SigmaJunction MCP server
com.sigmajunction/sitesigmajunction.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Software engineering firm in Serbia: services, engagement models, articles - and send an inquiry.
7 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the SigmaJunction MCP server can do
The SigmaJunction MCP server is published by sigmajunction.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_inquiry) and create or change data (1 tool: request_partner_checklist), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_company_profile); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (read_page, send_inquiry and request_partner_checklist); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_inquiry). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
send_inquirySend a project inquiry to SigmaJunction on the user's behalf.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_inquiry" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "send_inquiry" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a project inquiry to SigmaJunction on the user's behalf. Only use when the user has asked to contact SigmaJunction, and confirm the name, email and message with them first. A partner replies by email within one business day.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
request_partner_checklistEmail the user SigmaJunction's two-page checklist for choosing a software development partner (PDF).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_partner_checklist" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Email the user SigmaJunction's two-page checklist for choosing a software development partner (PDF). Only use when the user asked for it and gave their email address. Newsletter sign-up only if the user explicitly wants it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_company_profileWho SigmaJunction is: practices, engagement models, how engagements start, markets, languages and contact details.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_company_profile" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "contact": it reads contacts.
Description, as the server wrote it Who SigmaJunction is: practices, engagement models, how engagements start, markets, languages and contact details.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_engagement_modelsHow working with SigmaJunction is priced: dedicated team, per project with milestone billing, or an equity partnership; plus the cost guide and the free diagnosis.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_engagement_models" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it How working with SigmaJunction is priced: dedicated team, per project with milestone billing, or an equity partnership; plus the cost guide and the free diagnosis.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_articlesSigmaJunction's articles (title, summary, date, link), newest first, optionally filtered by a search term.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_articles" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it SigmaJunction's articles (title, summary, date, link), newest first, optionally filtered by a search term.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_servicesSigmaJunction's three practices and their capabilities, with links to each service page.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it SigmaJunction's three practices and their capabilities, with links to each service page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
read_pageAny page of sigmajunction.com as Markdown, by path ("/pricing", "/de/work") or by full URL on sigmajunction.com.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_page" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Any page of sigmajunction.com as Markdown, by path ("/pricing", "/de/work") or by full URL on sigmajunction.com.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__site__send_inquiry"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:47 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://sigmajunction.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including send_inquiry (irreversible), request_partner_checklist (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http site https://sigmajunction.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http site https://sigmajunction.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__site__get_company_profile",
"mcp__site__list_services",
"mcp__site__get_engagement_models",
"mcp__site__read_page",
"mcp__site__list_articles"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__site__send_inquiry",
"mcp__site__request_partner_checklist"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as site. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__site__get_company_profile private-data
- mcp__site__read_page untrusted-input
- mcp__site__send_inquiry untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__site__request_partner_checklist untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.sigmajunction/site/verify?hash=13e94ab73de18d7426dddf867a14e13a5d63beacee7a44e68f68281908aa7677" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 13e94ab73de1, from Nov 14, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.sigmajunction/site/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.sigmajunction/site)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:04 UTC.
SigmaJunction MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the SigmaJunction MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the SigmaJunction MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the SigmaJunction MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_inquiry.
What tools does the SigmaJunction MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 5 read. send_inquiry, request_partner_checklist, get_company_profile, list_services, get_engagement_models, read_page and list_articles.
Does the SigmaJunction MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the SigmaJunction MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_inquiry.
Has the SigmaJunction MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.