StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server
com.storetechscan/storetechscanstoretechscan.comstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
Website tech stack + passive DNS, product prices & AI fit. 25 one-time trial.
7 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 1
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server can do
The StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server is published by storetechscan.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (claim_purchase) and create or change data (4 tools: inspect_domains, inspect_product_url, check_credits and buy_credits), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (inspect_domains); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (inspect_domains, inspect_product_url, get_inspection_results and 2 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (inspect_product_url). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
claim_purchasePoll a purchase created by buy_credits using the agent-held session_id and claim_token.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "claim_purchase" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Poll a purchase created by buy_credits using the agent-held session_id and claim_token. While ready is false, wait retry_after_seconds before retrying (up to 15 minutes). Once the human has paid, returns the API key for the agent to store securely and use in the MCP connection or REST Authorization header. Keep the claim token out of the browser; key retrieval can be retried from the same IP for 15 minutes after the first successful claim.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
buy_creditsCreate a one-time credit pack checkout for a human to pay in their browser.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a one-time credit pack checkout for a human to pay in their browser. Show only checkout_url to the human; keep session_id and claim_token with the agent and never put claim_token in a browser URL. After payment, poll claim_purchase every 10–15 seconds for up to 15 minutes. The API key appears only in the claim_purchase tool result, once with a 15-minute same-IP retry grace window. To top up an existing account, authenticate this MCP connection with its Bearer or X-API-Key header before calling.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
check_creditsCheck your StoreTechScan credit balance and recent ledger transactions (when authenticated via Authorization: Bearer or X-API-Key HTTP header), or view the anonymous one-time 25-do…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check your StoreTechScan credit balance and recent ledger transactions (when authenticated via Authorization: Bearer or X-API-Key HTTP header), or view the anonymous one-time 25-domain free trial policy and pay-as-you-go pack pricing. Costs 0 credits.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check StoreTechScan Credits & Quota
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
inspect_domainsLive 4-stage enrichment for 1–25 unique domains per call: detects ecommerce platforms & marketing/support/pixel stack (Shopify, WooCommerce, Klaviyo, Gorgias, Recharge, Meta/TikTok…Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "inspect_domains" says "inspect": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "inspect_domains" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "inspect_domains" says "inspect": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Live 4-stage enrichment for 1–25 unique domains per call: detects ecommerce platforms & marketing/support/pixel stack (Shopify, WooCommerce, Klaviyo, Gorgias, Recharge, Meta/TikTok Pixel, GA4), samples public Shopify /products.json catalog counts & native-currency min/median/max prices, scores 1.0–5.0 ICP prospect fit + active-merchant check + wholesale/B2B signal, and extracts public same-domain role emails (hello@, sales@) & social URLs. Pass multiple domains together in one array rather than calling 1 domain at a time. Paid mode (via HTTP header Authorization: Bearer zsk_live_... or X-API-Key) debits 1 credit per reachable billable domain ($0 for DNS/TLS/timeout/5xx/429/WAF failures), enables calibrated AI ICP scoring, and returns a durable job_id recoverable via get_inspection_results.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Inspect Ecommerce & Company Domains
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
inspect_product_urlProbe 1–10 public Shopify, WooCommerce, BigCommerce, or Schema.org DTC product URLs for live title, brand, native currency, price, compare-at price, variants, and explicit public a…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "inspect_product_url" says "inspect": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "inspect_product_url" says "inspect" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "inspect_product_url" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "inspect_product_url" says "inspect": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Probe 1–10 public Shopify, WooCommerce, BigCommerce, or Schema.org DTC product URLs for live title, brand, native currency, price, compare-at price, variants, and explicit public available: true/false status. Unreachable, rate-limited, or WAF-blocked URLs return billable: false ($0). Paid mode (via HTTP header Authorization: Bearer zsk_live_... or X-API-Key) debits 1 credit per reachable billable domain ($0 for DNS/TLS/timeout/5xx/429/WAF failures), enables calibrated AI ICP scoring, and returns a durable job_id recoverable via get_inspection_results.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Inspect Live Ecommerce Product URL
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_ecommerce_benchmark_2026Retrieve empirical benchmark findings across 235 deduplicated real storefronts comparing unpaced burst HTTP (29.4% reachability, 155 HTTP 429s) vs.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_ecommerce_benchmark_2026" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve empirical benchmark findings across 235 deduplicated real storefronts comparing unpaced burst HTTP (29.4% reachability, 155 HTTP 429s) vs. paced inspection (92.8% reachability, 95.9% cohort consistency, 100% zero-drift native-currency price medians). Costs 0 credits.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get 2026 Ecommerce Tech & Rate-Limit Benchmark
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_inspection_resultsRetrieve saved results for a previously submitted StoreTechScan job_id (from inspect_domains or web workspace) at 0 credit cost.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_inspection_results" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve saved results for a previously submitted StoreTechScan job_id (from inspect_domains or web workspace) at 0 credit cost. Useful if a network connection dropped during an inspection.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Retrieve Saved Inspection Batch Results
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
5 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__storetechscan__inspect_product_url"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://storetechscan.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including claim_purchase (irreversible), inspect_domains (write), inspect_product_url (write), check_credits (write), buy_credits (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warninspect_domains
The server marks "inspect_domains" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "inspect_domains" says "inspect": a word for reading.
The server marks "inspect_product_url" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "inspect_product_url" says "inspect": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http storetechscan https://storetechscan.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http storetechscan https://storetechscan.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__storetechscan__get_inspection_results",
"mcp__storetechscan__get_ecommerce_benchmark_2026"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__storetechscan__inspect_domains",
"mcp__storetechscan__inspect_product_url",
"mcp__storetechscan__check_credits",
"mcp__storetechscan__buy_credits",
"mcp__storetechscan__claim_purchase"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as storetechscan. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__storetechscan__inspect_domains private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__storetechscan__inspect_product_url untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__storetechscan__get_inspection_results untrusted-input
- mcp__storetechscan__buy_credits untrusted-input
- mcp__storetechscan__get_ecommerce_benchmark_2026 untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.storetechscan/storetechscan/verify?hash=b1ebbbed1b9a67edd50aba916518e4fe8436a6d1c0d2331841db2ba75f15cceb" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b1ebbbed1b9a, from Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.storetechscan/storetechscan/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.storetechscan/storetechscan)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: claim_purchase.
What tools does the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read. claim_purchase, inspect_domains, inspect_product_url, check_credits, buy_credits, get_inspection_results and get_ecommerce_benchmark_2026.
Does the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): inspect_product_url.
Has the StoreTechScan — Ecommerce & Website Tech Stack API MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.