StatuteWire MCP server
com.statutewire/psvstatutewire.comstreamable-httpv3.1.0Scanned
US healthcare exclusion screening (OIG, SAM, state Medicaid) and state license checks. No PHI.
8 tools: 3 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the StatuteWire MCP server can do
The StatuteWire MCP server is published by statutewire.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: screen_practitioner, screen_roster and verify_receipt), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_receipt); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (screen_practitioner).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 3.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
screen_practitionerScreens one practitioner and returns state license status and board discipline flags (only for states that are live; sandbox keys get SAMPLE data for every state), identity check a…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Screens one practitioner and returns state license status and board discipline flags (only for states that are live; sandbox keys get SAMPLE data for every state), identity check against CMS NPPES, and exclusion screening (OIG LEIE, SAM.gov and the state Medicaid lists that are live), with an evidence receipt. Takes NPI + first name + last name + state; names that differ from the record block the result; they are not returned with a warning. The output lists which sources returned CLEAR and which did not. NOT_CHECKED and COULD_NOT_CHECK mean the source was not checked; they are not a clear result. Each call costs money: it counts as one lookup against the key's quota or prepaid balance (1 check), the same as GET /api/v1/sanctions. Not covered: states that are not live, licenses of staff without an NPI (use screen_roster), anything not on the official lists. A possible match is a finding for a person to confirm with the official source. Needs an API key (Authorization: Bearer sw_live_… or sw_test_…); without one it returns an error that points to how_to_get_access.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Screen one practitioner
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
screen_rosterAdds practitioners to the account's roster for monthly monitoring (up to 500 per call).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Adds practitioners to the account's roster for monthly monitoring (up to 500 per call). It adds rows only and does not delete or overwrite existing ones. It does not return screening results: results arrive with the next monitoring run and are read with get_receipt (roster_id + period). Each entry needs NPI + first name + last name. Quota or prepaid debit is applied as POST /api/v1/rosters/bulk applies it (one unit per newly enrolled license; duplicates and failures are free; prepaid live keys also need the enterprise deposit floor). Sandbox keys enrol sample data only; nothing is screened for real. Not covered: instant results, people without an NPI. Needs an API key (Authorization: Bearer sw_live_… or sw_test_…); without one it returns an error that points to how_to_get_access.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Add practitioners to monthly monitoring
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
verify_receiptChecks a StatuteWire receipt JSON (the whole file text or object): hash, canonical form, Ed25519 signature against StatuteWire's published key, and roster totals.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Checks a StatuteWire receipt JSON (the whole file text or object): hash, canonical form, Ed25519 signature against StatuteWire's published key, and roster totals. Free, not metered. VALID means the file is exactly as StatuteWire signed it; it does not say whether the practitioner is clean. A receipt signed with the SAMPLE key is reported as SAMPLE, not as valid. Needs an API key (Authorization: Bearer sw_live_… or sw_test_…); without one it returns an error that points to how_to_get_access.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify a signed receipt
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_coverageLists every exclusion source and every state license source with its status today: live, not live, or information only.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_coverage" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Lists every exclusion source and every state license source with its status today: live, not live, or information only. Needs no key, is free and returns no provider data. A source that is not listed as live is not checked, so the list shows what a screening result can and cannot cover.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Show source coverage
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_practitioner_historyThe append-only audit ledger of monitoring events for a practitioner on this account's roster (a practitioner screened or rostered by this key).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_practitioner_history" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The append-only audit ledger of monitoring events for a practitioner on this account's roster (a practitioner screened or rostered by this key). Free (rate limited). Not covered: practitioners not on your roster (404). Entries made from sample data stay labelled as sample data. Needs an API key (Authorization: Bearer sw_live_… or sw_test_…); without one it returns an error that points to how_to_get_access.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Show a practitioner's monitoring history
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_pricingReturns plans, monthly request quotas, prepaid credit packs and deposit floors, in cents and dollars.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_pricing" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns plans, monthly request quotas, prepaid credit packs and deposit floors, in cents and dollars. Needs no key, is free and returns no provider data.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Show pricing
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_receiptFetches a signed receipt as JSON: either a practitioner receipt by file name (the .json file name from a screening result, for a practitioner on your roster) or a monthly roster re…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "file": it reads files.
- private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetches a signed receipt as JSON: either a practitioner receipt by file name (the .json file name from a screening result, for a practitioner on your roster) or a monthly roster receipt (roster_id + period YYYY-MM, built from your latest complete run). Free (rate limited, not metered). A sandbox or non-production receipt is labelled as such or UNSIGNED and proves nothing; verify_receipt checks a receipt. Needs an API key (Authorization: Bearer sw_live_… or sw_test_…); without one it returns an error that points to how_to_get_access.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get a signed receipt
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
how_to_get_accessReturns how to get a sandbox key (sample data) and a live key, the sign-up URLs, and what each key returns.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "how_to_get_access" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns how to get a sandbox key (sample data) and a live key, the sign-up URLs, and what each key returns. Needs no key, is free and returns no provider data.
Annotations the server declares
- title: How to get an API key
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://statutewire.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_practitioner (write), screen_roster (write), verify_receipt (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff
- Changed:get_coverageOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:get_practitioner_historyOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:get_pricingOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:get_receiptOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:how_to_get_accessOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:screen_practitionerChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:screen_rosterChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:verify_receiptChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations
Install
Pinned to version 3.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http psv https://statutewire.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http psv https://statutewire.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__psv__get_coverage",
"mcp__psv__get_pricing",
"mcp__psv__how_to_get_access",
"mcp__psv__get_receipt",
"mcp__psv__get_practitioner_history"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__psv__screen_practitioner",
"mcp__psv__screen_roster",
"mcp__psv__verify_receipt"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as psv. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__psv__screen_practitioner untrusted-input
- mcp__psv__get_receipt private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.statutewire/psv/verify?hash=1d30a710e8f4725807bd410bd655694afea81611b896363713fd6f27239ef67b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1d30a710e8f4, from Nov 21, 2026, 01:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.statutewire/psv/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.statutewire/psv)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
StatuteWire MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the StatuteWire MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the StatuteWire MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the StatuteWire MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the StatuteWire MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 3 write, 5 read. screen_practitioner, screen_roster, verify_receipt, get_coverage, get_pricing, how_to_get_access, get_receipt and get_practitioner_history.
Does the StatuteWire MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the StatuteWire MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the StatuteWire MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 21, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.