storage file ID, a reference from the binary upload endpoint, or a ChatGPT attachment through chatgptFile. Uploads new bytes or reuses the existing storage file. Use only when sending is requested and all participant details and actual PDF placements are known. For an already prepared document, use send_prepared_signature_document instead. This tool does not itself sign the PDF. Provide exactly ONE file source: documentBase64 (raw standard Base64), documentUrl (public HTTPS PDF download URL, including a temporary signed URL), storageFileId (an existing SELISE storage PDF accessible to this server), uploadId (the exact short-lived reference returned by this server's HTTP POST /uploads), or chatgptFile (the host-provided file object for a PDF attached in ChatGPT). chatgptFile is exclusively for ChatGPT's attachment integration. Use it only when ChatGPT supplies the attachment object through openai/fileParams, including its download_url and file_id. Other clients, including Claude and Gemini, must not use this field or construct an equivalent object. They must use documentBase64, documentUrl, storageFileId, or uploadId, according to the file access available to them. If no supported source is available, ask the user for one; never fabricate file content, URLs, or identifiers. Do not combine sources, invent file content or IDs, or pass local paths to the server. A bare ChatGPT attachment ID is not a documentUrl or storageFileId. For binary upload, POST multipart/form-data with one file part named file to /uploads on this server's HTTP deployment, then use the returned uploadId before expiresAt; uploading does not prepare or send a document. Raw application/pdf uploads with a fileName query parameter are also accepted. The uploadId is valid for one hour; keep it private. Source PDFs are validated consistently. documentUrl must return PDF bytes without additional authentication headers; the server does not use browser cookies, login pages, or private-network URLs. It follows at most three public HTTPS redirects. Storage files and upload references are reused without a second upload. Supply fileName ending in .pdf and the normal preparation fields for every method. A file reference is not a documentId and does not mean preparation has completed. Maximum actual PDF size for every source on this server: 26214400 bytes, excluding Base64 encoding or multipart overhead. PDFs must be readable, unencrypted, and have supported page geometry. File-source retrieval and validation happen before preparation. Never fabricate file content. ownerEmail must match one of the signatories' emails. Signatory emails must be unique (case-insensitive). Provide a positive integer signingOrder for every signatory or omit it for all; role defaults to signer. Ask for missing participant details; do not invent people or change their intended roles to satisfy validation. Role values and behavior: signer signs the contract; reviewer is a view-only participant who can see the contract but has no action to perform; approver reviews and approves the contract without signing. Map a requested viewer to reviewer, and a requested reviewer who must approve to approver. The literal value viewer is not accepted. If the intended action is unclear, ask before choosing a role. Set coordinateSystem to page_percent. ALL field types use the same page-relative percentages: (0,0) is the top-left of the visible page, x increases rightward, y increases downward; 100 is the full page width or height, not 1. pageNumber is zero-based (0 is the first page). x/width are percentages of page width; y/height are percentages of page height. Positions must be >= 0, sizes > 0, x + width <= 100 and y + height <= 100. Example: x=10,y=80,width=30,height=10 starts 10% from the left and 80% from the top, covering 30% of page width and 10% of its height. The server reads each PDF page and handles backend units and field-specific conversions. Do not supply pixels, PDF points, or backend coordinates, or guess a placement from an unrelated image. Use the actual visible page and the user's intended field location. Unrepresentable placements, unreadable PDFs, 180-degree rotated placement pages, and text fields on rotated/cropped pages are rejected before sending; provide a flattened PDF if requested by the error. Provide at least one signatureCoordinates entry; optional coordinate arrays default to empty. Every coordinate's signatoryEmail must identify a participant in this document. Every signatory with role signer (including the default role) must have at least one signatureCoordinates entry, and every signature coordinate email must appear in signatories. The reviewer (view-only) and approver (approval without signing) roles do not sign and are not subject to this MCP signer-coverage check; do not invent signature placements for them. Every coordinate array applies to the selected source PDF. If placements are missing, obtain them; use prepare_free_signature_document only when preparation alone is intended. Returns sent when rollout succeeds, or pending when accepted but unconfirmed. sent does not mean completed signing. A failed combined workflow may already have uploaded or prepared a document; inspect its status before choosing a follow-up action. Keep returned documentId, fileId, operationId, and trackingId when present. pending means accepted but completion is unconfirmed: check get_signature_document_status with documentId instead of resubmitting. UNKNOWN_OUTCOME, a timeout, or a lost response may follow a successful submission; do not automatically repeat a preparation or send call. Inspect status when an ID is available; an empty status list does not make a retry safe. SIGNATURE_LIMIT_REACHED means the backend rejected sending because the signature quota is exhausted: explain the returned message … [499 more characters not shown]
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
send_prepared_signature_documentAdd field placements to an EXISTING prepared free-signature document and send it to its participants.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_prepared_signature_document" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "send_prepared_signature_document" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
- Info
The description is 3,847 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...dentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments."
