Skip to content

Skillforge Render API MCP server

com.skillforge99/render-apiskillforge99.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Screenshot, PDF, OG-image, and page extraction (markdown/JSON) over MCP. Bearer key or x402.

4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Skillforge Render API MCP server can do

The Skillforge Render API MCP server is published by skillforge99.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (screenshot_url) and create or change data (2 tools: render_pdf and render_og), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (screenshot_url, render_pdf, render_og and 1 more); 3 tools can send data out of your system (screenshot_url, render_pdf and extract_page).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • screenshot_urlCapture a screenshot image of a public web page or an inline HTML snippet, rendered in a real headless browser (JS, CSS, and web fonts execute).Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "capture": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "capture" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "screenshot_url" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Capture a screenshot image of a public web page or an inline HTML snippet, rendered in a real headless browser (JS, CSS, and web fonts execute). Returns a PNG/JPEG/WEBP image. Use this to visually preview a page, generate a thumbnail, or archive how a URL looked at a point in time.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • render_ogRender an inline HTML snippet to a social-share (Open Graph) image sized for link previews, defaulting to the standard 1200x630 OG dimensions.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Render an inline HTML snippet to a social-share (Open Graph) image sized for link previews, defaulting to the standard 1200x630 OG dimensions. Use this to generate og:image assets for blog posts, products, or share cards without hand-designing an image.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • render_pdfRender a public web page or an inline HTML snippet to a paginated PDF document, using a real headless browser (JS, CSS, and web fonts execute).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Render a public web page or an inline HTML snippet to a paginated PDF document, using a real headless browser (JS, CSS, and web fonts execute). Use this to turn a URL or HTML into a downloadable/printable PDF, e.g. an invoice, report, or saved article.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • extract_pageFetch a public web page and extract its content as either clean, readable markdown (the default) or as structured JSON fields matched against a caller-supplied schema.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a public web page and extract its content as either clean, readable markdown (the default) or as structured JSON fields matched against a caller-supplied schema. Use markdown mode to summarize or quote a page's text; use structured mode to pull specific named fields (e.g. price, title, author) out of a page's content.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:47 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://render.skillforge99.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including screenshot_url (irreversible), render_pdf (write), render_og (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "screenshot_url" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http render-api https://render.skillforge99.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http render-api https://render.skillforge99.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__render-api__screenshot_url",
      "mcp__render-api__render_pdf",
      "mcp__render-api__render_og",
      "mcp__render-api__extract_page"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as render-api. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__render-api__screenshot_url untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__render-api__render_pdf untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__render-api__render_og untrusted-input
  • mcp__render-api__extract_page untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.skillforge99/render-api/verify?hash=f537be4f3723302abb95e360f6f1c60ac5bfedd0c8b571b69a638c9e9e68ccec" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f537be4f3723, from Nov 14, 2026, 09:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.skillforge99/render-api/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.skillforge99/render-api
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.skillforge99/render-api.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.skillforge99/render-api)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:04 UTC.

Skillforge Render API MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Skillforge Render API MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Skillforge Render API MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Skillforge Render API MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: screenshot_url.

What tools does the Skillforge Render API MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read. screenshot_url, render_pdf, render_og and extract_page.

Does the Skillforge Render API MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Skillforge Render API MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): screenshot_url, render_pdf and extract_page.

Has the Skillforge Render API MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.