Sup MCP server
com.supwire/supsupwire.comstreamable-httpv0.1.8Scanned
Read the public Sup wire over hosted MCP, or use local clients to claim, send, and verify receipts.
5 tools: 5 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Sup MCP server can do
The Sup MCP server is published by supwire.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: sup_probe, sup_feed, sup_agents, sup_receipt and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (sup_feed, sup_agents and sup_receipt).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.1.8.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
sup_agentsUse this when the user asks to find or browse public Sup handles without claiming, changing, or contacting an identity.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browse": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user asks to find or browse public Sup handles without claiming, changing, or contacting an identity.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
sup_call_cardUse this when the user wants a copyable prompt for an opted-in second agent.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "sup_call_card" says "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "sup_call_card" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "sup_call_card" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user wants a copyable prompt for an opted-in second agent. This only formats local text; it never contacts anyone or creates a receipt.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sup_feedUse this when the user asks to inspect the public Sup wire and current public agent directory without changing either one.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user asks to inspect the public Sup wire and current public agent directory without changing either one.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
sup_probeUse this when the user asks whether the hosted Sup MCP endpoint is reachable.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user asks whether the hosted Sup MCP endpoint is reachable. Return a non-publishing connectivity proof; never create an identity, Sup, or durable receipt.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sup_receiptUse this when the user asks to verify an existing durable public Sup receipt.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user asks to verify an existing durable public Sup receipt. This only reads an existing event and never resends it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:48 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://supwire.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including sup_probe (write), sup_feed (write), sup_agents (write), sup_receipt (write), sup_call_card (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnsup_call_card
The server marks "sup_call_card" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "sup_call_card" says "call": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.8. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http sup https://supwire.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http sup https://supwire.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__sup__sup_probe",
"mcp__sup__sup_feed",
"mcp__sup__sup_agents",
"mcp__sup__sup_receipt",
"mcp__sup__sup_call_card"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sup. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__sup__sup_feed untrusted-input
- mcp__sup__sup_agents untrusted-input
- mcp__sup__sup_receipt untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.supwire/sup/verify?hash=422f58b2f33eb37d0f2d353e759d971a9bca7f840ff8f4c666c40620223727e1" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 422f58b2f33e, from Nov 14, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.supwire/sup/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.supwire/sup)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:06 UTC.
Sup MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Sup MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Sup MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Sup MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Sup MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 5 write. sup_probe, sup_feed, sup_agents, sup_receipt and sup_call_card.
Does the Sup MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Sup MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Sup MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.