Description, as the server wrote it Add field placements to an EXISTING prepared free-signature document and send it to its participants. This tool does not upload, prepare, or itself sign a document. Use only when sending is requested and preparation is confirmed; for a pending preparation, check status first. Reuse the matching documentId and fileId from preparation. All coordinate arrays apply to that single PDF and must refer to its existing participants. The server downloads the current PDF to read page dimensions for conversion; it does not discover intended field locations or retrieve participants. Obtain the participants and intended placements before calling. This tool uses only the prepared document's fileId, not documentBase64, documentUrl, storageFileId, uploadId, or chatgptFile. Maximum downloaded PDF size: 26214400 bytes. To start a new document from any of the five file sources, use a preparation tool instead. Set coordinateSystem to page_percent. ALL field types use the same page-relative percentages: (0,0) is the top-left of the visible page, x increases rightward, y increases downward; 100 is the full page width or height, not 1. pageNumber is zero-based (0 is the first page). x/width are percentages of page width; y/height are percentages of page height. Positions must be >= 0, sizes > 0, x + width <= 100 and y + height <= 100. Example: x=10,y=80,width=30,height=10 starts 10% from the left and 80% from the top, covering 30% of page width and 10% of its height. The server reads each PDF page and handles backend units and field-specific conversions. Do not supply pixels, PDF points, or backend coordinates, or guess a placement from an unrelated image. Use the actual visible page and the user's intended field location. Unrepresentable placements, unreadable PDFs, 180-degree rotated placement pages, and text fields on rotated/cropped pages are rejected before sending; provide a flattened PDF if requested by the error. Provide at least one signatureCoordinates entry; optional coordinate arrays default to empty. Every coordinate's signatoryEmail must identify a participant in this document. Role values and behavior: signer signs the contract; reviewer is a view-only participant who can see the contract but has no action to perform; approver reviews and approves the contract without signing. Map a requested viewer to reviewer, and a requested reviewer who must approve to approver. The literal value viewer is not accepted. If the intended action is unclear, ask before choosing a role. Returns sent when rollout succeeds, or pending when accepted but unconfirmed. sent means dispatched for signing, not that all participants have signed; use the status tool for completed. Do not send again after sending_success or completed, or while a previous send is pending. Keep returned documentId, fileId, operationId, and trackingId when present. pending means accepted but completion is unconfirmed: check get_signature_document_status with documentId instead of resubmitting. UNKNOWN_OUTCOME, a timeout, or a lost response may follow a successful submission; do not automatically repeat a preparation or send call. Inspect status when an ID is available; an empty status list does not make a retry safe. SIGNATURE_LIMIT_REACHED means the backend rejected sending because the signature quota is exhausted: explain the returned message to the user and do not retry sending or create another document to bypass the limit. INVALID_REQUEST means inputs need correction; REQUEST_FAILED gives a referenceId for diagnosis. If the cause is unclear, ask for clarification or use the referenceId rather than guessing. Repeating a preparation can create another document. Use only the declared fields. Ask for missing facts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
prepare_free_signature_documentPrepare a NEW free-signature document from one PDF without sending it.Reads text others write3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.storageFileId.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.storageFileId.description: "...cessible using this server's configured credentials. It is not a documentId, client-specifi..."
- Info
The description is 4,760 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...dentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments."
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare a NEW free-signature document from one PDF without sending it. Accept Base64, a public HTTPS download URL, an existing SELISE storage file ID, a reference from the binary upload endpoint, or a ChatGPT attachment through chatgptFile. New bytes are uploaded; existing storage/upload references are reused. Use when preparation is requested or placements are not ready; do not call again for an existing or pending document. Provide exactly ONE file source: documentBase64 (raw standard Base64), documentUrl (public HTTPS PDF download URL, including a temporary signed URL), storageFileId (an existing SELISE storage PDF accessible to this server), uploadId (the exact short-lived reference returned by this server's HTTP POST /uploads), or chatgptFile (the host-provided file object for a PDF attached in ChatGPT). chatgptFile is exclusively for ChatGPT's attachment integration. Use it only when ChatGPT supplies the attachment object through openai/fileParams, including its download_url and file_id. Other clients, including Claude and Gemini, must not use this field or construct an equivalent object. They must use documentBase64, documentUrl, storageFileId, or uploadId, according to the file access available to them. If no supported source is available, ask the user for one; never fabricate file content, URLs, or identifiers. Do not combine sources, invent file content or IDs, or pass local paths to the server. A bare ChatGPT attachment ID is not a documentUrl or storageFileId. For binary upload, POST multipart/form-data with one file part named file to /uploads on this server's HTTP deployment, then use the returned uploadId before expiresAt; uploading does not prepare or send a document. Raw application/pdf uploads with a fileName query parameter are also accepted. The uploadId is valid for one hour; keep it private. Source PDFs are validated consistently. documentUrl must return PDF bytes without additional authentication headers; the server does not use browser cookies, login pages, or private-network URLs. It follows at most three public HTTPS redirects. Storage files and upload references are reused without a second upload. Supply fileName ending in .pdf and the normal preparation fields for every method. A file reference is not a documentId and does not mean preparation has completed. Maximum actual PDF size for every source on this server: 26214400 bytes, excluding Base64 encoding or multipart overhead. PDFs must be readable, unencrypted, and have supported page geometry. File-source retrieval and validation happen before preparation. Never fabricate file content. ownerEmail must match one of the signatories' emails. Signatory emails must be unique (case-insensitive). Provide a positive integer signingOrder for every signatory or omit it for all; role defaults to signer. Ask for missing participant details; do not invent people or change their intended roles to satisfy validation. Role values and behavior: signer signs the contract; reviewer is a view-only participant who can see the contract but has no action to perform; approver reviews and approves the contract without signing. Map a requested viewer to reviewer, and a requested reviewer who must approve to approver. The literal value viewer is not accepted. If the intended action is unclear, ask before choosing a role. No coordinates are needed for this tool. Returns prepared only after preparation is confirmed, or pending after acceptance without confirmation. prepared does not mean sent or signed. Once prepared (or preparation_success is observed), use send_prepared_signature_document with the returned documentId/fileId and verified placements when sending is requested. Keep returned documentId, fileId, operationId, and trackingId when present. pending means accepted but completion is unconfirmed: check get_signature_document_status with documentId instead of resubmitting. UNKNOWN_OUTCOME, a timeout, or a lost response may follow a successful submission; do not automatically repeat a preparation or send call. Inspect status when an ID is available; an empty status list does not make a retry safe. SIGNATURE_LIMIT_REACHED means the backend rejected sending because the signature quota is exhausted: explain the returned message to the user and do not retry sending or create another document to bypass the limit. INVALID_REQUEST means inputs need correction; REQUEST_FAILED gives a referenceId for diagnosis. If the cause is unclear, ask for clarification or use the referenceId rather than guessing. Repeating a preparation can create another document. Use only the declared fields. Ask for missing facts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_signature_document_statusRead document status events once using an actual documentId UUID.Reads private data1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_signature_document_status" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_signature_document_status" says "get" and "document": it reads documents.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "document": it reads documents.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
Description, as the server wrote it Read document status events once using an actual documentId UUID. Use to check progress after preparation/sending, especially pending or UNKNOWN_OUTCOME. Does not upload, prepare, send, sign, or continuously poll. Returns {statuses: [...]} containing only distinct observed values: preparation_success (preparation succeeded), preparation_failed (preparation failed), sending_success (dispatch succeeded, not completed signing), sending_failed (dispatch failed), completed (document completion recorded). These are historical observations, not one current state. Success and failure can both appear; array order does not establish chronology. An empty list means no recognized events were returned: it does not prove existence, failure, completion, or that resubmission is safe. Other events, including cancellation, expiration, and individual-signer progress, are omitted; this is not a complete lifecycle report. Returns no timestamps, signer details, download URLs, or signing links. Request/authentication failures return an error, not an empty status list. If polling is needed, space checks by at least 3 seconds and avoid concurrent polling of the same document. A status check does not authorize retrying a state-changing tool. Use only the declared fields. Ask for missing facts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__signature__get_signature_document_status"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:46 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (2 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://signaturemcp.selise.biz/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including send_prepared_signature_document (destructive), prepare_and_send_free_signature_document (destructive), prepare_free_signature_document (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
The input schema at properties.storageFileId.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.storageFileId.description: "...cessible using this server's configured credentials. It is not a documentId, client-specifi..."
The description is 4,760 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...dentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments."
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
The description is 3,847 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...dentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments."
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
Show 3 more findingsShow fewer
The input schema at properties.storageFileId.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.storageFileId.description: "...cessible using this server's configured credentials. It is not a documentId, client-specifi..."
The description is 6,499 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...dentials are configured on the server and must not be included in tool arguments."
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ts instead of inventing values. Service credentials are configured on the server and must n..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:prepare_and_send_free_signature_documentDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:prepare_free_signature_documentChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:send_prepared_signature_documentDeletes or cancelsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 0.4.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http signature https://signaturemcp.selise.biz/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http signature https://signaturemcp.selise.biz/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__signature__get_signature_document_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__signature__prepare_free_signature_document"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__signature__send_prepared_signature_document",
"mcp__signature__prepare_and_send_free_signature_document"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as signature. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__signature__prepare_free_signature_document untrusted-input
- mcp__signature__send_prepared_signature_document untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__signature__prepare_and_send_free_signature_document untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__signature__get_signature_document_status private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.selisesignature/signature/verify?hash=6a604aab7139e7b4b9686faa57eec1240ab25fb7a5174ca941ce2fbcb12de9ff" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6a604aab7139, from Nov 9, 2026, 09:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.selisesignature/signature/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.selisesignature/signature)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
SELISE Signature MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the SELISE Signature MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 9 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the SELISE Signature MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: send_prepared_signature_document and prepare_and_send_free_signature_document.
Can the SELISE Signature MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the SELISE Signature MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 destructive, 1 write, 1 read. send_prepared_signature_document, prepare_and_send_free_signature_document, prepare_free_signature_document and get_signature_document_status.
Does the SELISE Signature MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the SELISE Signature MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_prepared_signature_document and prepare_and_send_free_signature_document.
Has the SELISE Signature MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.